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This volume offers a sample of the work on the theme Restricted linguistic 
systems as windows on language genesis done by a research group at the 
Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study (NIAS) in the 2005-2006 academic 
year. A central concern of the group was to investigate facets of the evolution 
of language – as one of the forms of language genesis – by adopting what has 
come to be known as the "Windows Approach". Two ideas are fundamental to 
this approach: the recognition that no direct evidence of the evolution of 
language has survived, and the working assumption that at least some facets of 
the evolution of language can be studied by investigating other phenomena 
about which there is direct evidence. The group pursued in depth the idea that 
linguistic systems which are restricted in terms of formal means and functions 
can legitimately serve as "windows" on language evolution. In particular, the 
group examined the "window" potential of pidgins and related contact varieties, 
of the linguistic systems acquired naturally by adults learning a second 
language, of homesigns and other sign language systems and, finally, of early 
non-grammaticalized language as well. 
All chapters in this volume arise from extensive additional work on draft 
articles or papers presented at conferences. Chapter 1 outlines the conceptual 
framework employed in various other chapters; it can, accordingly, be used as 
an introduction to them. In addition, each chapter includes an Abstract that 
provides a good idea of what it is about. Many of the outcomes of the work by 
group members have been or will be published elsewhere in the form of 
articles, chapters of books, and full-length monographs. Details of such further 
publications are to hand in the references supplied in various chapters.  
Without the generous support, financial and otherwise, given by NIAS, it 
would not have been possible for the members of the group to work on the 
"windows" project, either individually or collectively. On behalf of all group 
members, too, we would like to express our gratitude to the NIAS management 
and staff for the numerous ways in which they contributed to making our stay 
in Wassenaar so productive and pleasant. Last, but by no means least, we are 
most grateful to Connie Park for the professional way in which she has gone 
about compiling and reformatting the manuscript of this volume. 
 
Rudolf Botha, Stellenbosch/Utrecht 
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1. What are windows on language evolution? 
Rudolf  Botha 
Stellenbosch University and Utrecht University 
Abstract 
This chapter offers an elucidation of the idea that certain phenomena provide 
windows on language evolution. Non-metaphorically, such windows are shown 
to be conceptual constructs used for making inferences about aspects of 
language evolution from data or assumptions about properties of phenomena 
other than language evolution. Putative windows need to meet certain 
conditions to ensure that the inferences allowed by them are properly grounded, 
are warranted and are pertinent. Windows are shown, moreover, to vary in the 
nature of the inferential step for which they provide, in the purposes for which 
they are used and in the ways in which they are used. From the perspective of 
these differences, windows are seen to belong to different types: correlate 
windows, analogue windows and abduction windows. The heuristic potential of 
the Windows Approach lies not only in its ability to allow the drawing of non-
arbitrary inferences about language evolution, but also in its ability to stimulate 
in-depth empirical work on the phenomena from whose properties those 
inferences are drawn. Throughout the chapter, general points are illustrated 
with examples drawn from the respective putative windows based on pidgin 
languages, on Middle Stone Age shell beads and symbolic behaviour, and on 
similarities between modern language and music.  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Accounts of the evolution of human language have to overcome a formidable 
obstacle. Such accounts, by their very nature, express claims about why, when, 
where or how human language emerged and/or developed in a distant past. But 
there is no direct evidence about the events and other factors that may or may 
not have been involved in the first emergence and subsequent development of 
language in our species. In modern work on language evolution, however, 
various approaches have been adopted for overcoming the obstacle posed by 
this paucity of direct evidence. One of these is known as the 'Windows 
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Approach'.1 It proceeds from the assumption that language evolution can be 
insightfully studied by examining other phenomena about which there is direct 
evidence. These other phenomena are taken to offer windows on language 
evolution. Thus, it has been contended that features of language evolution can 
be 'seen' by 'looking at' it through windows offered by phenomena such as 
fossil skulls, ancestral brains, prehistoric symbols or symbolic behaviour, 
prehistoric sea-crossings, modern music and song, so-called language genes, 
and modern motherese. And in the view of various linguists, certain restricted 
linguistic systems – specifically pidgin languages, homesign systems used by 
deaf children of non-signing parents, the linguistic systems acquired naturally 
by adult second-language learners, non-grammaticalised early language and 
agrammatic aphasic language – provide windows on language evolution that 
have considerable heuristic potential.2 This view is expressed in various 
contributions to this volume, too, including Benazzo (this volume), De Swart 
(this volume), and Roberge (this volume). 
So what are they – these windows on language evolution? On the whole, 
it must be frankly admitted, their nature and properties are in various respects 
less than well understood. This is why the present chapter will take up the 
following questions: 
 
(1) (a) What kind of objects are windows on language evolution? 
 (b) What is it that determines how good an individual window on 
language evolution is? 
 (c) What are the main types of windows that have been used in the study 
of language evolution? 
 (d) Wherein lies the heuristic potential of the Windows Approach to 
language evolution? 
In discussing these questions, the article will draw on a considerable body of 
recent work, including work reported in (Botha, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 
2008a, 2008b, 2008c, to appear). 
Before turning to questions (1)(a)-(d), however, I have to clarify the 
compound concept of 'language evolution' that will be adopted below. As for 
its first constituent, the concept of 'language', this will be used restrictively to 
include (a) the capacity referred to by such expressions as 'the human language 
                                                  
1
 The other approaches to language evolution include the comparative approach (Hauser, 
Chomsky and Fitch, 2002; Fitch, Hauser and Chomsky, 2005) and computational simulation 
(Cangelosi and Parisi (Eds.), 2002; Perfors, 2002). 
2
 See, for example, Bakker (2003), Bickerton (1990, 1995, 1998), Heine (2003), Heine and 
Kuteva (2004), Jackendoff (1999, 2002), Klein (2001), Perdue (2003), Ragir (2002), Slobin 
(2002). 
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capacity' and 'the human language faculty', and (b) the systems referred to by 
such expressions as 'the first form of human language', 'ancestral language' and 
so on. Used in this way, the concept of 'language' does not include what has 
been referred to as 'speech' or 'mechanisms involved in speaking and listening'.3  
As for the concept of 'evolution' – the second constituent of 'language 
evolution' – I will likewise be using this in a restrictive way below: to include 
the processes or events referred to as (a) the 'origin, emergence or first 
appearance (of language in the human species)', and (b) the 'subsequent 
development of the first form of language into full language (in the human 
species)'. Used in this restrictive sense, the concept of 'language evolution' 
represents the phenomenon that has also been referred to as 'language 
phylogeny/phylogenesis'. And it accordingly excludes the processes or events 
making up what are known as 'historical or diachronic changes in full 
languages.'4  
 
1.2 Nature of windows 
What kind of objects, then, are windows on language evolution? In general 
terms, a phenomenon X is considered to offer a window on a distinct 
phenomenon Y if by 'looking at' X it is possible 'to see' something of Y. This 
point can be illustrated here with the aid of three putative windows on language 
evolution: 
The Shell-Bead-Symbol Window: By 'looking at' certain properties of a number 
of Middle Stone Age marine (tick) shells excavated at Blombos Cave (near 
Still Bay in South Africa), it can 'be seen' that the humans who inhabited the 
cave some 75,000 years ago had so-called fully syntactical language 
(Henshilwood et al., 2004: 204; d'Errico et al., 2004: 17-18; Botha, 2007b). To 
elucidate: The properties of the shells include physical ones such as the 
following: (i) the type of perforation in the shells is rare in nature and difficult 
to explain as the result of natural processes; (ii) the shells have flattened facets; 
(iii) four of the shells show microscopic traces of red ochre on their insides and 
                                                  
3
 For this restrictive concept of 'language', see for example, Klein (2001: 85-87). It is of course 
not maintained that speech or other linguistic entities do not have evolutionary histories of their 
own. For elaboration on this point, see Botha (to appear). 
4
 On Bickerton's (2007: 263) construal of this distinction, whereas language evolution is the 
process of biological evolution that yielded the language faculty, language change is the 
subsequent cultural recycling of variants possible in that faculty. For some other non-
evolutionary processes excluded from such restrictive concepts of '(language) evolution', see 
Botha (2006a: 132).  
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surfaces. These and other properties of the shells are taken to indicate that they 
were worn as beads in necklaces, a point to which we will return below. 
The Music Window: By 'looking at' certain similarities between modern 
language and music, it can 'be seen' that language and music evolved from a 
common precursor, referred to as 'musilanguage' (Brown, 2000: 272-273) or 
'Hmmmmm' (Mithen, 2005: 26; Botha, 2008c). To elucidate: As for the 
similarities between language and music: on Brown's (2000: 273-275) analysis, 
both music and language are characterised by 'phrase formation' which 
involves a limited number of discrete fundamental acoustic units, rules of 
combinatorial syntax, and rules of expressive phrasing. 
The Pidgin Window: By 'looking at' the order of constituents of pidgin 
language sentences, it can 'be seen', that the ancestral stage of language known 
as 'protolanguage' used Agent First and Focus Last as semantically based 
principles of linear ordering for its strings of elements (Bickerton, 1990: 187; 
Jackendoff, 1999: 275; Botha, 2006b).5 To elucidate: As a stage of ancestral 
language, protolanguage used arbitrary, meaningful symbols which were strung 
together in utterances that lacked any kind of syntactic structure (Calvin and 
Bickerton, 2000:  137, 257). Agent First is the ordering principle which says 
that in strings, Agent is expressed in the subject position. In terms of this 
principle, the string hit Fred tree means 'Fred hit the tree' and not 'the tree hit 
Fred'. Focus Last says that informationally focal elements appear last in a 
string. In accordance with this principle, in the utterance In the room sat a 
bear, the subject appears at the end for focal effect.  
To characterise windows on language evolution in terms of expressions 
such as 'looking at', 'seeing' and the like is to use metaphorical language, 
'windows' of course representing the root metaphor. So what would a window 
on language evolution be in non-metaphorical terms? In such terms, a window 
on language evolution is a conceptual construct for making inferences about 
language evolution. That is, to – metaphorically – 'see' a property of some 
aspect of language evolution by – metaphorically – 'looking at' a property of 
some other phenomenon is – non-metaphorically – to infer the first property 
from data or assumptions about the second property. The inferences drawn with 
the aid of windows on language evolution can, for ease of reference, be called 
'window inferences'. Similarly, the phenomena – MSA marine shells, pidgin 
                                                  
5
 Agent First is claimed to be used also (i) by the Basic Variety – which is an early stage in the 
untutored acquisition of a second language by adult learners; (ii) by homesign systems – which 
are systems of communicative gestures created spontaneously by deaf children who are not 
exposed to conventional spoken or signed language; and (iii) by the language of agrammatic 
aphasics  (Jackendoff, 1999: 275). 
 Botha     5 
languages, etc. – from whose properties such inferences proceed can be 
referred to as 'window phenomena'. 
Structurally, it is possible to draw a distinction between compound and 
non-compound windows on language evolution. In the case of a non-compound 
window, a single inferential step is taken in order to draw a conclusion about 
an aspect of language evolution from data or assumptions about a putative 
window phenomenon. Accordingly, the structure of a non-compound window 
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Figure 1.1: Basic structure of a non-compound window on language evolution 
 
The putative Pidgin Window referred to above represents a non-
compound window: starting from data or assumptions about properties of 
pidgins, a single step of inference leads to a conclusion about certain properties 
of protolanguage on accounts such as those by Bickerton (1990) and 
Jackendoff (1999) (see Botha, 2006b). Roberge (2008), however, holds an 
interesting different view of what can be seen through the Pidgin Window. 
The Shell-Bead-Symbol Window, by contrast, is a compound window, 
using a series of three inferential steps for getting from data or assumptions 
about MSA tick shells to a conclusion about the syntax of the humans who 
inhabited Blombos Cave some 75,000 years ago. That is, this window is 
formed by a chain of three non-compound windows.6 
 
The Shell Window: From data or assumptions about properties of a number of 
MSA tick shells, it is inferred that these shells were worn as beads by the 
humans who inhabited Blombos Caves some 75,000 years ago. To elucidate: 
Some of the (physical) properties of the tick shells have been mentioned above. 
                                                  
6
 For an alternative analysis in terms of which the chain is made up of two non-compound 
windows only, see Botha (2008a). 
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The Bead Window: From assumptions about the latter beads – or rather the 
beadworks of which they formed part – it is inferred that these humans engaged 
in symbolic behaviour. To elucidate: In terms of one of these assumptions, the 
beads were worn as personal ornaments.  
The Symbol Window: From assumptions about the symbolic behaviour of these 
humans, it is inferred that they had 'fully syntactical language'. To elucidate: In 
terms of a core assumption, the symbolic behaviour involved transmitting and 
sharing of symbolic meaning, an assumption to which I will return in section 
1.5 below. 
 
The Shell-Bead-Symbol Window, thus, instantiates the structure that can 



































Figure 1.2: Structure of the Shell-Bead-Symbol Window 
 
The Shell-Bead-Symbol Window shows that a distinction should be drawn 
between windows 'facing directly on to' language evolution and windows doing 
so indirectly only. The Symbol Window is an example of the former kind, 
making it a 'direct' window on language evolution. The Bead Window, by 
contrast, 'faces directly on to' MSA symbolic behaviour and the Shell Window 
on to MSA beads. This makes them 'indirect' windows on language evolution. 
Before considering question (1)(b), the idea of a window on language 
evolution needs to be clarified in two further ways. First, the expression 
'window on language evolution' has a more formal and a less formal use. More 
formally, it refers to constructs with the structure portrayed in figure 1.1, i.e., 
conceptual constructs made up of (minimally) three components – those 
indicated by A-C. Less formally, by contrast, the expression 'window on 
language evolution' has been used to refer to only the phenomenon or 
phenomena identified in box A; that is, in this second use, the expression refers 
to what may be called more accurately the 'window phenomenon' or 'window 
phenomena'. Note how this second use allows the phenomena – the fossil 
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skulls, the pidgins, motherese and so on – to be cryptically portrayed as 
themselves being the windows on language evolution. 
Second, a distinction has to be made between the expression 'window on 
language evolution' and the concept of 'window on language evolution'. The 
concept applies to any and all instances of an inference where a conclusion 
about an aspect of language evolution is drawn on the basis of data 
assumptions about a phenomenon that is distinct from language evolution. The 
latter data assumptions have conventionally been said to provide 'indirect 
evidence' for the claim about the former aspect of language evolution. Thus, to 
instantiate the concept of 'window on language evolution', an inferential device 
of the kind under consideration does not need to have been called a 'window on 
language evolution' in so many words. 
 
1.3 Conditions on individual windows 
Individual windows on language evolution have merit to the extent that they 
make it possible to draw non-arbitrary inferences about language evolution. To 
be non-arbitrary, the inferences need to meet a number of fundamental 
conditions, three of which will be considered below. The first – the 
Groundedness Condition – applies to the data or assumptions about the window 
phenomenon – represented in box A of figure 1.1 – from which the inference 
proceeds. This condition says that:  
 
(2) Inferences about language evolution need to be grounded in accurate 
data or non-arbitrary empirical assumptions about window phenomena 
that are well understood. 
 
It is clearly not possible to learn anything about language evolution from 
a phenomenon that is identified incorrectly, analysed superficially or 
understood poorly in some other way. 
But what does the Groundedness Condition involve in concrete terms? 
The Shell Window – i.e., the first constituent of the Shell-Bead-Symbol 
Window – satisfies the Groundedness Condition particularly well. That is, the 
inferential step allowed by it is grounded in data – about properties of MSA 
shells – that have been collected, analysed and appraised with great care by the 
team of archaeologists excavating Blombos Cave.7 The Music Window, by 
contrast, is rather problematic from the perspective of the Groundedness 
                                                  
7
 For particulars, see d'Errico et al. (2004) and Botha (2008a). The inferential steps provided for 
by the two other constituent windows – the Bead Window and the Symbol Window – are less 
well grounded, as has been argued by Botha (2008a). 
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Condition. The inference proceeds from what are claimed to be similarities 
between modern language and modern music. On closer analysis, however, the 
putative similarities turn out to be between speech and music, language having 
been erroneously identified with speech.8 Brown (2000: 273) maintains, for 
instance, that the discrete units of language are acoustic units and that the basic 
acoustic properties of language are modulated by expressive phrasing. As far as 
the grounding of the inferential step is concerned, the Pidgin Window is 
problematic too, being constructed with the aid of an insufficiently restrictive 
concept of 'pidgin language'. This concept refers to an internally 
undifferentiated range of contact varieties, including those that have been 
referred to as 'pre-pidgins', 'incipient pidgins', 'prototypical pidgins' and 
'elaborated' or 'expanded pidgins'. Prototypical and elaborated pidgins, 
however, are structurally too complex for their properties to provide a window 
on those of protolanguage.9  
For a window on language evolution to be able to meet the 
Groundedness Condition, then, the window phenomenon needs to be a well-
understood phenomenon. And most of the window phenomena from whose 
properties inferences have been drawn about language evolution cannot be 
understood by being subjected to direct observation or relatively simple forms 
of inspection. In empirical work, the only means of getting to understand 
phenomena such as prehistoric symbolic behaviour, ancestral brains, pidgin 
languages and modern language and music is to form non-arbitrarily 
appraisable theories about them. These theories – which may be called 
'grounder theories' – need to underpin (analyses of) the data or the assumptions 
from which window inferences are drawn.10 
The second fundamental condition to be met by windows on language 
evolution applies to their conclusions, in box C of figure 1.1. This condition – 
the Pertinence Condition – can be stated as (3). 
 
(3) Conclusions about language evolution need to be pertinent in being 
about (a) the 'right thing' and (b) the 'right process'. 
 
The 'right thing' here is language and not speech, language behaviour or 
some other linguistic entity. And the 'right process' is the evolution of language 
in the species and not processes of change – e.g., diachronic processes – to 
                                                  
8
 For further examples of Brown's attribution of properties of speech to language, see Botha 
(2008c). 
9
 For further discussion of the insufficiently restrictive nature of the concept of 'pidgin language' 
at issue, see Botha (2006b: 2-3, 10-11). 
10
 For further discussion of this point, see Botha (to appear). 
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which full languages are subject. The Pertinence Condition seems so obvious 
that it may seem hard to imagine how it will ever fail to be met. Yet, the 
literature contains many instances of conclusions about language evolution 
which fail the condition. Violations of subcase (a) result from conclusions 
which are about an entity that is not actually language or, worse, which are 
unclear as to what entity they are meant to be about. A common failing here is 
the confusion of language with speech, as is evidenced by Brown's conclusion 
that language and music had a common precursor.11 Violations of subcase (b) 
result from conclusions which are about a process that is not actually language 
evolution, or worse still, which are unclear as to what process they are meant to 
be about. For example, assuming without appropriate justification that 
conclusions about the historical process of grammaticalisation are statements 
about the (phylogenetic) process of language evolution would be a questionable 
step from the perspective of subcase (b).12 
To ensure that conclusions about language evolution are properly 
pertinent, they need to be underpinned by various theories. The first is a 
linguistic ontology: a theory giving a principled characterisation of the large-
scale linguistic entities that are believed to populate the linguistic domain. 
These entities include language, a language, the human language capacity or 
language faculty, tacit knowledge of language, language behaviour, speech and 
other modalities of language use, linguistic skill and so on.13 The second theory 
needed for underpinning conclusions about language evolution is one that 
draws, along the lines indicated in section 1.1 above, a principled distinction 
among the various processes of evolutionary and non-evolutionary change. 
The two theories considered above are not the only ones needed for 
underpinning conclusions about language evolution. This is illustrated by the 
conclusion that the humans who lived at Blombos Cave some 75,000 years ago 
had 'fully syntactical language'. This conclusion is empty if it is not clear what 
'fully syntactical language' is being assumed to be. In empirical work on 
language evolution, it simply is 'not on' for the substance of such an assumption 
to be arbitrarily stipulated by means of some simple definition.14 What is 
required, instead, is a principled theory of syntax. The point is indeed quite 
general: conclusions about the evolution of any component or aspect of 
                                                  
11
 For a discussion of various other instances of this failing, see Botha (2006a: 138-139; to 
appear). 
12
 For elaboration on this point, see Botha (to appear). 
13
 For a fuller characterization of what a linguistic ontology is a theory of, see Botha (to appear). 
14
 The need to underpin the conclusion in question with a principled theory of syntax and the 
consequences of the failure to do so are discussed in some depth in Botha (2008a, to appear). 
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language need to be underpinned by a principled theory of that component or 
aspect. 
The third fundamental condition for windows on language evolution 
applies to the inferential step represented by the arrow C in figure 1.1. This 
condition – the Warrantedness Condition – states that: 
 
(4) In empirical work, the inferential steps leading to some conclusion about 
what language evolution involved need to be suitably warranted or 
licensed. 
 
To see why this condition is needed, note that the following question 
arises about the inferential steps allowed for by all windows on language 
evolution: 'Why is it proper to infer properties about some aspect of language 
evolution from (data or assumptions about) properties of some window 
phenomenon?' For example: 'Why is it proper (i) to infer from properties of the 
symbolic behaviour of MSA humans that they had 'fully syntactical language'; 
(ii) to infer from putative similarities between modern 'language' and music that 
they had a common precursor; (iii) to infer from the fact that pidgin language 
sentences have a certain order of constituents that protolanguage strings had it 
too?' These questions ask for a warrant or license for the inferential steps in 
question. Such warrants cannot be stipulated; they need to take the form of 
bridge theories. A bridge theory is an empirical theory of how some specific 
phenomenon – e.g., MSA symbolic behaviour, pidgin languages, similarities 
between music and 'language' – is interlinked with a materially distinct 
phenomenon – e.g., an aspect of language evolution. The function of a bridge 
theory is, accordingly, to interrelate phenomena in two distinct ontological 
domains in a way that makes it possible to move inferentially from the one to 
the other.15 The inferential steps provided for by the Symbol Window, Music 
Window and Pidgin Window are still to be underpinned by explicitly stated and 
empirically justified bridge theories.16 These windows, that is, are still 'under 
construction'. 
 
The structure of non-compound windows has been merely represented 
skeletally in figure 1.1. From a consideration of three of the fundamental 
conditions to be met by non-compound windows, their structure has been 
shown to be more complex, incorporating as it does a layer of submerged 
theory too. More fully, the structure can now be represented by figure 1.3. 
 
                                                  
15
 On the need for and nature of bridge theories, see Botha (2003: 147ff.; 2006a: 137). 
16
 For elaboration on these points, see Botha (2006b: 12, 2008a, 2008c). 
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Figure 1.3: Filled out structure of a non-compound window on language 
evolution 
 
The three conditions discussed above apply to non-compound windows. 
Compound windows – i.e., windows comprising a series or chain of non-
compound windows – have to meet a fourth condition, the Coherence 
Condition stated as (5): 
 
(5) Two non-compound windows that are adjacent components of a 
compound window need to cohere properly: the conclusion of the first 
needs to present a basis for the inferential step of the second. 
 
Thus, in the case of the compound Shell-Bead-Symbol Window, the 
conclusion drawn with the aid of the Shell Window should present an empirical 
basis for the inferential step provided for by the Bead Window whose 
conclusion, in turn, should present an empirical basis for the inferential step 
allowed for by the Symbol Window.17 
 
 
                                                  
17
 For some discussion of whether the Shell-Bead-Symbol Window fully meets the Coherence 
Condition, see Botha (2008a). Botha (2006a: 141-142) offers a further illustration of the import 
of this condition. 
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1.4 Window types 
Windows on language evolution come in a great variety of shapes and sizes, as 
it were. They differ, for instance, in regard to (a) the phenomena from whose 
properties conclusions are drawn about language evolution, (b) the aspects of 
language evolution about which these conclusions are drawn and, 
fundamentally, (c) the nature of the inferential steps by which these 
conclusions are drawn. From the perspective of these steps, a distinction can be 
drawn among correlate windows, abduction windows, and analogue windows, 
which we consider in turn. 
The Shell Window, Bead Window and Symbol Window are correlate 
windows. That is, the phenomena from whose properties inferences are drawn 
about aspects of language evolution are taken to be correlates of these aspects. 
Thus, the MSA marine shells excavated at Blombos Cave are considered 
correlates of the beads worn by the inhabitants of the cave; these beads are 
taken to be correlates of the symbols used by them; and these symbols are 
believed to be correlates of a particular form of language they used. In the case 
of the Symbol Window, the correlation is that of 'being an essential requisite 
for'. That is, in the view of Henshilwood, d'Errico and their co-authors 
(Henshilwood et al., 2004: 404), 'fully syntactical language' is an essential 
requisite for symbolic behaviour. 'Being a requisite for' is but one of the ways 
in which a correlation can be manifested. Two entities X and Y can also be 
correlated in that 'X causes Y', (or 'X results from Y'), 'X precedes Y in time' 
(or 'X follows Y in time'), 'X is located in Y or in the proximity of Y', and so 
on. These expressions are indicative of the nature of the inferential steps 
provided for by correlate windows. 
The Pidgin Window and the windows based on other restricted linguistic 
systems are analogue windows. That is, the inferential steps that they allow for 
are instances of analogical inference. Thus, with respect to certain properties, 
pidgin languages are believed to be analogues of protolanguage, making it 
possible to draw from known properties of pidgins conclusions about unknown 
properties of protolanguage. Restricted linguistic systems are not the only kind 
of linguistic phenomena that have been used as the basis of analogue windows 
on aspects of language evolution. An analogue window on language evolution 
has, for instance, been constructed by Dean Falk (2004) on the basis of 
properties of modern motherese which she describes as the 'sing-song way in 
which parents vocalize to their infants' (p. 491). Motherese represents a special 
register of language use (it does not represent a restricted linguistic system). It 
has the substance of rhythmic, melodic speech sound which is used by care-
givers for expressing emotion and for manipulating the behaviour of infants. 
From these properties of motherese, Falk infers by analogy, for instance, that 
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(i) the early hominin mother-infant communications – which formed the 
prelinguistic foundations of so-called protolanguage or protospeech – had the 
substance of 'prosodic vocalizations', (ii) were used initially in an emotive 
function, and (iii) developed later into an instrument for manipulating the 
behaviour of others (Falk, 2004: 491, 501).18 Inferences such as these vary in 
regard to the strength of the analogical relation in question: that strength can be 
assessed in terms of both formal and non-formal criteria, something which has 
not yet been attempted by scholars who have used analogical windows in the 
study of language evolution.19  
In regard to type, the Music Window is neither a correlate nor an 
analogue window: it is an abduction window. The inferential step provided for 
by this window represents an inference from phenomena requiring an 
explanation – some similarities between so-called modern language and music 
– to a hypothesis – that modern language and music had a common precursor – 
which must furnish the explanation. This inference, accordingly, represents the 
first stage in a mode of inference called 'abductive reasoning' by Charles 
Sanders Peirce (1958). Since as a rule there are several alternative hypotheses 
by which a phenomenon can be explained, abductive reasoning requires a 
second stage on Peirce's account. In this stage, one of the alternative 
hypotheses is selected as the one offering the best explanation of the 
phenomenon, normally by virtue of its being 'simpler' than the alternatives. In 
the spirit of Peirce, Brown (2000: 277) has invoked a notion of 'simplicity' in 
choosing among the various hypotheses which could provide an explanation of 
the similarities between language and music: he prefers the 'musilanguage' 
hypothesis since 'it greatly simplifies thinking about the origins of music and 
language'.20  
Correlate, analogue and abduction windows do not represent alternative 
means of drawing inferences about language evolution. Being complementary, 
they differ not only in the kind of inferential step they allow for but also in 
what they are used for and in how they are used. Thus, correlate windows have 
been typically used for drawing conclusions about 'external' aspects of 
language evolution involving, for example, the time when and place where 
some form of language was used first. Analogue windows, in turn, have been 
typically used for drawing conclusions about 'internal' aspects of language 
evolution, including the function and structure of early forms of language and 
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 For an analysis of the Motherese Window constructed by Falk (2004), see Botha (2008b). 
19
 For discussion of some of these criteria, see Hesse (1963), Moore (1996: 278-279) and 
particularly Wylie (2002: 147-153). 
20
 His selection of the 'musilanguage' hypothesis over the alternatives, however, is questionable, 
as is shown by Botha (2008c). 
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including also the agents, phases and processes that featured in the evolution of 
early forms of language into full(er) language. 
Recent work on the way in which rudimentary homesign systems have 
been transformed into a full sign language in Nicaragua can serve as further 
illustration of the latter point. According to Senghas, Kita and Özyürek (2004), 
this has happened since, amongst other things, the minds of the deaf children 
involved in the process do two things in particular: (i) they dissect gestures into 
primitive elements, and (ii) they recombine these elements into linear 
sequences. These processes, it is claimed, are used by the minds of successive 
waves of deaf children in the process of learning homesign systems. And it is 
contended that these two language-learning processes shape fuller sign systems 
into discrete and hierarchically organized systems. Engaging in analogical 
reasoning, Senghas and her co-authors (2004: 1782) tentatively infer that the 
two language-learning processes in question could have been involved in the 
formation of the first human languages. 
Correlate and analogue windows are used in pursuing direct questions 
about 'external' and 'internal' aspects, respectively, of language evolution. Such 
questions are so-called fact-demanding questions (Hurford, 2003: 38): 
questions about, for instance, the time when, the place where, the purpose for 
which, the circumstances under which, the way in which or the properties with 
which a particular stage or form of ancestral language first appeared or 
subsequently evolved. Abduction windows differ from correlate and analogue 
windows in this regard, being used in addressing questions about properties of 
modern language, music and other related phenomena. Thus, the hypothesis 
that language and music had a common precursor, namely musilanguage, was 
not arrived at in pursuing the question 'What was the precursor of modern 
language or music?'; on the contrary the musilanguage hypothesis represents an 
answer to the question 'Why do modern language and music share certain 
features?'21 
 
1.5 Heuristic potential of Windows Approach 
Let us consider, in conclusion, the question of wherein the heuristic potential of 
the Windows Approach lies. Primarily, this approach is meant to make it 
possible to draw non-arbitrary inferences about what language evolution might 
or might not have involved. To unlock this part of the heuristic potential of the 
approach, however, it should be used in the right way. That is, to be non-
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 Hurford (2003: 38) holds that the goal of the study of language evolution should be to explain 
properties of contemporary language. Constructing abduction windows represents one means of 
pursuing this goal. 
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arbitrary, window inferences need to be properly grounded, warranted and 
pertinent. This means that an integral part of 'window' work on language 
evolution involves drawing upon or constructing the theories from which 
window inferences can derive these three 'good-making' properties. As shown 
above, these theories include grounder theories, bridge theories, linguistic 
ontologies, theories of language and so on. The only alternatives to drawing 
upon or constructing these empirical theories are unconstrained speculation or 
arbitrary stipulation. Engaging in such speculation or stipulation would be the 
wrong way of using the Windows Approach. 
The heuristic potential of the Windows Approach, however, is not 
restricted to what it may reveal about language evolution. For instance, the 
attempts at properly grounding some inferences about language evolution are 
likely to spark new questions about window phenomena, a point that may be 
illustrated with reference to the Symbol Window. Recall that this window has 
been used to infer that inhabitants of Blombos Cave had 'fully syntactical 
language' some 75,000 years ago. This inference, it has been contended, can be 
grounded in assumptions about the symbolic behaviour in which these people 
engaged. But in relevant literature, that behaviour is characterized in quite 
general terms only: as behaviour involving the 'sharing' and 'transmission' of 
symbolic meanings.22 To be able, however, properly to ground the inference to 
the possession of 'fully syntactical language', it is necessary to know what that 
behaviour involved in the way of specifics. In this connection, questions such 
as the following arise: 
 
(6) (a) What are the symbolic meanings that were 'shared' and 'transmitted' 
by the inhabitants of Blombos Cave? 
 (b) Were these meanings 'shared by' all the cave dwellers or only by 
particular groups or individuals? 
 (c) By whom were these symbolic meanings 'transmitted' – all the 
inhabitants of the cave, only a particular subgroup of them or only 
certain individuals? 
 (d) To whom were these symbolic meanings 'transmitted' – all the 
inhabitants of the cave, only a particular subgroup of them or only 
certain individuals? 
 
In the absence of specifics such as those asked for in these questions, it is 
not clear which inhabitants the 'fully syntactical language' can be properly 
                                                  
22
 See, for example, d'Errico et al. (2003: 6), d'Errico et al. (2004: 17-18), Henshilwood and 
Marean (2003:  636), Henshilwood et al. (2002: 1279), Henshilwood et al. (2004: 404). 
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attributed to. Finding answers requires further work, including the construction 
of an empirical theory of the MSA symbolic behaviour under consideration.23  
Consider next what is involved in giving an appropriate warrant for the 
inferential step leading to the conclusion that the inhabitants of Blombos Cave 
had 'fully syntactical language' some 75,000 years ago. This warrant is alluded 
to indirectly only in the relevant literature (Henshilwood et al., 2004: 404) in 
the statement 'Fully syntactical language is arguably an essential requisite to 
share and transmit the symbolic meaning of beadworks and abstract engravings 
such as those from Blombos Cave.' For warranting the inference at issue, 
however, more than this bare assumption is needed. That is, one would need 
such specifics as those asked for in the following questions:  
 
(7) (a) Why was 'fully syntactical language' necessary for 'sharing' and 
'transmitting' the particular symbolic meanings or symbolic meanings 
of the particular kind? 
 (b) Why could these meanings not have been 'shared' and 'transmitted' by 
means of a less fully evolved stage of ('syntactical') language or by 
some non-verbal means of communication? 
 (c) How do meanings for the 'transmission' of which 'fully syntactical 
language' is a requisite differ in essence from meanings that can be 
'transmitted' by less fully evolved language or by non-verbal means? 
 
These questions arise from the adoption of the Windows Approach; 
finding answers to them requires the construction of an empirical theory of the 
transmission of symbolic meanings in general and MSA symbolic meanings in 
particular. Clearly, then, these questions further illustrate the ability of this 
approach to stimulate empirical work on phenomena that may be indirectly 
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 For further illustration of how the adoption of the Windows Approach can generate interesting 
new questions about window phenomena, see Botha (2006a: 134-136). 
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2 The emergence of temporality: from restricted linguistic 
systems to early human language 
Sandra Benazzo 
UMR 8163, CNRS & Université Lille 3 
Abstract 
Temporality is a fundamental category of human cognition which, in contrast 
to animal communication, is encoded in elaborate ways in every modern 
language. Following the windows approach, this chapter investigates the 
development of temporal relations in simple linguistic systems of different 
natures – early varieties of untutored L2 learners and homesign systems of deaf 
subjects – and discusses the possible implications for language evolution. The 
comparison of linguistic systems arising in quite different circumstances allows 
for the identification of recurrent developmental patterns and thus provides a 
more robust empirical basis for projections on early language. 
 
2.1 Introduction: research topic and aims 
In the debate on language evolution several studies deal with time in language. 
Pinker and Bloom (1990), for instance, consider the expressive power of 
human language in the domain of temporality as one of the features showing its 
complex adaptative design, while Pinker and Jackendoff (2005) list tense and 
aspect markers among the devices that make human language special (in 
addition to syntactic organization), although they do not involve recursion per 
se. In a similar vein, Victorri (2005) highlights how natural languages allow the 
speaker to talk about dynamic situations anchored in time in a simple and 
straightforward manner and wonders about the role of narration for the 
evolution of temporal and aspectual marking. In fact, temporality is a 
fundamental category of human cognition, which is encoded in elaborate ways 
in every modern human language. Any language presents a full array of 
devices (adverbial, verbal or grammatical) to express the aspectual and 
temporal properties of a situation, i.e. broadly speaking, to comment on its 
distribution over time (continuous, iterative, habitual, etc.) and to situate its 
overall time of occurrence. Conversely, it is usually assumed that early forms 
of human language lacked a certain number of syntactic properties and were 
initially confined to the immediate perceptual reality of the here&now, most of 
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animal communication being generally considered as situation-specific.1 How 
is the gap between such extremes to be bridged? 
The research topic of this chapter concerns precisely the development of 
temporality in a linguistic system: the aim is to gain insight into the primordial 
temporal relations that may have been expressed in early forms of language and 
their possible elaboration towards modern full language. The empirical 
evidence used for this purpose comprises data from untutored second language 
acquisition – early varieties of adult learners (cf. in particular the 'Basic 
Variety') and from homesigns, i.e. the gestural systems of deaf subjects not 
exposed to conventional sign languages. Both cases represent spontaneous 
developmental processes leading to the emergence of communicative systems 
which are simpler than conventional language and therefore will be used as 
'windows' onto language evolution. They arise, however, in quite different 
circumstances and imply a different modality (spoken vs. manual). Their 
comparison allows for a distinction to be made between recurrent 
developmental patterns from process- or modality-specific ones, and thus to 
provide a more robust basis for projections on language evolution. 
The chapter is organized as follows: after providing some background 
information on the windows considered (section 2.2.), the expression of 
temporal relations in early stages of L2 acquisition and in homesign systems 
will be dealt with (section 2.3.). Building on this empirical basis, section 2.4 
addresses early language, proposing a logical sequence of steps for the 
emergence of temporality, which will then be discussed with respect to some 
widespread models of protolanguage. 
  
2.2 Preliminaries on the 'windows' considered 
The debate concerning language evolution has provoked a renewed interest in 
forms of linguistic organization as attested in pidgins, homesigns, early child 
language, early second language varieties, special cases like that of Genie, etc. 
(cf. Bickerton, 1990; Jackendoff, 1999, 2002; Comrie, 1992, 2000; Goldin-
Meadow, 2002; Morford, 2002, etc.). These correspond to partially different 
processes – implying language acquisition or disruption in language 
transmission – but share one common denominator: they give way to linguistic 
systems that are initially simpler vis-à-vis fully fledged languages. Following 
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 According to Johannsson (2005), it is actually an open issue to what extent functionally 
referential calls in spontaneous animal communication carry symbolic meaning like human 
words (p.128). Hauser et al. (2002) underline that 'unlike the best animal examples of putatively 
referential signals, most of the words of human language are not associated with specific 




Botha (2004), they can be defined as 'restricted' both in terms of the formal 
means they have at their disposal and as regards the expressive power they 
display,2 and as such can suggest intermediary steps between primitive forms 
of language and the complexity of modern ones; in other words they can be 
used as windows3 onto an evolutionary phenomenon that has left no direct 
evidence behind. This article follows the windows approach by investigating 
the expression of temporality in 'restricted linguistic systems' resulting from 
two different processes: early second language varieties developed by adult 
untutored learners and the communicative systems of deaf subjects who were 
deprived of linguistic input, i.e. homesigns.  
'Untutored adult language acquisition' – the process by which adult 
subjects acquire a second language outside the classroom – would appear to be 
a promising window onto the process of language evolution (cf. Jackendoff, 
1999, 2002; Klein, 2001; Perdue, 2006). Any subject, be it child or adult, faced 
with the task of acquiring a conventional language, does not purely imitate the 
input model. Yet the systems developed by children show, from very early on, 
the specific linguistic features of the target language to which they will 
conform in the end (cf. Slobin, 2005). On the other hand, adults are notoriously 
bad imitators: in contrast to the child, the adult learner very often ends up with 
a system which differs considerably from the target language, a phenomenon 
known as fossilization. This result can be attributed to different causes: the 
presence of a first language, changes in the learning capacity or input paucity. 
Moreover, especially in an untutored situation, the learner's initial goal is not 
necessarily to adhere to the target language norm but to convey the message: 
priority is given to the effectiveness of communication rather than its 
correctness. In fact, adult learners seem to be less able or willing to copy what 
they hear in comparison to children. 
The initial systems developed by adult learners do not seem to be 
strongly influenced by their L1 either. Research on untutored second language 
acquisition (the case of immigrant workers studied in the ESF project, cf. 
Perdue, 1993) has shown that learners representing different pairings of source 
and target languages initially develop a very similar linguistic system, which 
has been called a 'Basic Variety' (Klein and Perdue, 1997): a target language-
                                                  
2
 In Botha's terms:  'the concept of restricted linguistic system is used to refer to a form of 
language (a) which − in all cases − uses a limited range of the formal and/or semantic means that 
characterise fully-fledged languages, and (b) which − in some cases − performs only a limited 
range of the functions of fully-fledged languages' (2004: 4).  
3
 As pointed out by Botha (2006), an observable phenomenon X can be a window on an analog 
but distinct and inaccessible phenomenon Y, so that by studying properties of X one can draw 
inferences about Y. Here the analogy is based on the emergence of a linguistic system.  
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like lexicon is organized on the basis of pragmatic and semantic principles 
which are largely independent of the source/target language specifics. 
Given that early stages of L2 acquisition do not correspond to a 
relexification process (strong influence of the L1) nor to a piecemeal imitation 
of the target language (the available model), they have been interpreted as:  
 
(a) reflecting creative processes of the underlying human language faculty 
(Klein, 2001); 
(b) representing a linguistic organization that is neutral with respect to the 
grammaticalized features of a specific language (Perdue, 2006); 
(c) applying fossil principles from protolanguage, which modern languages 
often observe and frequently elaborate on (Jackendoff, 1999). 
 
The features just mentioned make early L2 varieties a potentially valid window 
onto language evolution: their study allows the researcher to observe the 
emergence of a new communicative system with a creative dimension, and the 
whole process is relatively well described. However, even if a direct influence 
of the specific languages in contact seems to be rather limited, it is not clear to 
what extent the experience of language itself affects the developmental process, 
at least with respect to temporality: after all, the adult learner enters the L2 
acquisitional process with a conceptual system fully developed during the 
process of first language acquisition. The comparison with the communicative 
systems resulting from another ontogenetic process, namely homesign systems, 
plays a crucial role at this point. 
'Homesigns' is the widely used term to designate the gestural 
communicative systems spontaneously developed by deaf children born into a 
hearing family, when deprived of contact with a conventional sign language. 
The work of Goldin-Meadow and colleagues extensively describes the 
emergence of language-like properties in homesigns: their accounts highlight 
that it is the deaf subject who creates the gestural system, starting with the 
minimal input that is represented by the co-speech gestures of the hearing 
environment, introducing novel gestures and elaborating the organizational 
properties of this repertoire (caregivers' gestures do not display the same 
systematic organization). Note that, despite different gestural input, children 
around the world seem to develop similar systems, the main notable difference 
being the emblems typical of their cultural environment (cf. Wang et al., 1995; 
Goldin-Meadow et al., to appear). This remarkable similarity is likely to be due 
to the high level of iconicity that deaf subjects must keep in their signs if they 
want to be understood by their hearing communicative partners; moreover, 




recombine gestural elements perceived in a meaningful context. Deaf subjects 
born to hearing families may still live in environments that do not provide them 
with exposure to institutional sign languages, even in adulthood. Studies on 
adult homesigners are few in number (cf. section 3.2), but they suggest that a 
deaf child's communicative system may become more complex as a 
consequence of cognitive maturation and according to social integration with 
the hearing environment (cf. Cuxac, 2005). 
The case of homesigns represents a unique situation: they constitute the 
first language of the deaf subjects (and therefore, in contrast to L2 acquisition, 
the influence of an antecedent language should be ruled out); in addition, 
unlike ordinary L1 acquisition, the influence of a specific target language can 
be excluded as well. The absence of a conventional linguistic model forces the 
creative features of the process not only at utterance level (grammar to combine 
items) but also at word level (invention of conventional symbols). On the other 
hand, their study represents a rather recent field of research: there are only few 
studies which describe how temporality is expressed in child and adult 
homesigns.  
The remainder of this article therefore describes the progressive 
expression of temporal relations in early L2 varieties; the developmental 
pattern thus obtained is then used as a basis for comparison with the available 
evidence from adult and child homesigns. Language is basically modality-
independent and no position will be taken here on the advantage or relative 
primacy of the manual modality over the spoken one in language evolution (on 
this subject, cf. Corballis, 2003). Rather, the comparison intends to distinguish 
recurrent developmental patterns from features that could be related to the 
specific circumstances of the processes in question (presence vs. absence of a 
previous language and of a model, spoken vs. manual modality). Given the 
different salient conditions in which such systems arise, if similarities are found 
between early L2 varieties and homesign systems, (a) an increasingly powerful 
argument can be made for the non effects of environmental factors on the 
development of L2 varieties and (b) they would constitute a more robust 
empirical basis for projections on early language. 
 
2.3 The expression of temporality: empirical data and analyses 
2.3.1 Temporality in untutored adult SLA 
Previous studies using SLA as a window onto early language have focused on 
the Basic Variety (henceforth BV): its simple grammar, its stable state and its 
relative independence from the specific features of the languages in contact 
makes this stage particularly relevant for projections on early language and will 
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therefore occupy a central place in this section. In order to capture the 
developmental dimension of early stages in L2 acquisition, we include a 
description of how temporality is expressed in the stages preceding and 
following the BV (cf. 'prebasic' and 'postbasic' varieties: Klein and Perdue, 
1992, 1997; Dietrich et al., 1995). Note that the data having led to the 
identification of the Basic Variety are based on the oral production of adult 
untutored learners (typically immigrant workers) representing ten different 
pairings of languages (cf. Perdue, 1993 for details). For practical reasons, most 
of our examples are given in English and French, but the remarks are also valid 
for L2 Dutch, German and Swedish. 
For the description of temporal relations, three basic operations will be 
considered: the localization of situations in time, their distribution over time 
(continuous, accomplished, etc.) and their respective ordering (situation A 
taking place before, after or overlapping with situation B). While focussing on 
how such operations are realized in L2 (and then in homesigns), reference will 
be made to Klein's model of temporality (1994). Three time variables are 
relevant to this end: the time of utterance (TU) or speech time, the time talked 
about or topic time (TT), and the time of the situation itself (Tsit). The topic 
time corresponds to the temporal span for which the assertion is claimed to 
hold. Tense is viewed as the relation between TT and the deictic TU: in the 
present tense the TT overlaps with the TU, in the past tense the TT precedes 
TU, and in the future tense the TT follows TU. In contrast to the topic time, the 
Tsit refers to the time span the situation occupies on the temporal axis. 
Grammatical aspect relates the TT to the time of the situation: for example in 
the perfective aspect the TT follows the Tsit (the situation is presented as 
completed before the asserted time interval), while in the imperfective aspect 
the TT is included in the Tsit (the situation is viewed as ongoing).  
 
2.3.1.1 Prebasic variety 
The initial L2 repertoire consists of some unanalyzed target language 
expressions and a set of lexemes roughly corresponding to target-language-like 
nouns, adjectives and adverbs. These items have a sound/meaning 
correspondence, but no clear grammatical specification. If verb forms are 
present, they have a rather 'noun-like' use or in fact they are difficult to 
categorize at all (cf. Perdue, 1996, 2006): for instance /lemanze/ (literally the-
eating) in French L2 can mean both 'food' and 'eat'; conversely, in an utterance 
like Charlie eingang (literally Charlie entrance in German L2) the nominal 
expression eingang could be reconstructed either as a noun or as a verb, while 
in Charlie weg strasse (literally Charlie away street) it is the invariable particle 




forms, this stage is defined as based on nominal utterance organization, but it 
could also be called preverbal utterance organization (cf. Klein and Perdue, 
1992). Utterance constituents may seem unconnected, but they are regularly 
related by a pragmatic principle: constituents having background status precede 
those having focus status ('focus last'). The following narrative passage, a film 
retelling, exemplifies some typical features of a prebasic learner's production:4 
 
(1) petit chien et garçon + à glace 
small dog and boy + to/on ice 
 
et garçon + boum glace 
and boy + boom ice 
 
et chien ++ sos 
and dog ++  sos 
 
At this stage learners' personal or fictitious narratives show the regular 
use of the Principle of Natural Order5 like in (1): events are recounted 
following their chronological order of occurrence. In the absence of any 
explicit linking device between propositions, this principle allows the inference 
of consecutivity between events. Thus, although there is no temporal 
expression in (1), an implicit AFTER relation holds between the events 
mentioned: a boy and a dog go to a frozen lake, then the boy involuntarily 
breaks the ice layer, then the dog helps him. In contrast to fully fledged 
languages, where the principle of natural order also applies, learners do not 
have any formal means to overrule it.  
Prebasic learners' production generally needs the native speaker's 
scaffolding. The prebasic repertoire, however, always includes some explicit 
means to express the temporal reference of the situation talked about (its Topic 
Time). The temporal span for which a situation holds is usually unmarked 
when it corresponds to the deictic utterance time or to a temporal interval 
introduced in previous discourse, but noun-like or adverbial-like items – in 
particular CALENDRICAL expressions like Sunday, tomorrow or 1970 – are used 
                                                  
4
 The following conventions are adopted to transcribe learners' production: + means an unfilled 
pause; ++ a longer unfilled pause; *…* encloses a sequence in a language other than the target 
language; NS stands for Native Speaker. 
5
 This discourse organizational principle is assumed to be the more natural way to recount events 
(or the unmarked way for linearizing complex information), as it facilitates the retrieval of events 
from memory by the speaker as well as inferences by the hearer (cf. Levelt 1989: 308). 
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very early to fix a different time reference.6 This mechanism is clearly 
exemplified in (2): the temporal anchoring of the first utterance is maintained 
as topical information from the native speaker's question, and therefore left 
implicit (like the topical entity husband), while the calendrical expressions 
tomorrow and Monday of the following utterances make explicit the temporal 
shift from the initial deictic now.  
 
(2) (NS: what about your husband?) 
 *en el * hopital 
*Sp. in the* hospital 
 
demain ++ permis… 
tomorrow permit (=to leave the hospital) 
 
et lundi à l'hopital 
and Monday to the hospital 
 
As for main constituents, the POSITION of temporal expressions in the 
utterance mirrors their pragmatic status: tomorrow and Monday are placed in 
the utterance-initial position to express the time interval for which the predicate 
is asserted, while they would occupy an utterance-final position if the temporal 
information they conveyed were the focal element.  
To summarize, the prebasic system is on the whole heavily context-
dependent: the interpretation of learner utterances demands strong pragmatic 
inferences in order to retrieve the relations holding between entities at sentence 
level (cf. rarity of identifiable verb forms) and between utterances (cf. rarity of 
connectors). In spite of these expressive limitations, learners quickly develop 
explicit means to express 'temporal displacement', in other words they find 
ways to overcome the dependency on the contextual here&now or the native 
speaker's contribution (cf. also conclusions in Perdue, 1993: 103).  
 
2.3.1.2 Basic Variety 
The following stage is marked by the emergence of clearly recognizable verb 
forms and their arguments, around which the utterance gets structured. The 
presence of thematic verbs allows the learner to make use of different types of 
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 In principle any NP referring to a situation having a temporal dimension can be used for this 
purpose. In pause film + ausgang mit freund und fräulein (film break + exit with friend and 
young lady; Dietrich et al., 1995: 82), it is the NP 'film break' that signals the temporal span for 




valency: the semantic principle agent first is thus added to the still predominant 
focus last. Verb morphology, if present, is not yet functional (hence the label of 
'verbal' or 'non finite utterance organization'): learners use either a unique form 
in different temporal contexts or variable forms in free alternation. In (3), for 
example, the learner produces a verb form (transcribed in phonetic symbols), 
which is pronounced like the target language present tense form, while the 
assertion concerns the past. 
 
(3) (NS: what are you doing here? Are you working?) 
 avant je [travaj] / maintenant non 
 before I work / now no 
 
The system is still very simple: it shows a transparent interplay of 
semantic and pragmatic principles, while grammatical devices such as case 
marking, functional verb inflection (marking agreement, tense or aspect) and 
subordination are still absent (cf. Klein and Perdue, 1997). Learners can, 
however, express a dense web of temporal relations via the following means: 
 
• In addition to their structuring power as for utterance organization, 
UNINFLECTED VERBS and their arguments make explicit the inherent 
temporal features of the situation talked about, its Aktionsart, making it 
possible to distinguish between states and activities/events, punctual or 
durative situations; 
• Items of verbal or adverbial nature (verb stems like start, finish or stop in 
English, but also adverbial forms like fertig in German L2), sometimes 
even unanalyzed chunks (like çayest in French L2), are added to the 
system to mark the left or right boundary of a situation (e.g. work finish 
roughly corresponding to when work is over); 
• An increasing number of temporal adverb(ial)s enrich the prebasic 
repertoire. Following a functional classification they minimally include:  
- temporal adverbials expressing the POSITION of the situation on the 
time axis in an absolute (Sunday, 1975), deictic (last week) or 
anaphoric way (later, after, before); 
- a few temporal adverbials expressing the FREQUENCY of situations 
(always, often, twice…) and their DURATION (usually bare nouns as 
2 hours, 4 days). 
• Items equivalent to AFTER and BEFORE express relations of order 
between situations; the presence of an overt marker for two (partially) 
overlapping situations (when) is subject to individual variation (cf. 
Dietrich et al., 1995). With respect to the previous stage, these items 
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allow the speaker to signal breaks in the chronology of events (before) or 
to provide a complex temporal reference (when) for the upcoming 
predicate.  
 
The contribution of temporal adverbials and boundary markers is highlighted in 
(4)-(5), which are typical discourse fragments of this stage: 
 
(4) nine o'clock in er + work start   
half past two finish… 
 monday I gone in the hospital and speak doctor  
 
(5) (about the learner's husband)  
*el* de vacances *el* mois de juillet   
*Sp. he* some holidays*Sp. the* month of July 
 
et moi /fe/ de le cours  
and me do the course (=she has to follow a course) 
 
*y* août moi de vacances *y el* de travail 
*Sp. and* August me holidays and *Sp. he* (some?) work 
 
The sequential ordering of constituents is still mainly determined by 
principles of information structure (cf. Dimroth et al., 2003): accordingly, 
temporal adverbials establishing the Topic Time are very often utterance-
initial, as they have scope over the entire proposition (as before in (3) or August 
in (5)), while temporal adverbs expressing the TSit (as month of July in (5)) or 
quantifying the situation are in non-initial position, because they belong to 
focus information (cf. also Starren, 2001). Linear position thus mirrors 
semantic influence in a transparent way.7  
In comparison to the previous stage, the BV displays rich potential for 
the expression of temporal relations, implicitly via a combination of discursive 
and pragmatic principles and explicitly thanks to essentially lexical means. 
Time reference is explicitly realized by an increasing repertoire of time 
adverbials, but spatial expressions can also contribute to its expression: thus 
Punjab I do agricultural farm is to be interpreted as 'when I was in Punjab…'. 
The temporal anchoring of the utterance is however still left UNMARKED, as in 
the prebasic stage, (i) when it is topical information maintained from previous 
discourse, (ii) when it is inferable from discourse organizing principles like the 
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 The same sort of semantic transparency holds for negation: the negator precedes the constituent 




principle of natural order (= PNO) in narratives), or (iii) when it corresponds to 
the deictic utterance time (default present reading), unless contrasted with 
another temporal span (as in (3)). Although this system gives way to frequent 
misunderstandings during interactions with native speakers, the BV in itself is 
rather effective for the localization of situations in time; this said, it presents 
some severe shortcomings as far as aspectual perspective is concerned: 
situations can be quantified (if repeated) or marked as 'completed', but there are 
no specific means to give another aspectual viewpoint, nor to mark 
simultaneity. As pointed out in Dietrich et al. (1995: 273) an utterance like 
when in Italy I go Rome can be attributed different readings: a 'single case' 
reading (when I was in Italy I went to Rome), an 'habitual' reading (when I was 
in Italy I used to go to Rome) or a 'generic' one (whenever I am in Italy I go to 
Rome). Despite the above shortcomings, many adult learners stop the 
acquisitional process here, i.e. they may add other lexical items to their 
repertoire, but the system as such remains stable (fossilization): its 
communicative possibilities are apparently rich enough to get along in most 
everyday situations.  
 
2.3.1.3 Postbasic varieties  
Further development leads to the emergence of the target language specific 
features for utterance organization (emergence of the subject function, 
subordination, cleft constructions, etc.) and of grammatical means to encode 
TENSE and/or ASPECT. Several studies point to the development of an 
'(inflected) AUX + (ininflected) Vlex' structure before main verbs are inflected 
(cf. for example Parodi, 2000; Perdue et al., 2002) if both are present in the 
environmental language, but these structures can also be used to convey 
idiosyncratic meaning far removed from the target (cf. von Stutterheim, 1991; 
Starren, 2001). Moreover, some specialized lexical markers may appear to 
convey special time configurations in a complementary or alternative way with 
respect to verb morphology.8 
Learners' paths thus vary as they approach the target language. The 
crosslinguistic variation can, however, be captured by some overall regularities. 
On the means level there is an initial preference for analytic forms – i.e. free 
morphemes (auxiliaries, periphrastic constructions and invariable specialized 
lexical markers) + a non-finite lexical verb – over synthetic ones, which is 
                                                  
8
 The continuative meaning of 'STILL' may be used to trigger an imperfective reading of the 
predicate; conversely, items equivalent to 'ALREADY' + non-finite verbs can contribute in 
conveying reference to a completed and/or past situation or to a past in the past (cf. Benazzo 
2003, Benazzo & Starren 2007 for L2; Comrie 1985 for fully fledged languages). 
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related both to reasons of perceptual salience in the input and to a learner-
specific tendency to keep semantic transparency. On the function level, priority 
is given to express grammatically the temporal opposition present/past 
(constructions relating two reference points in time, like "PlusQuamPerfect" (= 
PQP) of "PastPerfect", are late acquisitions) and the aspectual notions of 
ongoingness vs. accomplishment (or the imperfective/perfective distinction), 
which imply a dissociation between the topic time and the Tsit.  
We see in this developmental sketch not only the same 'communicative 
logic' at work in earlier stages – 'develop' means to express communicatively 
important functions (= overcoming constraints of the previous system), but also 
the first traces of some learners' attempt to approximate the formal organization 
of a target: here language is no longer being created anew. 
 
2.3.2 Temporality in homesign systems 
2.3.2.1 Child homesign systems 
The emergence of homesigns (henceforth HS) and their language-like 
properties have been extensively investigated by Goldin-Meadow and 
colleagues (Goldin-Meadow and Mylander, 1990; Goldin-Meadow, 2002, 
2003, etc.) in the longitudinal data of children covering an age range from 1;4 
to 5;9. The deaf child gradually develops a lexicon of stable gestural forms 
organized in paradigms: the gesture/meaning relation acquires arbitrary aspects 
(within an iconic framework) and gestures are progressively differentiated for 
the grammatical functions they serve (noun, verb/adjective, marker). Utterances 
grow in size and scope: the child starts with 'one gesture' utterances (akin to the 
one-word stage), which consist either of a pointing gesture or of an iconic one, 
then combines two gestures, and later builds multipropositional sentences. 
Gestural utterances display underlying predicate frames, whereby word order 
signals thematic roles. In addition to the (morphological and syntactic) 
elaboration, the gestural systems are described as serving an increasing range 
of functions (cf. Goldin-Meadow, 2002: 34, 2003: 186). Gesturing is used to: 
(a) make requests, comments and queries about the present (Here&Now 
Talk); 
(b) communicate about the past, future, and hypothetical (Displaced Talk); 
(c) tell stories about self and others (Narrative); 
(d) communicate with oneself (Self-talk); 
(e) refer to one's own and others' gestures (Metalanguage). 
In the following, the focus will be on displaced talk, i.e. the ability to 
refer to information that is spatially and temporally displaced from the location 




property is developed in three main steps (cf. Butcher et al., 1991; Morford and 
Goldin-Meadow, 1997):  
(i) After an initial period where pointings and iconic gestures refer to real 
world objects present in the immediate environment, children start 
mentioning non present objects, actions, attributes and locations. They 
can point to a present object that looks very much like the absent one 
they want to refer to (an empty jar of bubbles as a stand-in for the full 
one), or at the habitual location of the entity to which they intend to refer: 
one child for example points to a chair as stand-in for the child's father, 
who usually sits on it, and then produces a 'sleep' gesture to tell that his 
dad is asleep in another room.  
The production of gestures referring to non-present objects and actions 
seems to correlate with a turning point in the language-like properties of 
the system. Non-literal pointing (which can be considered as the 
realization of true symbolic function) coincides with the emergence of 
two levels of structure in the gesture organization: within the sentence 
(akin to syntactic structure) and within each gesture (akin to 
morphology); at this stage the distinction between nouns and predicates 
starts being expressed via word order and space inflection.9 
(ii) Later, children make reference to proximal events that are still tied to 
present context: they either anticipate what will happen or express events 
that have just taken place. A relevant example is the deaf child gesturing 
'bubble – EXPAND' after blowing a large bubble. 
(iii) Finally, they refer to distant or non-actual events, i.e. reference to events 
in the past or in the future, and to potential or fantasy events (starting 
around 3;5). All of them made reference to past events, only some to 
future or hypothetical ones.  
The explicit devices used to this end are the following ones: 
- A POINTING gesture (pointing over the shoulder to indicate past 
reference): for example one child points over his shoulder [=past], 
then points at a flashcard depicting a dog [=dog], then point to the 
floor [= here]. The past interpretation is confirmed by the child's 
mother reaction who says: yes, we used to have a gray poodle, huh? 
- A gesture glossed as AWAY (a palm or pointed hand extended or 
arched away from the body). Thus, David (age 5;3) comments on 
                                                  
9
 The basic distinctions between nouns and predicates (verbs/adjectives) is first expressed by the 
use of different gestures: points for nouns and iconic gestures for predicates; then, the same 
distinction applies via word order and space inflection (around 3;3). Evidence for a grammatical 
category arises, however, in a successive stage, where N/V do not exclusively refer respectively 
to objects and actions (cf. Goldin-Meadow et al., 1994). 
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his father's car accident by the following utterances: BREAK- away – 
dad – CAR GOES ONTO TRUCK (flat hand glides onto back of flat left 
hand) / CRASH – away (= dad's car broke and went onto a tow truck. 
It crashed). AWAY is first interpreted as a marker of both spatial and 
temporal displacement (Morford and Goldin-Meadow, 1997), later 
as a narrative marker (Goldin-Meadow, 2003);  
- A gesture glossed as WAIT (holding up the index finger) that 
children used to identify their intentions, i.e. to signal immediate 
future. One child for example gestured WAIT (future) TOYBAG, and 
then walked over to the toybag to fetch a new toy to play with. 
These gestures are either novel (like away), 'invented' by the child and 
apparently not repeated by the caregivers, or gestures existing in the cultural 
environment (like wait, conventional gesture to ask a brief delay or time-out) 
that the child adapts for new functions.  
It is not clear to what extent deaf children made use of these markers, in 
particular if reference to distant or non-actual events was signaled in a more or 
less systematic way, but the underlying developmental pattern is clearly 
defined: deaf children start pointing in their immediate environment; then the 
function of 'displaced reference' emerges, whereby they can mention non-
present entities/actions, but the situations are still linked to the here&now (or 
closely tied to it); finally, they can talk about situations 'displaced in time and 
space'. This cognitive development is accompanied by a first verbalized 
opposition concerning the temporal anchoring of the situations talked about: 
present or proximal events are left unmarked (it becomes the default reading), 
while overt markers are acquired for temporally (and spatially) displaced 
events. 
The last developmental step relevant for temporality concerns the 
relative ordering of events in narratives (Goldin-Meadow, 2003: 144-5): 3 
children out of 4 started recounting events in the order in which they actually 
occurred around the age of 5. Two remarks seem relevant with respect to this 
point: the first one is that despite the adjective qualifying the chronological 
order as 'natural', it has to be developed and this seems to happen rather late; 
the second one is that the child HS system does not include any temporal 
connectors yet, so that the reconstruction of their relative ordering is left 
completely to pragmatic inferences.  
 
2.3.2.1.1 Child Homesigns and L1 acquisition 
Morford and Goldin-Meadow (1997) also compare deaf children's production 
with that of English-speaking children. They conclude that, at a cognitive level, 




abstract categories of displaced reference. The main difference lies in the onset 
time and frequency: deaf children refer to the non-present much less frequently 
and at later stages than the hearing children. This delay is related to the 
behavior of the deaf children's caregivers, who made reference to distant events 
less frequently than the caregivers of hearing children, and marked temporal 
displacement only in their speech production (cf. the concept of unwilling 
communicative partner, Goldin-Meadow, 2002). It is useful, however, to 
underline the fact that unlike in the case of hearing children, only reference to 
distant or non-actual events is marked overtly by explicit devices: thus for 
reference to proximal events the authors compare the hearing child sentence 
'see, I flipped over' immediately after she has done a flip on the couch, with the 
deaf child gesturing 'bubble-EXPAND' after blowing a large bubble. The 
conceptual operation (making reference to proximal events) can be defined as 
similar, but the spoken utterance contains a linguistic marker of past (-ed) 
which is absent from the gestured one.  
The comparison provided by Morford and Goldin-Meadow focuses on 
the cognitive development of the deaf and hearing subjects rather than on the 
linguistic means used. This procedure is understandable and justified, given 
that the grammatical devices of the specific target language (e.g. verb 
inflection) emerge very early. Moreover, the process of form/function 
mapping seems to go in the opposite direction in the two cases: in normal L1 
acquisition form often precedes function,10 while the lack of a model for the 
homesigners forces them into the development of new linguistic means once 
(or after) they have elaborated a given conceptual function and feel the need to 
express it (in fact, the deaf children initiated more of their communication 
about non-present than their caregivers).  
Despite such differences, some intriguing parallels with L1 acquisition 
can be seen at the linguistic level by looking at the stage preceding the use of 
finite verbs.11 The study of Gretsch (2004) on finiteness and root infinitives 
points to a developmental pattern very similar to the one observed in child HS: 
using the metaphor of cell divisions, she explains the first step towards a TAM 
system as consisting of an initial fission between a default here&now vs. 
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 In L1 acquisition the child's task is to pick up forms from the environment and find out which 
function they serve. The order of acquisition (of grammatical morphemes) can be predicted 
according to (a) the cumulative complexity of semantic distinctions, (b) the formal complexity of 
how such distinctions are mapped onto forms, and (c) their frequency in the input. However, 
form usually precedes function in that new forms are often used when the children have not yet 
worked out exactly what they mean (cf. Clark, 2003: 194-195). 
11
 It would of course be interesting to take into account the development of temporal reference in 
deaf children acquiring a conventional sign language, but this is still an unexplored domain of 
research.  
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another point in time; the second fission gives directionality to the TT different 
from here&now (backward for past and forward for future), while proper 
aspectual distinctions, where TT and Tsit are dissociated, need a third fission. 
In tense-oriented languages (like German and Dutch) the first fission is 
expressed by the morphological opposition between finite forms (= here&now) 
vs. infinitival ones (not here&now), while in aspectual-oriented languages (like 
Russian) it is the perfective/imperfective opposition which is used to convey 
the same basic distinction in temporal reference by implication. Leaving aside 
differences in age between hearing and deaf children (due to the creative task), 
the developmental tendency is conceptually the same, but the chosen option of 
what is left unmarked is reversed: the former use morphologically marked 
verb forms for the here&now while for the latter this is the default unmarked 
context (like in early stages of L2). 
 
2.3.2.2 Adult homesign systems 
Deaf children born to hearing families may grow up and continue to live in 
environments which do not provide them with exposure to institutional sign 
languages. Studies on adult homesigners are few in number, but they all 
suggest that, with age, the means used to express temporal concepts become 
more diversified. From the pioneer studies of Yau (1992), Kendon (1980) and 
Mc Leod (1973) it can be observed for example that adult home signers have at 
their disposal some means to express at least the passage of time (deictically 
based time lines + skyline), to quantify time entities and to contrast situations 
referring to present context with respect to another time interval (cf. signs for 
parts of the day and for 'another day'12). Tense inflection is not developed, and 
the default reading for utterances without any tense marker is the present (or 
recent past). The focus of such studies, however, was not the expression of 
temporality.  
The main source of evidence for temporality in adult HS will be 
therefore the study of Fusellier-Souza (2004), who describes in detail the 
expression of temporal relations in the communicative systems of 3 deaf 
subjects living in Brazil: Jo (aged 26), Ana (aged 20) and Ivaldo (aged 53). 
Their gestural systems are structurally very similar and consistent with the 
properties described by Goldin-Meadow for child HS: they consist of a 
stabilized lexicon of gestural signs (with a quantifier, nominal, 
verbal/adjectival value), highly iconic gestures and pointing gestures, which are 
organized to form utterances following predicate frames. Table 2.1 reports the 
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 Yau (1992) reports for example Miss Pettwiki's strategy to express an(other) day (hence 




repertoire of stabilized gestural signs with a specific temporal or aspectual 
value, which were attested during a 15-minute free conversation between each 
deaf subject and his/her preferential speaker (the quantification takes into 
account the production of both speakers). 
 
Table 2.1: Stabilized gestural signs with a temporal value (adapted from 
Fusellier-Souza 2004: 278) 
*14/4 stands for token/type ratio. 
 
Repertoire of gestural signs  Semantic glosses  Ana Jo Ivaldo 
Gesture of accomplishment  
with both hands Finish  5 26 8 
Pointing over shoulder or 
rotational movement of the 
hand 
Before (before x or past) 1 12 5 
Pointing or circular 
movement in the opposite 
direction 
After (after x or coming = 
future) 13 7 5 
Pointing downwards Now/Here - 2 4 
Repeated sleeping gesture  Every day (generic or habitual reading)  1 - - 
Fingers snapped repeatedly 
Long time (indefinite 
duration)  
Long time ago (distant 
past) 
3 - 5 
Various gestures for 
calendrical expressions:  
e.g. gesture of a cross = 
Sunday 
Designation of a specific 
month 
(June, December, etc.) and 
of a specific day of the 
week (Sunday) 
1 - 14/4* 
Various gestures for time 
units:  
e.g. gesture for sleeping = 
day; 
gesture for December = year 
x days, x years, x months 1 3 2 
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The communicative exchanges recorded are rather rich in temporal 
expressions. The repertoire includes a wide range of means to localize 
situations in time: 
- Gestures to indicate basic 'TIME UNITS', like day, month or year, plus 
their quantification;  
- Gestures identifying a specific temporal span (CALENDRICAL 
expressions) like June, September, December or a specific day of the 
week like Sunday;13 
- Gestures corresponding to 'AFTER' and 'BEFORE' (the opposition is 
expressed either by pointing on a time line crossing the subject, over the 
his/her shoulder or in front of it, or by making a repeated circular 
movement with the hand in opposite directions), which can be used 
adverbially to express a 'generic past / future' or in adposition to 
calendrical expressions to indicate a specific time span (before + June; 6 
days + after = in 6 days). 
- Pointing downwards to the space in front of the speaker to mean either 
'HERE' or 'NOW'. 
The above gestures can also be combined with 'time lines' to construct 
complex temporal references. Thus in (6), in order to fix an appointment for the 
following Wednesday early evening, the speaker first signs 'Sunday', whose 
signing location becomes the starting point of a time line where 3 working days 
are placed, then 'sunset' (movement of the sun) and finally 'go'. 
 
(6) SUNDAY [starting point of a time line] WORKING-DAY 3 (= 3 days 
later) SUNSET GO 
 
The temporal properties of situations can be specified by:  
- A gesture glossed as 'FINISH' (very productive in all subjects), which is a 
clear marker of accomplishment;14 
- A gesture glossed as 'LONG TIME' (apparently the reinterpretation of a 
Brazilian hearing community's gesture) which can mark either the 
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 Different strategies are attested to create a calendrical expression: a specific time span can be 
associated with the cultural or habitual activity taking place during it (e.g. cross meaning Sunday, 
the day when people go to church; the sign for sleeping for 'day') or with one of its perceptually 
salient details (December or Christmas time is represented by gesturing flashing lights by Ana, 
and by gesturing Santa's beard by Ivaldo).   
14





'indefinite duration' of activities (e.g. walk for a long time) or a 'distant 
past' (roughly equivalent to long time ago);15 
- A gesture glossed as 'EVERY DAY', which corresponds to the repetition of 
the 'day' gesture without specifying a precise quantity. It is the indefinite 
quantification of days which triggers a generic or habitual reading. 
It should also be noted that all subjects produce predicates referring to 
static (see, listen, like) and dynamic, atelic (eat, sleep) and telic processes (die, 
cut, leave), whereby the repetition of the movement designating an action is an 
explicit device to express reiteration or duration of the same activity. 
Some discrepancies in the repertoire of the three subjects can be 
attributed to the different conversational topics they discussed,16 but on the 
whole the linguistic means they used for temporal relations, while showing a 
continuity with child HS, are not very different in nature from the ones stated at 
BV level, at least to the extent that they allow the speaker to cover the same 
basic functions stated for L2 at this stage. Besides the inherent properties of 
situations, inferable from the lexical content of the verb (lexical aspect), 
speakers have at their disposal expressions in order to – 
- locate situations on the time axis (with deictic, anaphoric and absolute 
value), making reference to an indefinite future/past or a definite time span 
(calendrical expression);  
- order situations with respect of each other;  
- quantify minimally the frequency of situations (reiteration, habituality) or 
their duration, be it definite (x days) or indefinite (long time); 
- mark the right boundary of a situation (finish). 
The similarities extend to the functioning of these expressions in 
discourse: the temporal reference for which the predicate holds is very often 
left unmarked if retrievable in context, i.e. (a) either set in previous discourse 
or (b) corresponding to utterance time (default present reading); a deictic now, 
however, has to be expressed when it takes a contrastive value (compare (7)-(8) 
taken from Fusellier, 2004: 282, with (3) from L2). 
 
 
                                                  
15
 Fusellier-Souza reports also a contextual interpretation equivalent to since long time, where the 
gesture would set reference to an activity started in a distant past and going on until utterance 
time. This interpretation seems, however, to be dependent on the discourse context and on the 
atelic nature of the verbs. 
16
 Reference to the future (the 'coming' meaning of after) is for example only attested in Ana's 
production, who comments on events that have to take place in the village and on things she will 
do later. In contrast, Jo and Ivaldo refer more to past situations, hence the larger number of 
references to past or accomplished situations. 
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(7) (Ivaldo about his working situation) 
before [pointing over shoulder] GOOD  
now [pointing downwards] SO SO (more or less) 
 
(8) (about a football team) 
before [rotating hand backwards] WIN [sign for win/victory] 
now [pointing downwards] FINISH 
 
The above utterances also show some regularities in word order: the speaker 
builds a time reference before predicating some properties for the constructed 
time interval. The utterance initial position can be considered iconically 
motivated as word order matches the semantic scope of the adverb. Conversely, 
the temporal expression seems to be utterance final when it represents focal 
information, as in the following utterance (Fusellier-Souza, 2004: 285): 
 
(9) (answering a question about a journey: how many nights/days did it 
take to go there?) 
GO me [pointing at himself] NIGHT [or day: sleeping sign] THREE 
 
The position of temporal expressions thus seems to be determined by the 
same pragmatic and semantic principles found in early L2. In the list of 
similarities we can also add the extensive use of the principle of natural order 
(PNO) in narratives: if events are recounted in their chronological order, the 
consecutive relation is not marked. 
The adult systems show both a structural continuity with child HS and an 
important development in their expressive power for temporal relations. This 
complexification can be attributed to the cognitive maturation taking place with 
age, combined with the presence of favorable conditions for the use of 
language. Actually, the 3 subjects observed by Fusellier-Souza are isolated 
from a deaf community, but at least partially integrated into the hearing 
environment (two of them exert a professional activity). In particular one 
member of their hearing family functions as a preferential speaker (if necessary 
interpreter vis-à-vis hearing people), which means that each deaf subject has at 
least one communicative partner who fully shares the HS system.17 
 
                                                  
17
 Notice the difference between the parents of the American deaf children, who insisted on an 
oral method and did not consider the child's gesture as language (hence the concept of unwilling 
partner, Goldin-Meadow 2002), and  the families of Fusellier-Souza's subjects, who had a 
positive attitude towards HS (cf. also Morford and Kegl 2000 about the parents of Nicaraguan 




2.3.2.1.2 Modality specific features?  
In the introduction it was hypothesized that the specifics of the expressive 
mode could have an impact on the developed system: in contrast to the spoken 
one, the signed modality potentially offers the simultaneous availability of 
multiple resources (hands and facial mimicking). In this respect, Fusellier-
Souza mentions the use of 'eye gaze', which seems to play a role in making the 
difference between a specific and unspecific time reference, although in an 
unclear way (an utterance is for example interpreted with a generic/habitual 
reading because the speaker does not build a time reference and refer back to it 
by his gaze). More interestingly, the 'role shift' from narrator to protagonist that 
takes place in narrative stretches, whereby the signer's own body becomes the 
referential index of a character, allows the speaker to represent simultaneously 
two overlapping activities. In Fusellier's data this is attested on two occasions: 
during the narration of an accident, Jo represented with the hand his movement 
towards the hurt person, while his face mimicked that he was meanwhile 
watching everything; Ivaldo referred to his son noticing a young girl (facial 
mimick and eye gaze) while he was drinking a coke (one hand keeping a 
drinking straw). Such a possibility for expressing simultaneity seems however 
to be exploited only in highly iconic passages, when meaning is constructed by 
'showing' (Cuxac, 2005), and for a limited repertoire of actions. In comparison 
to the spoken one, the manual modality probably also offers a greater potential 
to exploit lexical aspect (cf. for example repetition of the same gesture to 
express reiteration), thanks to the iconic component of visual representation. 
On the other hand, it is not clear to what extent beginning L2 learners also 
resort to gestures because of their limited spoken repertoire in the L2.18 
In sum, from what could be reported in Fusellier-Souza's study, the 
differences related to the expressive modality seem to be rather marginal for 
the domain of temporality. Not specific to modality but to the task of inventing 
items, are: (a) the direct link between gestures and the perceptual experience 
(for example the sleeping sign meaning both day/night and the time unit of 
24h) and (b) conversely the difficulty of expressing arbitrary time units (for 
example months) or absolute time spans, which in HS give way to long 
periphrastic constructions. 
 
                                                  
18
 Gullberg's study on gestures in L2 underlines that they do not replace speech but accompany it. 
Their higher frequency in L2 'suggests a need on the part of the learner to be over-explicit and 
redundant' (1996: 72), but the dominant modality is speech. The analyzed learners of her study, 
however, are rather advanced and we do not know of any study on gestures in early stages of L2 
acquisition.  
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2.3.3 Some final remarks on the windows considered 
The developmental sequences sketched in the previous sections show striking 
similarities and some important differences between L2 varieties and HS 
systems. In particular, it is not easy to put the earlier stages of each process on 
a par, i.e. prebasic varieties in L2 and child homesigns. The cognitive 
development that takes place in the deaf child and his/her initially limited 
communicative needs make child homesigns, if anything, more suitable for a 
comparison with L1 acquisition. On the other hand, child HS make visible a 
stage preceding the expression of any temporal relation that adult L2 
acquisition cannot show: the progressive use of the symbolic function, i.e. 
mentioning entities that are out of the immediate perceptual field. For temporal 
relations, however, there is a first step common to each process (L2, L1, HS): 
the transition from a system that is initially context-dependent (or limited to 
contingent situations) to the development of some means to go beyond the 
here&now. In both cases the deictic speech time is left unmarked, while the 
first temporal devices explicitly mark the (spatio)-temporal displacement of 
the situations talked about. In doing so, children seem to privilege indefinite 
markers (clustering ambiguously another time and another space), while 
definite ones come later. 
Further development leads to a convergence between the systems 
involved in the two processes. The formal repertoire and the communicative 
possibilities that characterize the Basic Variety and adult homesigns are indeed 
very similar. From what can be attested in the literature, in both cases a 
repertoire of lexical expressions arises (i) to locate situations in time (in a 
deictic or absolute way), (ii) to quantify their frequency and duration (be it 
definite or indefinite), (iii) to signal boundaries (thus overruling the inherent 
semantic properties of predicates) and (iv) to order situations with respect to 
each other (in particular before, necessary to overrule the PNO). We can also 
list, as shared features, the organization of temporal information in the 
utterance (linear position mirroring information status and semantic influence) 
and in discourse (leaving unmarked the temporal information recoverable from 
the situational context, from previous discourse or from discourse 
organizational principles). As a result, there is no obligatory element to identify 
the time reference of each predication or its aspect. Their main features for 
temporal relations come close to pidgins and we can subscribe to Labov's 
remark about time in pidgins when he says:  
 
This system may seem primitive but it is hard to prove that it is 




discourse situations it proves to be quite efficient to designate time 
relations: specifically when called for, otherwise not (1990: 18). 
 
Yet, the systems described can be considered both 'simpler' (as for the 
means) and 'restricted' (as for the temporal notions getting expressed) with 
respect to their fully-fledged spoken or signed counterparts. L2 postbasic 
varieties, while approaching the target language, present a wider range of 
formal means in the temporal–aspectual domain which make it possible to 
express more sophisticated temporal notions (for example simultaneity, past in 
the past, aspectual viewpoints other than 'completion'). Sign languages, which 
can be considered as the natural target of HS (or conversely HS as emergent 
Sign Languages, cf. Cuxac, 2005) seem rarely to inflect for tense, but they 
always present a rich system of grammaticalized aspectual marking.19 Studies 
on the emergence of the Nicaraguan Sign Language attest the presence of 
specific means to express iterative, completed and progressive aspect (which 
are already beyond individual HS) even in what is presented as a peergroup 
pidgin developed by the first cohort of homesigners.20 Language diversity 
implies the unequal grammaticalization of aspectual and/or temporal notions,21 
while the system of adult homesigners and L2 learners at Basic Variety level 
present the means to express just a subset of them. 
Various extralinguistic factors can explain the limited amount of formal 
means stated in BV and HS. In the L2 case, the presence of an L1 can represent 
a blocking factor to further development: after all the learner already has a 
                                                  
19
  According to Pfau and Steinbach (2006), signed verbs do not inflect for tense (with some 
exceptions): temporal information is conveyed by time adverbials (use of the so-called time 
lines) and lexical tense markers, or it is inferred from the context; conversely, Sign Languages 
are known to have at their disposal complex systems of aspectual marking. French Sign 
Language includes for example aspectual markers for completion, prospective, recent past, 
experiential and habituality  (cf. Fusellier-Souza and Leix 2005). 
20
 The study of Kegl, Senghas and Coppola (1999) reports how some signers of the peergroup 
pidgin mark certain aspectual information with mouth gestures often accompanied by 
vocalizations that are visually detectable: a rapid protrusion and retraction of the tongue while 
vocalizing /blΛlΛlΛ/ for iterativity and an unvoiced bilabial trill for completion (p. 183). The 
authors also mention the presence of sign reduplication to mark the progressive in the pidgin 
used between hearing individuals and deaf signers (p. 185). Their main point is to show that 
aspectual marking is encoded in a more sophisticated way by the following cohorts; nonetheless 
iterativity, completion and progressive are already expressed, by different means, as of the peer-
group pidgin stage. 
21
 On this point, Chinese and German could be mentioned as representing the extremes: the 
former lacks grammatical tense but presents a set of grammatical aspectual particles, probably 
combined with assertive functions, while the latter has grammaticalized tense in verb inflection 
but lacks a grammatical marking of aspect.  
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language community sharing his/her mother tongue and can be satisfied when 
basic communication for everyday life takes place in the L2. On the other hand, 
the adult homesigner only has his/her gestural system with which to 
communicate, but is exposed to a limited number of exchanges and lacks a 
community of peer interlocutors to further grammaticize the system. Both 
processes give way, however, to stable communicative systems which are 
remarkably similar despite the different circumstances characterizing their 
emergence and the expressive modality. This statement leads to two important 
remarks. First, it reconfirms the idea that the simple systems analyzed are not a 
simplified or reduced version of fully fledged languages, rather the latter are 
but elaborations of the former, obtained by increasing the formal repertoire 
with supplementary means, and making their expression possibly obligatory 
(cf. Corder, 1977; Klein and Perdue, 1997).22 Secondly, given their 
convergence on a functional level, the similarities attested can be attributed to 
the pressure of similar communicative needs (getting more sophisticated in 
adults) which, in a favorable environment (= interaction with communicative 
partners) and in presence of basic cognitive capacities (to segment, analyze and 
recombine elements perceived in a meaningful context23), push the human 
language faculty towards the same direction. The projections onto early 
language start with the assumption that similar driving forces were also at work 
in language evolution. 
 
2.4 Implications for temporality in early language 
2.4.1 The logical sequence 
In modern languages, temporality crucially involves three basic semantic 
operations: localize situations in time, express their distribution over time and 
order them with respect to each other. The development observed in emergent 
L2 and HS systems suggests a relative hierarchy in their expression: explicit 
means for 'localizing situations in time' are attested before specific means to 
'give an aspectual perspective' on them or to 'order' them. This priority is 
directly inferable from L2 development – temporally displaced reference is 
expressed before the emergence of clear verb forms or of any boundary 
                                                  
22
 On the basis of similarities between pidgins, foreigner talk, baby talk and L2 varieties, Corder 
(1977) prefers to 'treat standard languages as 'complicated' forms of a 'basic' simple language'. 
The same idea is defended by Klein and Perdue (1997) specifically for the BV. Formal 
elaboration arises from the broadening range of communicative function within the speech 
community and the need to reduce the ambiguity inherent in simple systems. 
23
 Cf. conclusions given for HS in Goldin-Meadow and Mylander (1990) and Senghas, Kita and 




markers – and indirectly in the analyzed HS systems: the most elaborate means 
deaf adults have at their disposal (deictic, anaphoric and absolute) are 
specialized for this function, while the deaf children produce signs explicitly 
marking the (spatio)-temporal displacement but there is no report on the 
presence of any aspectual markers. The natural sequence thus described 
involves two main steps in the expression of temporal relations: anchoring 
situations in time < giving an aspectual viewpoint on them. Both stages must, 
however, have been preceded by a previous one where symbols were simply 
disconnected from the presence of their referents. 
(i) Mere displaced reference  
Displaced reference is considered to be an essential function of human 
language. It is useful here to distinguish between mere 'displaced reference' – 
making reference to entities in their absence (= the symbolic function of 
language) – and 'temporally displaced reference', i.e. marking that a situation 
does not refer to the present temporal span or specify to which temporal span it 
applies. It seems reasonable to assume a stage where a lexicon of symbols 
referring to situations or speech acts were combined and interpreted by 
pragmatic principles before the emergence of any explicit temporal marking 
(cf. child HS). Utterances would correspond to speech acts related to the 
here&now or close to it, as in (a). 
 
     Sit.A    
(a) -------!-----→      
 Speech time       
 
(ii) Anchoring situation in time: from contextual dependency to temporally 
displaced reference 
The conceptual category of temporality would display a first basic partitioning 
between situations referring to the here&now vs. (spatio)-temporally displaced 
reference (metaphor of cell divisions, cf. Gretsch, 2004). In continuity with the 
previous stage, the origin of this deictic system – 'speech time' or 'close to 
speech time' – may be left unmarked as it belongs to situational, contextual and 
shared knowledge (present default interpretation). An item designating a deictic 
now or here must, however, be available in the system in order to mark the 
contrast to the other temporal (spatial) entities. 
An initial stage of contextual dependence (absence of explicit temporal 
reference) would thus be followed by the development of a minimal deictic 
system, where it is possible to overtly mark speech acts for past, present or up-
coming temporal spans. Note that the temporal system at this stage implies a 
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relation between two parameters – the Topic Time and the Time of Utterance – 
which can coincide (b' TT=TU) or be dissociated (b'' TT<TU; b''' TT>TU). 
 
        Sit.A  Sit.A    Sit.A 
(b') ------[-!-]----→ (b'') [---]-----!-----→(b''')     -------!---[---]--→ 
          S    S                     S 
 
The expression of directionality in temporal displacement could be 
preceded by a stage where the opposition concerns only the here&now and its 
negative counterpart (cf. L1 acquisition and child HS). 
Different scenarios may be envisaged to be involved in the process of 
creating the abstract notion of time. Temporal displacement may first be 
expressed by spatial specification: mentioning another place is a clear strategy 
still used to convey the idea of another time (cf. L2 varieties and, for HS, 
pointings ambiguously meaning 'here' or 'now' and the gesture 'away' implying 
both another time and another place). The visual perception of space makes it 
probably less abstract than the concept of time, but also everyday natural 
events like sunrise/sunfall and the day/night alternation belong to ordinary 
perceptual experience that can have served as a source to quantify time and 
express temporal displacement.  
Once deictic items identifying an indefinite past (before now) and an 
indefinite future (after now) are available, they can also be used anaphorically 
for ordering situations with respect to each other (before x or after X; cf. adult 
HS).  
(iii) Giving a viewpoint on situations: from lexical aspect to boundary markers 
The system just described implies setting a static time reference for a situation 
viewed as a whole (such as 'at time X holds situation A'), which can probably 
also be quantified or repeated, but does not enable any distinction of its inner 
constituency. A further step would be represented by the development of means 
giving a dynamic/aspectual perspective on the situation talked about, and 
boundary markers seem to play a crucial role in this process. 
As we have seen, in emergent L2 and HS systems a first temporal 
characterization of situations arises with the emergence of verb forms: the 
semantics of lexical verbs and argument structure convey properties like 
punctuality, duration or telicity. The introduction of boundary markers (in 
particular items for completion equivalent to finish) allow the speaker to 
overrule the natural semantics of the predicate (cf. for example the combination 
of finish with atelic processes with no natural endpoint). At the same time, they 
represent an increase in conceptual structure: putting a right (or left) boundary 




different phases of the same situation, plus indicating their orientation on a 
temporal scale: for finish the transition goes from a positive (+A) to a negative 
phase (-A), whereby only the latter is expressed. 
 
 Right boundary marker    
Sit.+A Sit.-A      
(c)  ---------[--!--]---→   
  S         
 
The use of items meaning completion (like finish or over), inchoativity 
(like start) or continuation (like keep on), give a dynamic perspective to 
temporal reference and lead to the introduction of a third temporal span: the 
time of the situation itself (in contrast to the asserted one). The data of L2 
acquisition and HS constitute evidence on the primacy of right boundary 
markers (cf. also Bickerton on pidgins24), even if any of them could potentially 
start the mechanism of aspectual perspective. Once the system includes lexical 
means for such notions, aspectual categories like ongoingness or perfectivity – 
where TT and Tsit do not exactly coincide – can develop by ordinary processes 
of grammaticalization (cf. for example Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca, 1994 for a 
crosslinguistic study on lexical sources of tense/aspect markers).  
In the logical sequence just sketched, we can see how a system made of 
non-situation-specific symbols designating entities, actions and properties, can 
acquire more abstract meaning and be progressively used to express the basic 
semantic operations involved in temporality. 
 
2.4.2 Projection on existing models of 'protolanguage'  
The developmental sequences observed in emergent L2 varieties and HS 
systems have enabled us to extrapolate a logical sequence of operations 
concerning the expression of temporal relations in early language. How does 
such a sequence fit existing models of language evolution? Which prerequisites 
in the complexity of the system (and which specific means) are required to 
express temporal relations? In other words, which features of the system must 
co-evolve?  
                                                  
24As Bickerton puts it: 'Pidgins usually have two expressions that mean, respectively, 
"earlier/completed" and "later" (pau and baimbai in Hawaian Pidgin, pinis and bai in Melanesian 
Pidgin). Reflexes of what were probably expressions meaning "earlier/completed" in their 
antecedent pidgins (don in English creoles, and fin in French creoles, kaba in Portuguese creoles) 
are found in almost all creoles and are all, like the Hawaian and Melanesian examples, derived 
from verbs with the meaning "finish" ' (1990: 183).  
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The described sequence is compatible with scenarios whereby language 
evolution takes place progressively by incremental steps. Since Bickerton 
(1990), 'Protolanguage' has become the recurrent term to depict a precursor of 
modern language (cf. Comrie, 2000; Jackendoff, 1999; Arbib, 2003; Wray, 
1998, etc.): such a form of early language is assumed to have been by 
definition 'simpler' than modern language (lacking for example morpho-
syntactic structure), but other features and/or intermediary steps vary according 
to the authors. A first contrast opposes synthetic models to analytic ones: the 
former (for example Wray, 1998) assume that early language would have 
emerged from entirely arbitrary strings of sounds with an holistic meaning, that 
were later fragmented into meaningful components, while the latter (for 
example Bickerton, 1990; Jackendoff, 1999, 2002) posit the emergence of 
single symbols that were afterwards combined. On this point, our data are more 
compatible with the analytic models. 
Though agreeing on the analytic structure of protolanguage, Bickerton 
and Jackendoff end up with different conclusions about its features, despite the 
fact that both authors ground their speculations on similar sources of empirical 
evidence (i.e. trained primates, pidgins, child speech under 2, Genie, late L2 
acquisition, speech of agrammatic aphasics). Bickerton (1990) proposes two 
main steps in the evolution of the human capacity for language: protolanguage 
and language. As reiterated more recently, protolanguage would almost 
exclusively consist of: 'nouns and verbs, without modifiers – if adverbs appear, 
they are usually whole-utterance modifiers, not modifiers of single words. If 
adjectives appear, they are a few of the more common ones, probably acquired 
with nouns as unanalyzed chunks […]. All units are of equal value' (Calvin and 
Bickerton, 2000: 41). In negative terms, protolanguage is very often defined as 
structureless. As a first approximation, it is language minus syntax: it lacks 
function words, utterances do not show any consistent word order, arguments 
can be missing and syntactic embedding is absent. The transition towards 
syntax takes place via argument structure: the regular pattern introduced by the 
obligatory presence of arguments would constitute a template for hierarchical 
phrase structure and syntactic embedding (Calvin and Bickerton, 2000). The 
author is rather laconic about temporality: inflections expressing tense, mood 
and aspect are unlikely candidates for protolanguage, but he speculates on the 
possible presence of expressions meaning earlier/completed (regularly attested 
in pidgins, cf. note 24) derived from verbs meaning finish, which would 
represent 'an analysis of time more primitive than the tense analysis of true 
language' (1990: 183).  
If we consider the repertoire involved for the expressions of the three 




Bickerton's protolanguage: it just requires nouns, verbs and adverbs. A 
protolanguage with such a 'simple repertoire' of lexical means is therefore not 
necessarily confined to the here&now or highly context-dependent; it actually 
allows the speaker to express a dense web of temporal relations. The analysis 
of L2 and HS also leads to a criticism of the idea that the lack of syntactic 
organization equals a random word order: the position of utterance constituents 
(and temporal expressions) can be determined by their information status and 
can mirror their semantic scope. Moreover, the development of argument 
structure may function as a template for syntactic embedding, but it seems 
implausible that it immediately triggers it, as assumed by Bickerton: both BV 
and HS use argument structure but lack formal means for subordination. 
Jackendoff (1999, 2002) elaborates on Bickerton's model, proposing 
several incremental steps instead of one main leap. In his view, the repertoire 
of protolanguage is made up of 'symbols' used in a non-situation specific way 
and combined by pragmatic/semantic principles (Agent first, Topic last, 
Grouping); grammatical categories and symbols for abstract semantic relations 
– prepositions expressing spatial relations, temporal terms like now, yesterday, 
before, after, until, as well as markers of illocutionary force and modality – 
emerge rather late, after the sentence shows the presence of hierarchical phrase 
structure, i.e. in an intermediary stage between protolanguage and modern 
language. The evolutionary schema presented by Heine and Kuteva (this 
volume) also suggests that temporal-spatial displacement is realized only after 
the elaboration of phrase structure and the emergence of several grammatical 
entities.  
Once again the means involved in the development sketched for 
temporal relations are compatible with a stage that would precede modern 
language in Jackendoff's model, but the timing of their co-evolution with 
respect to grammatical categories is less straightforward. If we focus on the 
first temporal operation attested – the displacement of temporal reference from 
the here&now or the localization of situations in time – child HS produce items 
expressing temporal displacement after their system has developed the 
distinction between Nouns (for entities) and Verbs (for actions), even though 
such a distinction is still semantically based (= symbols for abstract semantic 
relations follow or co-evolve with grammatical categories); L2 adult learners, 
on the other hand, realize such a temporal operation even before the production 
of relational items equivalent to verbs (= symbols for abstract semantic 
relations precede a clearcut distinction of grammatical categories). 
The mismatch just pointed out has been attributed to the specifics of each 
ontogenetic process: as opposed to the child, a cognitively mature and socially 
integrated subject cannot be confined to utterances limited to the here&now. 
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The divergence in the empirical sources can thus be accounted for in terms of 
speakers' unequal cognitive-social development and communicative needs, but 
it also raises a fundamental question for projections on language evolution: 
What degree of cognitive development and what kind of communicative needs 
are attributed to human beings creating early language? Are children or adults 
the initial language-makers? 
A closely related question has been formulated about language 
innovation. Contra Bickerton's Bioprogram Hypothesis, Slobin (2002) 
underlines the child's lack of true creativity in normal language acquisition, 
whereas 'much of linguistic innovation is due to individuals who are advanced 
in cognitive and social development'; he recognizes that children can create a 
communicative system with language-like properties in the absence of a 
conventional model (HS), although its grammaticization implies the intensive 
language use induced by the presence of a peergroup community.25 In sum, 
despite age-related differences, both adults and children have the capacities to 
innovate/create language to a certain extent. Notice however that, when it 
comes to the advantage represented by the emergence of language in evolution, 
most of the functional reasons adduced – be it planning joint ventures like sea-
crossings (Coupé and Hombert, 2005), foraging (Bickerton, 2002) or regulating 
social behavior (via grooming for Dunbar, 1996, via narrating for Victorri, 
2002) – suggest adult-like needs and cognitive capacities.  
If our windows on language evolution leave open the initial question 
about the emergence of grammatical categories with respect to the expression 
of temporal displacement (and the subsequent one on the initial language-
makers), they unambiguously indicate that 'complex functions' can be 
expressed by 'simple means'. In particular: 
(a) It is not necessary to presume a high level of syntactic development as a 
pre-requisite for the expression of (complex) temporal relations. The 
basic semantic operations in temporality are compatible with a 
protolanguage repertoire still lacking many of the syntactic features 
displayed by modern language. This observation clearly goes against 
conclusions drawn in several studies which attribute fully syntactic 
                                                  
25
 It is actually subject to debate how far language development can go over the ontogenetic 
lifespan in the absence of a conventional model. Morford (2002) distinguishes convincingly 
between 'innovation' (individual deaf subjects developing linguistic structure out of inconsistent 
gestural input) and 'grammaticization', requiring structured linguistic input and intensive 
language use (for example Nicaraguan signers having the first cohort's HS as input). Fusellier's 
data seem to confirm this statement: even if the oldest subject, with more diversified social 
contacts (hence wider practice of language) displays a richer production in comparison to the 




language on the grounds of evidence for symbolic behavior, like burial 
rituals or personal decoration (cf. Henshilwood et al., 2004 on shell 
beads26); 
(b) What seems crucial for temporality in early language is not the 
complexity of syntactic development, but rather the pre-existing 
conceptual structure for its representation (cf. Wilkins and Wakefield, 
1995) and the need to express it in a linguistic way. This statement 
reconfirms, to a certain extent, that the big step in language evolution is 
the emergence of a lexicon for symbolic function (cf. Deacon, 1997) – in 
particular the ability to disconnect the symbol from the presence of its 
referent – preceded by or combined with the development of pragmatic 
capacities, by which other individuals are recognized as intentional 
agents (cf. the concept of joint attention in Tomasello, 2003, as well as 
the pre-adaptations listed in Hurford, 2003). 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
The goal of this chapter was to gain insight into temporality in early language, 
using the indirect evidence offered by some present-day spontaneous 
developmental processes. To this end we have compared how temporal 
relations are progressively expressed in early stages of adult untutored L2 
acquisition and in (child and adult) homesign systems. 
The first question was whether there are common developmental patterns 
despite the different circumstances of emergence and expressive mode. The 
answer is affirmative: the comparison highlighted some process-specific 
features, but also many striking similarities, such as a remarkable convergence 
between BV and adult HS, both in terms of the formal repertoire and their 
expressive power for temporal relations. The presence of a similar sequence of 
developmental steps suggests a relatively low impact of environmental factors 
(like previous experience of language and expressive mode, the main difference 
being cognitive development); it conversely highlights the communicative 
logic underlying both processes, e.g. a hierarchy in the expression of temporal 
notions, which was used as an empirical basis to propose a logical sequence of 
conceptual operations in early language. 
Another question concerned the means necessary to express the 
fundamental operations identified. By contrasting some models of 
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 The authors report on the discovery of personal ornaments (perforated shell beads) from 
Middle Stone Age and conclude 'fully syntactic language is arguably an essential requisite to 
share and transmit the symbolic meaning of beadworks and abstract engravings such as those 
from Blombos cave' (2004: 404). 
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protolanguage with the simple systems analyzed it was possible to refine the 
potential expressive power of a protolanguage repertoire. The expression of 
basic relations, like temporal displacement (which is already far beyond 
primates communication), does not demand syntactic complexity per se, but 
rather the previous development of the conceptual structure necessary for its 
representation. Projections on early language always have a speculative flavor, 
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thanks go to the coordinator of the project, Rudie Botha, and NIAS for the 
extremely stimulating intellectual environment they provided, and to Clive 
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3. Negation in early L2: a window on language genesis 
Henriëtte de Swart 
Utrecht University 
Abstract 
Early second language has been defined as a restricted linguistic system that 
can offer a 'window' on language genesis. In this paper, I model the acquisition 
of negation by L2 (adult) learners as a sequence of constraint rankings in the 
framework of Optimality Theory. The rankings shift from pragmatics via 
conventionalization of negation as a focus operator to syntax. Early language is 
argued to follow the same path. The transition from protolanguage to language 
is located in the shift from pragmatic combinations of symbols to semantic 
recursion over propositions as visible in the use of negation as a truth-
functional operator. In this view, semantic recursion precedes and drives 
syntactic recursion.  
 
3.1 Negation, L2 and language genesis 
Section 3.1 sketches the background and basic assumptions of the research. We 
establish the study of restricted linguistic systems as a possible window on 
language genesis (section 3.1.1). The empirical phenomenon studied in this 
paper is negation (section 3.1.2). The transition from a protolanguage not 
involving the concept of proposition to a language stage in which semantic 
recursion over propositions is visible in the use of negation can be modeled in 
Optimality Theory (OT) (section 3.1.3). OT has a clear concept of language 
acquisition. Section 3.2 presents the data on negation in L2 acquisition, based 
on the so-called ESF project (Perdue, 1993). The ESF project involves two 
European projects on adult L2 acquisition 'The structure of learner varieties 
and 'The dynamics of learner varieties', and a number of spin offs by research 
teams from different European universities. Section 3.3 models the transition 
from pragmatics to syntax in the early stages of L2 acquisition of negation in 
an OT framework. Section 3.4 formulates possible inferences towards a similar 
transition in language genesis in an OT system that starts from general 
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3.1.1 Restricted linguistic systems as 'windows' on language genesis 
Early second language acquisition is a restricted linguistic system that might 
provide a 'window' on language genesis, according to Jackendoff (2002), Botha 
(2004). The uniqueness and complexity of human language make it an 
important target for evolutionary study. Early stages of human language have 
left no traces, so the evolution of language is not directly recoverable. It needs 
to be reconstructed in the context of neo-Darwinian evolution theory and 
modern linguistic theory (Botha, 2003). Various proposals have been made, but 
no final agreement has been reached, as is obvious for instance from the recent 
debate between Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch on the one hand and Pinker, 
Bloom, and Jackendoff on the other (cf. Pinker and Bloom, 1990; Hauser, 
Chomsky and Fitch, 2002; Pinker and Jackendoff,  2004; Fitch, Hauser and 
Chomsky, 2005). This paper offers an empirical contribution to the debate by 
focusing on the notion of recursion in the conceptual system (semantics) and its 
interaction with the computational system (syntax). 
The paucity of evidence concerning what happened in the very early 
stages of language evolution makes it attractive to look for indirect evidence 
that might help us understand the evolutionary process (Botha, 2003). I will 
follow Bickerton (1990, 1998), Calvin and Bickerton (2000) and Jackendoff 
(2002), who take language to originate in 'protolanguage'. Via intermediate 
stages, with more or less gradual or sudden transitions, this protolanguage 
developed into full language. The study of synchronic varieties of language 
intermediate between protolanguage and full language may help us understand 
this process (Bickerton, 1998: 354). Examples of such restricted linguistic 
systems are pidgins, (early) stages of first and second language acquisition, 
home signs invented by deaf children of non-signing parents, and aphasia. In a 
series of papers, Botha (2004, 2006a, b, 2007) discusses the potential of the 
'windows' approach on language genesis, and points out the merits and 
limitations of various windows (pidgins, home signs). Given the wealth of data 
available within the ESF project, early L2 acquisition is a particularly 
promising window. Lack of time and space prevents us from working out the 
patterns in other restricted linguistic systems in this paper. 
 
3.1.2 Negation as semantic recursion 
The empirical phenomenon under investigation is negation. Negation is a 
universal category of natural language (Dahl, 1979). No animal communication 
system has a full-fledged notion of negation (Horn, 1989; Jackendoff, 2002). 
Recent research on animal cognition suggests that a concept of pre-logical 
negation might be available in the cognitive representation of higher animals 
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(birds, dolphins, primates). On the basis of a review of the literature on animal 
cognition, Heine and Kuteva (2007) conclude that trained animals are able to 
develop notions of rejection and refusal, and even of non-existence. However, 
none of these non-human animals clearly has acquired a notion of denial, that 
is, the ability to deny the truth or falsity of a given assertion. Accordingly, 
animals could be ascribed a notion of pre-logical negation, but not full, truth-
conditional negation. One obvious reason for this fundamental difference 
between human language and animal communication systems would be that 
human language constitutes a recursive system, and animal communication 
systems possibly lack this feature (Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch, 2002). 
Negation in natural language is recursive because it functions as a propositional 
operator: semantically, it takes a proposition p as its argument, and builds a 
new proposition ¬p out of it. Syntactically, it also involves recursion: it is an 
optional element that builds a new sentence when added to a sentence. This 
paper emphasizes the relevance of recursion in the conceptual system 
(semantics), and the way it feeds into the computational system (syntax) for the 
debate on language genesis.  
Full language implies a notion of proposition that can be operated on by 
propositional operators. We can model negation as a propositional operator in 
terms of the connective ¬ from first-order logic. Without making claims about 
the psychological reality of first-order logic, I will assume that (something 
equivalent to) first order predicate logic is part of (modern) human cognition, 
because this logic models important parts of human reasoning. Thus, full 
languages typically have well-formed expressions that express meanings like 
¬p. Full recursion with negation is rare in natural language, i.e. we seldom find 
instances of multiple negation as in 'She didn't not talk to me,' and tri-negative 
interpretations seem to be blocked altogether. Corblin (1996) argues that we 
don't find more than two semantic negations in natural language, because of 
performance limitations on the processing of complex embeddings. This paper 
focuses on sentences containing a single negation, because I am interested in 
the recursion step, not in performance limitations. 
Not all occurrences of the linguistic marker no or not need to be 
associated with the truth-functional connective ¬. Negative utterances can 
function as speech acts indicating rejection, internal desire, refusal as well as 
truth-functional negation or falsity. Rejection and refusal are sometimes 
described as affective or pre-logical negation (Horn, 1989: 164). I will adopt 
the conservative position that rejection and refusal are not be properly 
characterized as signaling semantic recursion over propositions. Clearly, these 
uses of negation are rooted in the discoursal context, relating the speaker's 
utterance to actions or utterances of the interlocutor. However, I will base the 
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claims of negation as semantic recursion in L2 acquisition and in language 
genesis on instances of negation that are clearly truth-functional in nature.  
Protolanguage does not or does not necessarily involve the same notion 
of proposition and truth-value as full (modern) language. Protolanguage 
involves linear order of concatenated symbols, organized by pragmatic 
principles like 'Focus Last' (Jackendoff, 2002: 246-249). It is not necessary to 
ascribe to the speakers of a protolanguage the conceptual notion of proposition 
to allow them to combine symbols in this way. A conservative approach would 
be to posit that protolinguistic utterances are well-formed speech acts that 
convey meaning, but do not denote propositions with a truth-value. Such a 
view implies that the notion of proposition emerges somewhere in the 
transition from protolanguage to full language. It is difficult to make that 
transition visible in factual language use, because it is a conceptual one, rather 
than something that can be observed on the basis of linguistic output. The 
behavior of negation can be used as a pointer under the assumption that one 
cannot use a propositional operator until one has a concept of proposition. 
Given that negation is a very foundational concept for human beings, 
expressions for ¬p would closely follow the introduction of the notion of 
proposition. Under this scenario, the emergence of a truth-functional operator 
like negation corresponds with the transition between a protolanguage not 
involving the conceptual notion of proposition, and a language stage that does. 
Whether this stage counts as 'full' language or not depends on the criterion one 
wants to use to characterize 'full' languages. Negation as recursion would 
certainly be a possible cut-off point, and the one I will adopt here. 
 
3.1.3 Optimality Theory and language acquisition 
One complication that arises in a study of negation from an evolutionary 
perspective is that systems of negation in natural language are widely 
diverging, as the result of highly complex grammaticalization processes, as is 
well known from typological and theoretical research on negation. How can we 
retrace the evolutionary path hidden under this bewildering variety? In de 
Swart (2008), I explore the range and limits of this variation by exploiting the 
tools of bidirectional Optimality Theory. Optimality Theory (OT) is a theory of 
grammar inspired by connectionism. Given that language is a symbolic system, 
rules (constraints) are defined in symbolic terms. However, language is 
embedded in the brain, so Prince and Smolensky (1997), and Smolensky and 
Legendre (2006) develop a 'brainstyle' view of grammar in terms of a harmonic 
system of interacting, soft constraints. In OT, grammatical well-formedness is 
associated with a harmony function over a connectionist network. OT uses 
variable rankings of violable and potentially conflicting constraints to model 
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aspect of natural language. If constraints that are ranked higher do not 
discriminate between candidates, we see the force of lower ranked, 'weak' 
constraints at work. This phenomenon is called the 'emergence of the 
unmarked'. In line with the windows approach, I will use the emergence of 
unmarked negation in early L2 acquisition as the basis for my hypothesis on 
language genesis.  
OT constraints come in two types: faithfulness constraints and 
markedness constraints. Faithfulness constraints specify input-output relations. 
In OT syntax, a faithfulness constraint relates features of the input meaning that 
a speaker wants to express to particular formal features of the output syntactic 
structure. Markedness constraints are output oriented only. They penalize 
marked (long, complex, infrequent) forms and favor unmarked (short, simple, 
frequent) expressions. Faithfulness and markedness constraints frequently 
conflict: a faithfulness constraint might drive the speaker to use a more 
elaborate form that is penalized by a markedness constraint. In OT, this conflict 
is resolved by the ranking of constraints: lower ranked constraints can be 
violated in order to satisfy a higher ranked constraint. Constraints are universal, 
but the ranking of constraints is language specific. Different grammars arise 
from the interaction within a fixed set of constraints.  
The OT model has been exploited to describe the language acquisition 
process by Tesar and Smolensky (1998). They posit that the learner starts out 
with a grammar in which markedness constraints are ranked above all 
faithfulness constraints, and develops a series of grammars getting closer and 
closer to the grammar of the target language s/he is acquiring. If formal 
structure is blocked by the high ranking of the markedness constraints, the 
learner may not be able to produce any output. If the markedness constraints 
only concern formal features, the learner may start to understand the language 
before he or she is able to produce language, when the learner has access to the 
faithfulness constraints. This approach allows comprehension to precede 
production, a phenomenon we find in both L1 and L2 acquisition. The task of 
the learner is to rerank the constraints, and find the right balance between 
faithfulness and markedness constraints. Reranking takes place in small steps 
(one constraint at a time), which allows for intermediate stages. 
Under the assumption that the constraints are universal, we could assume 
that the adult learner has access to the constraints thanks to the grammar of 
their mother tongue. This position would imply access to Universal Grammar 
in the process of second language acquisition. However, the debate in the 
literature leaves the issue of full access to UG by L2 learners undecided, and I 
do not want to be committed to it. Researchers working on L2 acquisition in 
the context of the ESF project have argued that learners rely on pragmatic 
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principles to structure their utterances in the early stages of L2 acquisition (cf. 
Klein and Perdue, 1992; Klein and Perdue, 1997; and others). Syntactic 
principles do not come into play until later stages. I will follow their idea that 
in L2 acquisition, grammar is developed again. In order to model the 
acquisitional path, I propose a sequence of OT systems, in which pragmatic 
principles of utterance structure are gradually replaced by syntactic rules 
(section 3.3). In section 3.4, a similar development will be postulated for 
language genesis. But let us first look at the data on L2 acquisition from the 
ESF project. 
 
3.2 Negation in L2: data and analyses 
We present some preliminaries and early observations on negation in L2 
(section 3.2.1), and then define the main stages of L2 acquisition from the ESF 
project in section 3.2.2. Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 spell out the patterns of 
negation in the pre-basic and basic variety. Negation in Swedish L2 French 
speakers functions as a test case (section 3.2.5).  
  
3.2.1 Preliminaries 
An important debate in L2 acquisition concerns the distribution of labor 
between transfer from L1, Universal Grammar (UG), and the cognitive 
strategies of (adult) speakers who have already mastered a first language. Is the 
output the result of interference with L1, or is it the result of general linguistic 
or cognitive strategies? Wode (1981) is an early reference bringing the 
complexity of this issue to the foreground in relation to the acquisition of 
negation. Wode's subjects are German speaking children acquiring English as a 
second language in the United States. They produce utterances showing 
apparent first language influence, such as (1): 
 
(1) John go not to the school.                                           (Wode, 1981: 98) 
 
In standard modern German, the marker of negation is placed after the 
finite verb (in main clauses), but of course in English, negation requires do 
support. So the production of English utterances like (1) can be an effect of 
interference with the German L1. However, Wode points out that his subjects 
did not produce such sentences early on. Their first attempts at negation were 
utterances like (2) and (3): 
 
(2) No, Tiff.                                                                      (Wode, 1981: 98) 
(3) No sleep.                                                                     (Wode, 1981: 98) 




They do not produce sentences such as (1) until they have acquired the rule of 
negation for auxiliaries, i.e., when they produce utterances like (4): 
 
(4) It's not finished.                                                         (Wode, 1981: 100) 
 
Wode concludes that first language influence appears in later stages of L2 
acquisition, but not in the earliest ones. Most early studies focused on English 
as a target language, and corpus data were not available on a large scale. Data 
on a wider range of languages are now available through the ESF project 
(Perdue, 1993). In this project, longitudinal data have been collected from 
untutored adult learners (mostly immigrants with no or very limited language 
training). The focus of the project is on European languages as L2 (English, 
German, Dutch, French, Spanish). In this section, we discuss the data that have 
been collected in the ESF project, and the analyses that have been proposed for 
the different developmental steps taken by L2 learners.  
 
3.2.2 Stages of L2 acquisition and the role of negation in them 
The results of the ESF project support the view that different inquisitional 
stages of the learner can be described as separate linguistic systems. Even if the 
transitions are not always sharp, it is possible to distinguish three 
developmental stages, referred to as the pre-basic variety, the basic variety, and 
the post-basic variety. The pre-basic phase is based on nominal structure. The 
structure of the utterance is driven by pragmatics, in particular topic-focus 
articulation ('Focus Last). The utterances consist of two or three constituents 
(typically nouns, some adjectives and adverbs, no or almost no verbs). The 
appearance of verbs leads to a new stage of the grammar. The presence of a 
verbal element allows the building of a relational structure around the kernel of 
the verb: the notion of predicate-argument structure emerges. The schematic 
structure of the sentence is NP1-V or NP1-V-NP2 or NP1-Copula-NP2/Adj or V-
NP2. During this stage, the verb form shows no morphological reflections of 
tense, person, number, and there is little or no functional structure. In the post-
basic stage, verbal inflection and functional structure appear, and the grammar 
becomes closer to the target language. There is more variation in the features of 
the post-basic variety, depending on the target language. However, the pre-
basic and the basic variety share many features that are independent of the 
source language (the L1 of the user) and the target language (the L2 of the 
learner). It is those features that qualify early L2 acquisition systems as a 
potential window on language genesis. If learners appeal to 'older' general 
cognitive principles in the early stages of second language acquisition, we can 
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take the production in the pre-basic and basic variety to display features of 
historically early language. Such utterances are then viewed as 'living' fossils. 
The acquisition of negation by L2 learners with different first language 
backgrounds and different target languages is described by Bernini (1996), 
Perdue, Benazzo and Giuliano (2002), Stoffel and Véronique (2003), Giuliano 
(2004) and others.  
 
3.2.3 Negation in the pre-basic variety 
At the very beginning of the learner's process, holophrastic (or anaphoric) 
negation is used to deny the assertability of a proposition previously mentioned 
in the discourse.1  
 
(5) IN c'est un accident.                                              (Giuliano, 2004: 116) 
     'It is an accident.' 
           SF non + *un* manifestation.  
     'No, a demonstration.' 
 
Holophrastic negation has the function of denial, refusal, rejection or 
correction, so it does not necessarily function as a propositional (truth-
conditional) operator.  Already in the pre-basic variety, we find combinations 
of holophrastic negation with a complete utterance. Dimroth et al. (2003) 
emphasize the clausal scope of the negator in examples like (6) and (7). 
 
 
(6) a. MAD nee hier huis                          (Dimroth et al., 2003: 74) 
   no here house 
 b. MAD veel eten nee 
   much eat no 
(7) a. PG nein tasche eh links 
   no   bag      uh to the left 
  PG nei platz eh *gazett* 
   no place uh newspaper 
 
                                                  
1
 In the examples, IN indicates the interviewer. SF indicates that the speaker's L1 is Spanish, her 
L2 is French. IE: L1 is Italian, L2 is English. MAD: L1 is Moroccan Arabic, L2 is Dutch. PG: L1 
is Polish, L2 is German. IG: L1 is Italian, L2 is German. The data consist of transcriptions of oral 
material. + indicates a pause. * indicates material borrowed from another language (usually the 
source language). The paraphrases may insert material not pronounced (between ||). The 
examples come from different sources. I have followed the author's transcriptions as closely as 
possible. 
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In (6a), hier functions as the topic, and huis as the predicate or focus. The 
negator nee precedes the combination of the topic with the predicate, and takes 
scope over the entire utterance. Dimroth et al. (2003) claim that the anaphoric 
origin of the negation operator may explain why forms like nee and nein are 
used as opposed to the target form of sentence negation, i.e. niet or geen in 
Dutch, and nicht and kein in German.  
Giuliano (2004) also emphasizes the role of topic-focus structure in the 
pre-basic variety. Besides the holophrastic use of the negator in (5), she 
discusses the integration of negation in the utterance structure. She claims that 
the negative utterances in the pre-basic variety come in two versions: NEG + X 
and X + NEG, where X=N, Adj, Adv. In utterances with the structure X + NEG, 
X is the topic, and negation functions as the comment. Relevant examples of X 
+ NEG include the following: 
 
(8) IN il y a des taxis                                                  (Giuliano, 2004: 116) 
 SF non + taxis non 
 'No, taxis no.' 
 
(9) IN so you are having an easy time yes?               (Giuliano, 2004: 308) 
 IE For me yes + for my manager the restaurant no. 
 
(8) is qualified as a topic-focus structure, where the topic of conversation is 
taxis, and non is the comment on taxi. Just like Bernini (1996), Giuliano 
observes that negation functions as a focus operator in constructions NEG + X, 
in the sense that X is the constituent that is affected by negation:  
 
(10) SF *ahì no* [nepa] là                                         (Giuliano, 2004: 117) 
 (there, not there/don't look there)) 
  
(11) PE daughter's dad + no job                             (P,B&G, 2002: 858)2 
 (the little girl's father doesn't have a job) 
 
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish holophrastic (anaphoric) negation from 





                                                  
2
 PE stands for a Punjabi learner of English. 
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(12) IN Are there English people in the factory?      (Giuliano, 2004: 316) 
 IE No Italian 
 IN Only Italians? 
 IE yeah + *solo italiani* 
 IN mm 
 IE No English 
 IN No English? 
 
In 'no Italian', negation has an anaphoric function. In 'no English', the negator 
functions as a focus operator and affects the constituent English to its right. In 
the pre-basic variety, holophrastic negation, NEG + X and X + NEG make up the 
inventory of negative expressions of the L2 speaker.  
 
3.2.4 Negation in the basic variety 
In the basic variety, the verb emerges as the kernel of the utterance. Argument 
structure (involving thematic arguments like AGENT, THEME, GOAL) evolves 
along with the verb-noun distinction. The verb does not bear morphological 
finiteness features yet. It is typically used in an invariant form that does not 
reflect tense, person, or number. Although we still find some examples of X + 
NEG, its use diminishes in favor of the constructions NEG + X, and, in particular 
NEG + V. The dominant phrase structure of negative utterances in the basic 
variety is (NP) + NEG + V (+ Y), where V is morphologically non-finite, and Y 
= NP, PP or AdvP (Perdue, Benazzo and Giuliano, 2002; Giuliano, 2004: 350). 
Examples of NEG + X include the following:  
 
(13) SF *en* la cite [nepade] classe                          (Giuliano, 2004: 126) 
 (à la cité il n'y a pas de classe) 
 'In the cité there are no classes.' 
 
 
(14) SF [el demãnd] à la dame *por* [mãZe]           (Giuliano, 2004: 126) 
 (Elle demande à la dame pour manger.) 
 'She asks for the lady to eat.' 
 SF *y* [nepade] l'argent *por* [pãZe] 
 (et il n'a pas d'argent pour payer) 
 'And he does not have money to pay.' 
 
In the examples (13) and (14), the copula remains implicit, but the negation is 
clearly propositional in nature. In (15) and (16), negation precedes a lexical 
verb: 




(15) IN Est-ce qu'il y a un travail que vraiment vous n'aimeriez pas du tout 
faire? 
 Is there a kind of work you would really not like to do at all?  
 SF Ah oui + nepade komprende *por* français à travail de kusin. 
 (ah oui + je ne comprends pas à cause de mon français le travail de 
cuisine.) 
 'Ah, yes, I don't understand because of my French the kitchen work.' 
                (Giuliano, 2004: 127) 
(16) SF mon mari eh [eskri] *y* [kompri] bien le français 
 (mon mari écrit et comprend bien le français) 
 'My husband writes and understands French well.' 
 SF mais moi [nepadekriBir] 
 (mais moi |je| n'écris pas) 
 'But me, I don't write.'                                        (Giuliano, 2004: 127) 
 
The L2 speaker of French that produced the data in (15), (16) frequently uses 
an unanalyzed form nepade as the marker of sentential negation. It always 
appears preverbally, even though pas in modern French is post-verbal.3 We 
find a similar phenomenon of a frozen negation form in the following L2 
English example: 
 
(17) IN What other things could you see in the room? 
 IE I [dont] see very well. 
 (I didn't see very well.)                                      (Giuliano, 2004: 268) 
 
The form dont looks like the combination of do and enclitic n't, but it is most 
likely morphologically unanalyzed, because it doesn't inflect for person, tense 
or number. Dont always occurs before the lexical verb.  
Dimroth et al. (2003) analyze negation in the basic variety as a link 
between topic and focus. They provide examples like the following to support 
their views: 
 
(18) MAD ik niet *hapis* gaan                         (Dimroth et al., 2003) 
  I   not  prison   go 
 
 
                                                  
3
 Post-verbal occurrences of pas are frequent in formulaic speech, as in Je sais pas ('I don't 
know') or Je comprends pas ('I don't understand'). Giuliano takes these to be remembered as 
'chunks', and claims they do not tell us much about the grammar of the speaker.  
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(19) IG meine kind nix        in schul             (Dimroth et al., 2003) 
  my     child nothing in school 
 
The structure (NP) + NEG + V (+ Y) is then an instance of the pattern topic + 
link + focus, with the possibility of an implicit, anaphoric topic. 
Perdue, Benazzo and Giuliano (2002) and Giuliano (2004) suggest that 
the structure NEG + V is a characteristic of the basic variety independently of 
the source and target languages at hand. The target in the acquisition of French 
is for pas to follow the finite verb. The target in the acquisition of English is for 
not to follow the auxiliary (have, be, modals) if there is one in the sentence, and 
to introduce do-support with lexical verbs. These structures do not 
systematically arise until the post-basic variety, where auxiliaries are acquired, 
and morphology and functional structure emerge. Giuliano (2004) extensively 
discusses the possibility of influence from the source language. Her data come 
from Spanish and Italian learners of French and English respectively, and both 
Spanish and Italian have preverbal negation, so this would be a natural 
possibility of transfer. However, Giuliano argues that transfer is unlikely to 
explain the data in full. In her view, we would not expect L2 users to come up 
with idiosyncratic forms like nepade in preverbal position if the input contains 
post-verbal pas. Moreover, preverbal ne is frequently dropped in the informal, 
spoken French of the input, so the L2 learner does not really get support for a 
preverbal negation from the input. Giuliano (2004: 219) favors an explanation 
in terms of 'natural syntax', and assumes that preverbal negation is the 
typologically unmarked option. Accordingly, preverbal negation might be the 
first hypothesis about the position of negation to be entertained by the L2 
learner. It is not until the post-basic variety that learners acquire the correct (i.e. 
target language) placement of negation, along with verb morphology and a 
richer syntactic structure. Not all L2 learners reach this stage: some never 
progress past the basic variety.  
 
3.2.5 Swedish learners of French: a test case. 
Researchers in the ESF framework emphasize that learners with different 
source languages and acquiring different target languages show many 
similarities in their acquisitional path. The presence of NEG + V in the basic 
variety is one of the features that could be labeled as an overall tendency. 
However, in most of the cases we have seen so far, the L1 languages had 
preverbal negation (Italian, Spanish), or discontinuous negation (Moroccan 
Arabic). We should test the hypothesis of preverbal negation emerging as the 
unmarked case in a context in which both the L1 and the L2 have post-verbal 
negation. If we find preverbal negation with such L2 speakers, this would 
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support the hypothesis that preverbal negation is a feature of the basic variety. 
The study of Swedish learners of French, reported by Sanell (2005) could very 
well provide the relevant ingredients. Swedish has a post-verbal position for 
negation, just like German. Formal French has a discontinuous negation ne + V 
+ pas, but the spoken language only preserves the post-verbal negation pas.  
Sanell's L2 learners of French are highly tutored: they are high school 
students, college students, and university students training to be language 
teachers. Sanell uses the classification developed by Bartning and Schlyter 
(2004) to describe the various stages of L2 acquisition. The initial stage in this 
classification resembles the pre-basic variety from the ESF framework. The 
post-initial stage seems roughly parallel to the basic variety. The intermediate 
stage could be equated with the post-basic variety, and the advanced stages are 
definitely past the levels distinguished in the ESF framework. In the initial 
stage, the post-initial stage and the intermediate stage, constructions with 
preverbal negation are found. Relevant examples include non preceding the 
lexical verb in (20) and (21), ne seul preceding the lexical verb in (22), (23), 
and pas preceding a finite lexical verb (24): 
 
(20) E: e:h/eh ils non comprendre comprendre. 
 (Ils ne comprennent pas) 
 'Eh, they don't understand.'  
 I: Les Français ne comprend + comprennent pas l'anglais. 
 (Les Français ne comprennent pas l'anglais) 
 'The French don't understand English.'          (Carin: 1, GD) initial stage 
 
(21) I: tu as travaillé? 
 'You have worked?' 
 E: non + non travaillE non non 
 (Non, non, je n'ai pas travaillé) 
 'No + no I haven't worked no no.'                  (Carin: 1, GD) initial stage 
 
(22) E: eh mais mais je ne nétudiE chaque jour 
 (Eh, mais mais je n'étudie pas chaque jour) 
 'Eh, but but I don't study every day.'       (Vera: 4, GD) post-initial stage 
 
(23) I: Plusieurs fois par semaine? 
 'Several times a week?' 
 E: par se- # je ne comprends. 
 (Parce que, je ne comprends pas) 
 'Because, I don't understand.'                 (Pelle: 1, GD) post-initial stage 





(24) I: qu'est-ce que # c'est le soleil qui te désoriente? 
 'What is  it  # it is the sun that disturbs you?' 
 E: non no (RIRE) non eh je je seulement / je je seulement pas vois 
mon/ 
 mon <schema>               (Pelle: 7, GD) post-initial stage 
 (Non non, seulement, je ne vois pas mon schéma) 
 'No no, no it is just that I don't see my schema.' 
 
The numbers are fairly low: we are talking about a total of 18 utterances 
in the initial, post-initial and intermediate stage together.4 The number of 
utterances involving post-verbal negation by means of pas in the same three 
stages is 145, 11 of which already occur in the initial stage. A relevant example 
includes the following: 
 
 (25) E: oui. (I:mm) et mais/ le garçons est plus gentiLS. (RIRE) 
 (Oui, mais les garçons sont plus gentils.) 
 'Yes, but the boys are nicer.' 
 I: sont plus gentils que les filles? + Xc'est Xvrai. Ah bon. 
 'Are nicer than the girls? It's true. Ah well.' 
 E: (RIRE) SIM mais il est / il est deux filles / qui n'est pas. <NEJ>. Qui 
eh n'est pas (SOUPIR) // 
 (Mais il y a deux filles qui ne sont pas) 
 'There are two girls who are not.' 
 I: il y a deux filles/ 
 'There are two girls.' 
 E: eh je ne // est ce je n'aime pas. 
 (Eh, que je n'aime pas) 
 'Eh, that I don't like.'                                      (Heidi: 1, GL) initial stage 
 
Just like L2 speakers in the ESF project, Sanell's learners produce early 
occurrences of post-verbal pas in formulaic sequences. In the post-initial stage, 
there are 82 occurrences of sentence negation, almost all of which in line with 
the target language.  
The presence of preverbal negation in the L2 French of Swedish learners 
is quite surprising. This cannot be an influence of the source language, for 
                                                  
4
 Sanell renders the L2 French in standard French. The English translations are mine. 
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negation in Swedish is post-verbal. Even though the numbers are low, the 
appearance of NEG + V constructions in the L2 French of Swedish learners 
provides support for Giuliano's hypothesis that preverbal negation is part of 
'natural' syntax. 
  
3.3 An interpretation of the L2 data on negation in OT 
This section starts with the constraints relevant to negation (section 3.3.1). 
Sections 3.3.2 through 3.3.5 offer an OT analysis of holophrastic negation, 
negation in the pre-basic, basic and post-basic variety respectively. Section 
3.3.6 sums up the developmental path.  
 
3.3.1 OT constraints governing negation 
Elsewhere (de Swart, 2006, 2008), I have developed an analysis of negation in 
Optimality Theory. The insights of that work on universal aspects of negation, 
and cross-linguistic variation can be used model the L2 process. The system is 
based on the balance between the two constraints FNeg and *Neg: 
 
♦ FNeg  
 Be faithful to negation, i.e. reflect the non-affirmative nature of the input 
in the output. 
♦ *Neg 
 Avoid negation in the output. 
 
FNeg is a faithfulness constraint, because it establishes a relation between the 
input and the output. *Neg is a markedness constraint, because it is exclusively 
output related. From the formulation of the constraints, it is clear that FNeg and 
*Neg are in conflict. If the message to be conveyed is negative, FNeg drives 
the speaker to use a negative form. However, *Neg drives the speaker to avoid 
negative forms, without any regard for the meaning the speaker intends to 
convey. The OT grammar strikes a balance between the conflicting constraints 
by ranking them in a particular order. Weaker constraints may be violated in 
order to satisfy stronger constraints. The actual form the speaker chooses is the 
optimal form under a particular constraint ranking. L2 acquisition is a 
developmental process, during which the rankings gradually change. The 
reranking of constraints models the development of the grammar towards a 
ranking that corresponds with the grammar of native speakers of the target 
language.  
The evolutionary bidirectional learning algorithm of Jäger (2003), 
Mattausch (2005, 2007) uses frequency asymmetries in the input meanings to 
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derive Horn's (1984) division of pragmatic labor. The Horn system in which 
unmarked (frequent) meanings are paired up with unmarked (short, simple) 
forms, and marked (rare) meanings are paired up with marked (long, complex) 
forms arises as an evolutionary stable system of communication (Van Rooy, 
2004). De Swart (2008) applies this algorithm to negation, and shows that 
FNeg and *Neg emerge as the relevant constraints in this model. This outcome 
correlates with the typological observation that negation is a universal category 
in the world's languages (Dahl, 1979). The constraints FNeg and *Neg are thus 
well grounded. 
The constraints FNeg and *Neg provide the foundation of the negation 
system. In the OT syntax, the constraint ranking FNeg >> *Neg forces the 
overt realization of negation. This is derived from the following tableau: 
 
Tableau 3.1: Negative sentences (production) 
Meaning 
¬p 
Form FNeg *Neg 
 S *  
 not S  * 
 
The input in tableau 3.1 is a meaning, and the output candidates 
evaluated by the grammar are forms. All the generation tableaux have this set-
up. The left to right order of the constraints indicates that FNeg is stronger than 
*Neg. This implies that a violation of FNeg (indicated by an asterisk) is 'worse' 
than a violation of *Neg. In other words, a violation of *Neg is tolerated if this 
allows the candidate to satisfy the higher ranked constraint FNeg. The optimal 
candidate is the one marked by the pointing hand. In tableau 3.1, it is the 
candidate form that realizes the semantic input ¬p as 'not S'. Even though this 
output violates *Neg, it is the best possible way of satisfying the constraints 
under this ranking. The ranking FNeg >> *Neg reflects the generally accepted 
view that negative statements are cross-linguistically more marked in form than 
their affirmative counterparts (Payne 1985, Horn 1989, Haspelmath 1997), as 
illustrated by the overt marker of negation in (26).  
 
(26) a. John is not sick.                                                         [English] 
 b. Ou petetai Sokrates.                                       [Ancient Greek] 
   Not flies Sokrates.  
   'Socrates doesn't fly'  
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 c. Dokumenty ne obnaružilis                                        [Russian] 
   Documents not were found.  
 'Documents were not found.' 
 d. Mtoto ha-ku-lia.                                                        [Swahili] 
   Child neg-past-cry.  
 'The child did not cry.' 
 
Obviously, negation should not only be produced (by the speaker), it 
should also be understood (by the hearer). The production of negative forms is 
determined in the OT syntax; the interpretation of these forms is determined in 
the OT semantics. In the OT semantics, FNeg is satisfied if a form marked as 
negative is mapped onto a negative meaning. *Neg is satisfied if the meaning 
representation does not involve a negation. Under the constraint ranking FNeg 
>> *Neg, we get the following tableau: 
 
Tableau 3.2: Negative sentences (interpretation) 
Form 
not S 
Meaning FNeg *Neg 
 P *  
 ¬p     * 
 
The input in tableau 3.2 is a form, and the output candidates evaluated by 
the grammar are meanings. All the interpretation tableaux have this set-up. If 
FNeg outranks *Neg, we obtain a negative meaning as the optimal 
interpretation of sentences like (26). 
As far as the position of negation is concerned, a constraint that plays an 
important role in many languages is NegFirst: 
 
♦ NegFirst (focus version) 
 Negation precedes its focus.  
 
The tendency for negation to be expressed early in the sentence has been 
observed by Jespersen (1917) and Dahl (1979). Horn (1989: 293) dubs the 
principle NegFirst, and describes it as the preference of negation to precede its 
focus (1989: 446). As a result of NegFirst, negation precedes the constituent it 
modifies, occurs early in the sentence, occupies a preverbal position, etc. Given 
that verbs are the core predicative part in (full) sentences, the grammaticized 
version of NegFirst that we see play a role in natural language is often the one 
that requires negation to be preverbal: 
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♦ NegFirst (grammaticized version) 
 Negation precedes the (finite) verb. 
 
Typologically speaking, NegFirst is a tendency, not a hard rule. 
Therefore, it works well as a soft, violable constraint, which can be ranked 
higher or lower in the hierarchy in order to reflect the role it plays in the 
grammar. NegFirst is ranked high in Romance languages, in which we find an 
asymmetry between negative indefinites in preverbal and in post-verbal 
position. As illustrated for Italian, a preverbal negative subject is incompatible 
with a marker of sentential negation (27b), whereas a sentence with a post-
verbal negative subject would be ungrammatical without a marker of sentential 
negation (27a) (examples from Corblin and Tovena, 2003): 
 
 (27) a. *(Non) è venuto nessuno [Italian] 
   *(SN) is come nobody. 
   'Nobody has come.' 
 b. Nessuno (*non) è venuto. 
   Nobody (*SN) es come. 
   'Nobody has come.' 
 
The high ranking of NegFirst in the grammar of Italian requires the 
presence of non in contexts like (27a) in order to satisfy this constraint, 
whereas the preverbal position of the subject in contexts like (27b) is sufficient 
to satisfy NegFirst. An extra negation marker is not necessary in that case, and 
is accordingly blocked for economy reasons. 
Although NegFirst is a ranked high in many languages, also outside of 
Romance, it is not in Germanic languages like Dutch and German. In these 
languages, we find a post-verbal marker of sentential negation (28a), and free 
use of post-verbal negative indefinites without the support of a marker of 
sentential negation (28b): 
 
(28) a. Jan komt niet. [Dutch] 
  Jan comes sn 
  'Jan doesn't come.' 
 b. Floor zegt niets. 
  Floor says nothing 
  'Floor doesn't say anything.' 
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The contrast between Italian and Dutch can be accounted for if the ranking of 
NegFirst in the grammar of negation varies across languages.5 In sections 3.2-
3.5, we show how the constraints FaithNeg, *Neg and NegFirst are gradually 
acquired and ranked by L2 learners.  
 
3.3.2 Holophrastic negation 
In section 3.3 above, I assumed that the L2 learner starts out with the 
markedness constraints ranked above faithfulness constraints. I model this by 
ranking a meta-constraint *Structure above a meta-constraint Faith. Under this 
setting, no language is produced, and no utterances are interpreted. This is the 
null stage of L2 acquisition. During the acquisition process, more and more 
faithfulness constraints are ranked about the corresponding markedness 
constraints, and comprehension and production follow. If we apply this idea to 
the faithfulness and markedness constraints related to negation, we expect the 
learner in the null situation to have the setting *Neg >> FaithNeg, and thereby 
not produce any output for negative utterance. The ESF data show that 
holophrastic negation is produced early on. According to Perdue, Benazzo and 
Giuliano (2002: 863), 'it seems that a word for negation is essential.' This 
implies that learners switch to the ranking FaithNeg >> *Neg in the pre-basic 
variety. Note that the input in tableau 3.3 is not(p), where not stands for pre-
logical negation. 
 
Tableau 3.3: Generation of holophrastic negation 
Meaning             
not(p) 
Form FaithNeg *Neg 
 (S) *  
 no (S)     * 
 
In holophrastic negation, p and S may remain implicit, so negation is 
typically anaphoric (cf. example 5 in section 3.2.3 above). Holophrastic 
negation may also be added to a complete utterance (cf. examples 6, 7 in 
section 3.2.3 above), in which case S is overt. Given that FaithNeg >> *Neg is 
the universal ranking in natural languages (cf. tableau 3.1 in section 3.3.1 
above), the ranking posited in tableau 3.3 may not come as a surprise. 
                                                  
5
 The situation of English negation involves do-support, so it is more complex, and will not be 
discussed here. The interested reader is referred to de Swart (2008) for discussion and an 
analysis. 
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However, the early emergence of negation in L2 acquisition indicates the 
relevance of the function of negation for L2 speakers over many other features 
of the target language to be acquired.  
 
3.3.3  Negation in the pre-basic variety 
In the pre-basic variety, utterances are organized on the basis of pragmatic 
principles ('Focus Last'), rather than rules of syntax. Pragmatic principles are 




 New information comes last in the utterance 
 
FocusLast comes into play in word order in general. Here, we focus on the role 
of topic-focus articulation in the placement of negation. If we assume that 
FaithNeg is ranked higher than *Neg, and FocusLast is the relevant constraint 
determining word order, we arrive at the patterns X+NEG and NEG+X described 
for the pre-basic variety (Giuliano, 2004). If the input meaning construes X as 
the topic, and negation as the comment, X+NEG is the optimal form (tableau 
3.4). The same constraints in the same order guarantee that an utterance of the 
form X+NEG leads to the optimal interpretation in which X is topic, and 
negation is the focus (tableau 3.5): 
 
Tableau 3.4: X is topic (production of X+NEG) 
Meaning     Xtop 
notfoc 
Form FNeg  *Neg FocusLast 
 X  *        
 X NEG  *      
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Tableau 3.5: X+neg (interpretation of X as topic) 
Form         X 
NEG 
Meaning FNeg  *Neg FocusLast 
       X *        
 Xtop notfoc  *    
 Xfoc nottop       * * 
 
Negation is expressed in the pre-basic variety, because of the ranking 
FNeg >> *Neg. The topic-focus structure of the input translates into linear 
order in the production tableau 3.4. Conversely, linear order is interpreted in 
terms of information structure (tableau 3.5). The constraint FocusLast thus 
decides the word order in the production, and the topic-focus articulation of the 
message in the interpretation.  
 
Tableau 3.6: X constitutes the focus of negation (production) 
Meaning     Neg 
Xfoc 
Form FNeg   *Neg FocusLast 
 X  *        
                     X NEG        * * 
 NEG X         *     
 
Tableau 3.7: neg + X (interpretation of X as the focus of negation)  
Form      NEG  
X 
Meaning FNeg  *Neg FocusLast 
     X *        
                    Xtop Negfoc         *     
 NEG Xfoc        * * 
 
In tableau 3.6, the input meaning construes X as the focus of the 
utterance, and we see that NEG + X is produced as the optimal form. The 
difference in form is perceived as a difference in meaning (tableau 3.7). 
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The four tableaux sum up the two possible form-meaning pairs in the 
pre-basic variety. The ranking FNeg >> *Neg guarantees the expression of 
negative forms and the interpretation of these forms in terms of negative 
meanings. Besides FNeg and *Neg, we need FocusLast to relate word order 
variation to information structuring concepts like topic and focus. 
The fact that negation in the pre-basic variety interacts with topic-focus 
articulation indicates that negation is sensitive to focus in the early stages of L2 
acquisition. Of course, the focus sensitivity of negation is a well-described 
phenomenon in semantics (cf. Rooth, 1985; Kratzer, 1989; and others). The 
standard view on focus operators is that they split the sentence into a 
background and a focus. Only the focused material is affected by the operator; 
background material remains outside of its scope. For negation, this is 
illustrated in (29), where the different parts of the sentence that can be 
associated with focus are marked with the subscript f: 
 
(29) Mary didn't buy a red sweater 
 a. Mary didn't buy a [red]f sweater. (She bought a green one) 
 b. Mary didn't buy a [red sweater]f. (She bought a green vest) 
 c. Mary didn't [buy]f a red sweater. (She borrowed one) 
 d. [Mary]f didn't buy a read sweater. (Sue did) 
 
The different readings in (29a-d) indicate that focus has truth-conditional 
effects. Negation is thus qualified as a focus operator that associates with focus 
to determine the truth conditions of the sentence. In the pre-basic variety, we 
see the focus-based use of negation in tableaux 3.6 and 3.7. The structure NEG 
+ X arises when X is in focus. However, we also find a different use, namely 
that in tableaux 3.4 and 3.5. The structure X + NEG arises when negation itself 
is in focus, and functions as a predicate over the topic X. The use of negation as 
a predicate is possible in the pre-basic variety, because the L2 speaker uses a 
nominalized structure in this stage. Verbs as designated expressions for 
predication do not appear until the basic variety. In the absence of a notion of 
lexical category in the pre-basic variety, all lexical items can be freely used as 
topic or focus in a two word utterance in which topic comes first and focus 
comes last. Negation is no exception, as the existence of X + NEG alongside 
NEG + X proves. 
  
3.3.4 Negation in the basic variety 
In the basic variety, the verb emerges as the kernel of the utterance. Argument 
structure (involving thematic roles like AGENT, THEME, GOAL) evolves along 
with the noun-verb distinction. Negation is pre-dominantly preverbal in this 
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stage, according to Perdue, Benazzo and Giuliano (2002) and Giuliano (2004). 
That is, the overall structure of negative utterances is (NP +) NEG + V (+ Y), 
where Y=NP, PP or AdvP. This aligns with the early English L2 data from 
Wode (1981). Sanell's (2005) data show infrequent, but surprising patterns of 
preverbal negation in the L2 French of Swedish learners in the initial, post-
initial, and intermediate stage. Giuliano (2004) qualifies the preverbal position 
of negation as an instance of 'natural' syntax.  
It is tempting to relate this pattern to the emergence of NegFirst as the 
relevant constraint governing the position of negation in the utterance. 
However, such a ranking cannot directly be linked to the preceding stage of the 
pre-basic variety, that we defined in terms of FocusLast and FNeg >> *Neg in 
section 3.3.3. The reason is that FocusLast is a general pragmatic constraint, 
whereas NegFirst (grammaticized version) is an item specific, syntactic 
constraint. Under the assumption that L2 acquisition involves a gradual change 
in constraint ranking, the one cannot simply replaced by the other. The L2 
speaker faces two tasks: relate negation to the newly developed noun-verb 
distinction, and make the transition from information structure to syntactic 
structure. We model this as a development in two steps.  
In the transition to the basic variety, a grammatical structure arises with 
the verb as the kernel of the utterance. In order to give negation scope over the 
utterance as a whole, the verb becomes the focus of negation. In two-word 
utterances involving negation, the structure NEG + V is a direct successor of 
NEG + X, and is primarily used to express negation of the verb, or by extension, 
negation of the VP, and of the utterance as a whole. So far, this can be handled 
by the existing constraint setting, as illustrated in tableau 3.8, (to be compared 
to tableau 3.6 in section 3.3.3 above). 
 
Tableau 3.8: V constitutes the focus of negation (production) 
Meaning      not 
Vfoc 
Form Fneg   *Neg FocusLast 
 V  *        
                     V NEG        * * 
 NEG V         *     
 
The introduction of a clear distinction between nouns and verbs, and 
the thematic roles evolving along with it immediately triggers another 
development. In utterances expressing affirmative statements, the linear order 
NP + V (+ NP) becomes the standard format for predicate-argument structures 
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in which the controller (the NP) is first and the focus/predicate (the V or 
V+NP) is last. Including negation in this format leads to a problem, because 
negation is neither the controller (it is not an agent), nor the predicate (negation 
does not have thematic argument structure). Dimroth et al. (2003) characterize 
negation as a link between topic and focus. The linear order NP + NEG + V (+ 
NP) reflects the structure topic + link + focus. The emergence of propositional, 
focus sensitive operators involves a new category of expressions next to the 
verb-noun distinction that marks the transition from the pre-basic to the basic 
variety. The emergence of focus operators requires an integration of the 
operator-scope structure into the word order. Both information structure and 
operator-scope have a natural tendency to align with the left-right order of 
constituents. De Hoop and de Swart (2000) postulate a mirror principle α < β, 
which models this.  
 
♦ Mirror principle α < β  
α < β: topic < focus: operator < scope, i.e. the linear order of two 
syntactic constituents α and β corresponds to the order topic-focus in the 
information structure, which corresponds to the order operator-scope. 
 
So far, the relation between word order and information structure has 
been captured by means of the constraint FocusLast. With the acquisition of 
scope bearing operators, the learner has to generalize this constraint to include 
scope bearing operators as spelled out in the mirror principle. Tableau 3.9 
illustrates how the generalization of FocusLast to the mirror principle leads to 
the ranking NP + NEG + V (+ NP): 
 
Tableau 3.9: Production of NP + NEG + V (+ NP) (mirror principle) 
Meaning    ¬xtop 
[V y]foc 
Form FNeg   *Neg α < β 
 NP V NP *        
                     NEG NP V NP        * * 
 NP NEG V NP  *  
 NP  V NP NEG  * * 
 
According to the input meaning, the first argument (the agent) is the 
topic of the utterance. The verb cluster (V + second argument) is in focus. 
Propositional negation typically affects the verb, or the verbal cluster as the 
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kernel of the utterance. All candidates that realize negation in the form violate 
the constraint *Neg in order to satisfy the higher ranked constraint FaithNeg. 
The mirror principle then decides the position of negation in the utterance. A 
clause initial position of negation is less optimal than a preverbal position, in 
which the operator immediately precedes its focus. Under this constraint 
ranking, an input in which negation affects the verb induces placement of 
negation in a position immediately preceding the verb. 
NegFirst (focus version) is nothing but a particular instance of α < β in 
relation to negation. The identification of negation as a scope bearing operator, 
and the extension of FocusLast to the mirror principle α < β implies that the 
learner has adopted the constraints NegFirst (focus version) and FNeg >> 
*Neg:  
 
Tableau 3.10: Production of NP + NEG + V (+ NP) (NegFirst, focus version) 
Meaning   ¬xtop 
[V y]foc 
Form FNeg   *Neg NegFirstf 
 NP V NP *        
                     NEG NP V NP        * * 
 NP NEG V NP  *  
 NP  V NP NEG  * * 
 
In parallel to the development of the structure NP + NEG + V (+ NP), we 
find that the structure X + NEG diminishes in use and gradually disappears, as 
shown in section 3.2.3 above. This supports the view that in the basic variety, 
negation can no longer be viewed as a predicate or a comment on the topic 
expressed by X, because verbs emerge in this stage as the expressions of 
predication by excellence. In the learner's input to the production system, we 
still find NEG Xfocus (as in tableau 3.6, section 3.3.3) but no longer Xtopic NEGfocus 
(as in tableau 3.4, section 3.3.3). Once negation is no longer usable as a 
predicate, it is de facto conventionalized as a focus operator linking the topic 
and the predicate. Given that the use of negation as a focus operator is the 
typical situation in the target language (cf. 29), this restriction means that the 
L2 output gets closer to the target language production. This improves the 
communicative situation, and supports the development.  
As far as the semantics is concerned, the introduction of a noun-verb 
distinction implies that the L2 user has acquired lexical categories, as well as a 
concept of predicate-argument structure and thematic roles. Negation is outside 
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the noun-verb distinction, and is a member of a separate category of linking 
expressions. Dimroth et al. (2003: 70) take linking expressions to validate the 
relation between the state of affairs described in the predication part of the 
utterance, and its topic. Negation gets a truth-functional interpretation, because 
the linking relation shows the conceptualization of the utterance as conveying a 
full-fledged proposition, based on predicate-argument structure. Negation is 
now conceived as a scope-bearing operator, involving semantic recursion. This 
is reflected in the interpretation we propose for the grammar of negation in the 
pre-basic variety: 
 
Tableau 3.11: Interpretation of NP + NEG + V (+ NP) 
Form            NP 
NEG V NP                    
Meaning FNeg   *Neg NegFirstf 
 xtop [V y]foc *        
 ¬xtop [V y]foc        *      
 ¬xfoc [V y]top  * * 
 
In the structure NP + NEG + V (+ NP), negation needs to be interpreted 
because of the high ranking of FNeg. The role of NegFirst in the semantics is to 
interpret the part of the utterance that follows negation as its focus, i.e. its 
domain of application. This rules out the interpretation in which x (the agent) 
would constitute the focus of negation. The transition from the interpretation 
tableaux 3.5 and 3.7 (section 3.3.3) to the interpretation tableau 3.11 reflects a 
major change in the conceptualization of utterances. In tableaux 3.4 through 
3.7, the semantics of negation is written in terms of the (pre-logical) negation 
not because we had no evidence that truth-functional negation was involved. In 
tableau 3.10, the semantics of negation is written in terms of the first-order 
logical connective ¬, because the validation of the relation between topic and 
predicate relies on the notion of a proposition with a truth-value. 
In sum, the introduction of a lexical noun-verb distinction pushes the 
learner to conventionalize negation as an expression that associates with focus, 
because it loses its status as a possible predicate. The conventionalization of 
negation as a focus operator is visible in the decreasing use of structures like X 
+ NEG. With the noun-verb distinction in place, a new category of propositional 
operators is introduced (the link between topic and focus in Dimroth et al., 
2003). This new category is embedded in the utterance structure thanks to a 
generalization of the FocusLast principle to a mirror principle for focus 
operators. The emergence of the mirror principle is visible in the appearance of 
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structures NP + NEG + V (+ Y). The qualification of negation as a linking 
expression implies the identification of negation as a truth-functional operator 
that applies to propositions. Negation in the basic variety thus signals the 
emergence of the notion of proposition and semantic recursion in the 
conceptualization of utterances. This conceptual change is the foundation for 
the development of syntax. 
 
3.3.5 Towards the post-basic variety 
When the learner moves towards the post-basic variety, pragmatic word 
ordering principles gradually give away to syntactic orderings. NegFirst 
(grammaticized version) reflects a typologically unmarked variant of the 
placement of negation, because of the way word order mirrors information 
structure: 
 
Tableau 3.12: Production of NP+NEG+V (+NP) (NegFirst, grammaticized 
version) 
Meaning    ¬xtop 
[V y]foc 
Form FNeg   *Neg NegFirstg 
 NP V NP *        
                     NEG NP V NP        * * 
 NP NEG V NP  *  
 NP  V NP NEG  * * 
 
Giuliano (2004) assumes that the L2 learner conceptualizes such an 
unmarked position as the first hypothesis to entertain about the placement of 
negation in the target language (cf. section 2.4 above). We can refine her view 
here and assume that NegFirst (grammaticized version) comes naturally as the 
first hypothesis about the placement of negation for the L2 learner to entertain 
in the process from topic-focus articulation to syntactic structure based on a 
grammatical operator-scope configuration. The conventionalization of negation 
as an operator that associates with focus is the driving force behind this 
hypothesis.  
Note that there is no change in output (production) in the switch from the 
mirror principle (tableau 3.9) via NegFirst (focus version) (tableau 3.10) to 
NegFirst (grammaticized version) (tableau 3.12). Accordingly, it is difficult to 
determine whether occurrences of preverbal negation in the learner variety are 
driven by information structure (negation as a focus operator) or by syntax 
(negation as preverbal). When the learner moves beyond the topic-link-focus 
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structure and develops more complex syntactic structure, NegFirst can be 
tested as a syntactic hypothesis for the expression of propositional negation in 
the target language. It will turn out to work for languages like Italian and 
Spanish, but not for French, Dutch and German. Learners who have acquired 
the syntactic position for negation in their target language are free to express 
propositional negation with a negator in post-verbal position, because their 
word order structuring principles do no longer require operators to be adjacent 
to their scope. 
Learners vary as to how fast they move from information structure to 
syntax, but preverbal negation marks the transition from a pragmatic utterance 
structuring with no lexical categories (in the pre-basic variety) to a fully 
syntactic structuring of the utterance (in the post-basic variety). The fact that 
we find NegFirst effects in all the L2 production data discussed in section 3.2 
above gives us a glimpse of this process. 
 
3.3.6 The developmental path 
The developmental path of negation in L2 acquisition can be summed up as a 
series of OT grammars corresponding to the following five stages: 
 
Table 3.1: Five stages in the development of negation in L2 acquisition 
Stage 0 *Structure >> Faith no L2 production/comprehension 
Stage 1 FNeg >> *Neg holophrastic negation 
Stage 2 FNeg >> *Neg, FocusLast negation in pre-basic variety 
Stage 3 FNeg >> *Neg, α < 
β/NegFirst (focus) 
negation in basic variety 
Stage 4 FNeg >> *Neg, NegFirst 
(grammaticized) 
negation in post-basic variety (L2 
of target languages with preverbal 
negation) 
 
Stage 0 corresponds to the stage preceding the acquisition of the target 
language. In this stage, there is no linguistic output whatsoever in L2, so no 
output of negation either. Stage 0 corresponds with our hypothesis that in the 
initial stage of L2 acquisition, all markedness constraints are ranked above all 
faithfulness constraints (cf. section 3.1.4 above). Gradually, faithfulness 
constraints emerge. Stage 1 models this for the emergence of holophrastic 
negation: FNeg is ranked above *Neg, which allows the expression of negation 
in L2. No combinatorics are available yet. In stage 2, the additional constraint 
FocusLast allows the structuring of utterances based on topic-focus 
articulation. No distinction is established between lexical categories, so all 
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lexical items (including negation) can be placed in focus position or topic 
position. Accordingly, we find the structure X + NEG as well as NEG + X. The 
distinction between nouns and verbs in the basic variety leads to the 
introduction of a third category of linking expressions. In stage 3, the mirror 
principle captures the conventionalization of negation as a focus operator. As a 
result, the structure X + NEG disappears, and we find NEG + V as a typical 
instance of NEG + X. Instances of preverbal negation in L2 varieties indicate 
the relevance of the mirror principle, because we find instances of preverbal 
negation even if the source language and/or the target language do not have 
preverbal negation in their grammar. The transition of the basic variety to the 
post-basic variety corresponds with a transition from pragmatic structuring of 
utterances to syntactic rules governing word order. The grammaticized version 
of NegFirst emerges as the first hypothesis to test about the syntax of negation.  
Independent support for the view on negation developed in this paper is 
provided by the studies of Perdue, Benazzo and Giuliano (2002) and Dimroth 
et al. (2003), which do not only bear on negation, but study negation in relation 
to the L2 acquisition of focus particles like only, also, the iterative adverb 
again, temporal adverbs of contrast like already, still, no more, modals, and 
markers of illocutionary force.  Perdue et al. find that focus operators are 
acquired in a fixed order, with negation preceding additive and restrictive 
particles (also, only, and equivalents), which in turn precede the temporal 
items. In terms of the OT approach developed in this paper, the observation 
that the development of focus particles closely follows the acquisitional path of 
negation means that the identification of negation as a linking operator, leading 
to a generalization of FocusLast to the mirror principle α < β opens up the 
same route for a whole domain of focus sensitive operators. The development 
from pragmatic structure (pre-basic variety) to full syntactic structure 
(inflectional morphology and functional structure) in the post-basic variety is 
then mediated by the emergence of predicate-argument structure based on the 
verb-noun distinction, and operator-scope relations based on focus sensitive 
particles, modals, etc.   
 
3.4 Implications for language evolution 
If restricted linguistic systems provide a window on language evolution, we can 
use the OT analysis to formulate a hypothesis about the emergence of semantic 
recursion in language genesis. I adopt the current stance in the literature that a 
certain primate conceptual structure pre-dates the emergence of language (cf. 
Tomasello and Call, 1997; Jackendoff, 2002; Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch, 
2002; Hurford, 2003; Gärdenfors, 2003; and others). Hurford (2003: 45) states 
that 'While apes may perhaps not be capable of storing such complex structures 
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as humans, it seems certain that they have mental representations in predicate-
argument form.' According to Gärdenfors (2003: 142), most layers of the 
human thought had emerged in evolution before we started to speak. I assume 
that social life is the driving force behind language in one way or another, 
whether for gossip (Dunbar, 1998), hunting and teaching (Calvin and 
Bickerton, 2000), planning future actions (Gärdenfors, 2003) or otherwise. I am 
committed to the view that language emerged for communicative purposes. 
Communication has to do with the interaction between people. Utterances 
convey a message between a speaker and a hearer, which is anchored to the 
outside world. The OT analysis developed so far has its roots in this 
communication process, and allows us to capture both directions of 
optimization: production and interpretation.  
If we take language to emerge from animal cognition, a gradual 
development is most likely (Tallerman, 2007). The five main stages I postulate 
are the conceptual stage (before language emerges), the holophrastic stage 
(communication with single-word utterances), the protolanguage stage 
(communication with utterances structured by topic-focus articulation), 
language with semantic recursion (communication with sentences involving 
propositions and operators), and syntax-based language (communication with 
sentences structured by syntactic principles). It is outside the scope of this 
paper to give a full description of all aspects relevant to each of these stages, 
but I will focus on the development of negation. 
 
3.4.1 Conceptual stage 
In terms of the OT analysis developed here, I assume that a (pre-linguistic) 
conceptual stage corresponds with a system in which all the markedness 
constraints are at the top of the ranking. In the conceptual stage, no linguistic 
output corresponds to the meaningful input. This is consistent with the 
observation that linguistic isolates do not develop a (first) language if not 
spoken to, even though they have the mind of a modern human being. Of 
course, I do not mean to say that all the faithfulness and markedness constraints 
that we use to describe modern, full languages were in place in the mind of the 
early humans. But we can assume that a proto-constraint that avoids any 
linguistic structure, say *Structure was ranked higher than a proto-constraint 
about input-output correspondences, say Faith, that would lead to the 
expression of some meaningful input into some linguistic form. Postulating a 
proto-constraint Faith only makes sense for cognitive agents who have enough 
of a mental representation to allow correspondences between an input meaning 
and an output form, and to have a communicative intention that drives the 
expression of some input meaning.   
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The ranking *Structure >> Faith that we use to characterize the 
conceptual stage corresponds to stage 0 in L2 acquisition as spelled out in 
tableau 3.1 in section 3.6 above. The main difference between L2 acquisition 
and language genesis in this stage concerns the richness of the conceptual 
representation supporting the general faithfulness constraint. So the proto-Faith 
constraint in language genesis is much more restricted in terms of the input 
meanings it can support than the faithfulness constraints in modern language. 
As suggested already, I take pre-logical negation to be part of the pre-existing 
conceptual structure of early hominids, but not necessarily full truth-functional 
negation. 
 
3.4.2 Holophrastic stage 
In the step from the conceptual stage to the holophrastic stage, some aspect of 
the proto-faithfulness constraint moves above the proto-markedness constraint, 
and a concept gets expressed that was not expressed before. There is no need to 
assume this to be a single transition; it can very well be a stepwise development 
during which the proto-constraints *Structure and Faith gradually split up into 
versions of faithfulness and markedness related to all kinds of conceptual 
inputs, and formal outputs.  
Because of the basic function of negation in communication, there is 
strong conceptual pressure to express this concept. Given the asymmetry 
between affirmation and negation, and Horn's distribution of pragmatic labor 
(cf. section 3.3.1), this leads to marking of negation rather than affirmation. 
Accordingly, I expect the order FNeg >> *Structure to be achieved fairly early 
in the evolution of human language. Because negation is both syntactically and 
semantically marked, the faithfulness constraint FNeg is immediately mirrored 
by the markedness constraint *Neg, and we obtain the order FNeg >> *Neg. 
This is the ranking that we adopted for holophrastic negation in L2 acquisition 
(stage 1 in table 3.1, section 3.3.6). 
The earliest expression of negation can be postulated to be holophrastic 
negation. Holophrastic negation can be interpreted as denial, rejection, refusal, 
disagreement, in other words as a general 'negative' attitude with regard to 
some proposal, request, action in the context of use. Holophrastic negation does 
not have to be interpreted as truth-functional negation. We have described this 
as pre-logical negation (section 3.1.2). Accordingly, it does not require 
cognitive capacities corresponding with recursion. Thus we are not making 
overly strong claims that might be incompatible with the more limited brain 
capacity of early humans.  
Holophrastic negation is inherently context-dependent. 'No' only means 
something if the interlocutor knows what is under consideration in the situation 
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of use. What negation bears on need not be linguistically overt (it can be an 
action, movement, or non-verbal communication act in the situation), but it is 
likely to be a communicative act. That is, holophrastic negation would be 
uttered in reaction to the actions, attitude or words of some other human being, 
rather than as part of inner thought, or as a reaction to a rainstorm, a falling 
rock, or an animal of prey approaching. In that sense, holophrastic negation is 
an important feature of communication as an interaction between two 
participants. 
Holophrastic negation is potentially part of human language from the 
stage onwards where single forms were uttered with a single or a (deictically) 
complex meaning. Under the view that social life is the driving force behind 
language in one way or another, negation is likely to be part of the earliest 
stages of human communication. In all social settings, manipulation and 
negotiation play a role in the gathering and distribution of food, in the 
hierarchy of power, in the distribution of labor, in shared gossip, in teaching 
children, etc. Communicative acts like requests, acceptance, disagreement and 
refusal/rejection are normal aspects of such social processes. That is not to say 
that refusal, disagreement and rejection could not be expressed non-verbally 
(cf. Horn, 1989: 166). Gestures, general body language, tone and pitch of voice 
are all potential means for the expression of discoursal negation without the use 
of words. This only confirms that the concept of (pre-logical) negation pre-
dates its linguistic expression. Once humans started using words, it is likely 
that they developed forms for the expression of the basic acts that constitute 
manipulation and negotiation processes in a social setting. In that sense, having 
a word for negation is an advantage even in the small lexicon of a 
(holophrastic) protolanguage. 
 
3.4.3 Utterances structured by topic-focus articulation (protolanguage) 
Under the assumption that holophrastic communication is successful in the 
social life of early hominids, we may assume there is evolutionary, 
environmental and/or cultural pressure driving the enrichment of language. For 
a while, this can be covered by a growing vocabulary. But once a certain 
threshold on the number of vocabulary items is reached, concatenation of 
symbols emerges as a more economical strategy by natural selection, as shown 
by Nowak et al. (1999, 2000). Communication based on concatenation of 
symbols is harder, because the speaker has to come up with a device for linear 
order (in spoken language), and the hearer needs to have knowledge of multiple 
lexical items. However, it has the advantage of allowing speakers to formulate 
messages that were not learned beforehand. The advantages of this more 
complex form of communication only come out when speakers want to 
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communicate about larger sets of events. Nowak et al. take this to be the case 
only for humans. 
Nowak et al. (1999, 2000) provide a model and a motivation for the 
linguistic systems of early hominids to switch from holophrastic 
communication to a system based on utterances that involve concatenation of 
symbols. Researchers differ in opinion as to how the move from holophrastic 
utterances to utterances combining multiple words is realized. Two opposing 
views are defended by Wray (1998, 2000) and Tallerman (2007 and references 
therein). Both Wray and Tallerman assume that a holophrastic phase 
historically precedes the stage of language in which combinatorics arise. But 
Wray defends the view that the holophrastic message was fractioned into 
composing parts (holistic view), whereas Tallerman takes them to be 
reanalyzed as single words that can be combined to form complex utterances 
(synthetic view). The fact that negation lends itself to a holophrastic use makes 
it possible to hypothesize that negation is already part of the holophrastic stage. 
Holophrastic negation in early L2 is realized by the expression of anaphoric 
negation in the target language: English no, French non, German nein (cf. 
section 3.2.3 above). Although we find unanalyzed forms like nepade in L2 
French, and dont in L2 English, these expressions do not arise in the 
holophrastic stage, but are part of the pre-basic or basic variety in which 
combinatorics are already in place. Thus, they cannot be taken to support 
Wray's claims. The fact that holophrastic negation, as we find it in early L2 
isn't fractioned when complex utterances arise, but is reanalyzed as a single 
word that builds an utterance based on topic-focus articulation might be taken 
to support Tallerman's synthetic view, rather than Wray's holistic approach. As 
far as the evolution of negation is concerned, my model fits in better with the 
synthetic view. 
We have seen that the pre-basic variety organizes utterances on the basis 
of topic-focus articulation, which can be summed up with the pragmatic 
principle Focus Last. In this phase, there are no verbs yet in the learner's 
grammar. If we project this onto the protolanguage of early humans, along the 
lines defended by Jackendoff (2002) and the windows approach (Botha, 2004), 
we can hypothesize that lexical categories didn't exist yet in the earliest stages 
of protolanguage. In the absence of a category distinction between noun-like 
expressions and verb-like expressions, any constituent can either function as a 
topic or as a focus, as a thing we predicate something of, or as a predicate of 
something.  
If we assume that holophrastic negation pre-dates protolanguage, we 
need to see how negation is integrated in the newly developed linear order of 
concatenated symbols driven by topic-focus articulation. The functioning of 
92 Negation in early L2 
 
negation in the pre-basic variety shows that negation takes its place in this 
structure just like other symbolic expressions. In the protolanguage stage, 
negation can either be the comment on some topic X (in the structure X + NEG), 
or associate with some other element that functions as its focus (in the structure 
NEG + X). The relevant constraints involved in the expression of negation in 
this stage are FNeg >> *Neg. The relevant constraint governing the placement 
of negation in the utterance is FocusLast. Thus, the protolanguage system of 
negation is characterized by the same constraint setting as that of the pre-basic 
variety (stage 2 in table 3.1, section 3.3.6). 
 
3.4.4 Semantic recursion 
In terms of L2 acquisition, the introduction of a distinction between nouns and 
verbs gives rise to a grammar in which the verb functions as the kernel of the 
utterance. Thematic arguments (AGENT, THEME, GOAL, etc.) evolve along with 
the noun-verb distinction. The analogy with language genesis is that there is a 
stage following the protolanguage stage described in section 3.4.2, which is 
characterized by the introduction of lexical categories such as nouns and verbs, 
and the development of predicate-argument structure as tied to these lexical 
category distinctions. Heine and Kuteva (2002: 394) identify this as the stage in 
which 'there might have existed only two types of linguistic entities: one 
denoting thing-like time stable entities (i.e. nouns), and another one for non-
time stable concepts such as event (i.e. verbs)'.6 Full, modern syntax need not 
be in place yet. Word order in NP V (+ NP) utterances can still be determined 
by pragmatic principles such as 'Focus Last'.  
As far as negation is concerned, the introduction of lexical categories and 
thematic arguments leads to the conventionalization of negation as a focus 
sensitive operator. Negation is neither a verb nor a noun, and predicate-
argument structure is complemented with a status of operator linking topic and 
focus. According to Jackendoff (2002: 253), 'at the one-word stage, relational 
words are pointless. But once multiple-symbol utterances are possible, many 
classes of "utility" vocabulary items offer themselves as design possibilities.' In 
the terminology adopted in this paper, it is crucial that the introduction of 
linking devices signals the emergence of semantic recursion. Once reflection 
on propositions can be expressed, we can safely assume that a conception of 
                                                  
6
 Note that not all modern (full) languages have a clear noun-verb distinction. Salish languages 
have been claimed to have a general lexical category of predicative expressions (cf. Mithun, 
1999 for discussion). However, there is no doubt that Salish languages exploit thematic roles in 
predicate-argument structure. I conclude that the emergence of thematic arguments is crucial. It 
may co-evolve with a lexical noun-verb distinction, but it doesn't have to. 
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utterances as denoting propositions is part of human cognition. Given the 
existence of holophrastic negation, and the continued presence of negation in 
protolanguage, we expect negation to be one of the earliest expressions of 
semantic recursion emerging in the genesis of natural language.  
FocusLast is not enough to govern the placement of linking devices, but 
the mirror principle α < β permits a generalization of topic-focus articulation to 
include operator-scope structure. In this way, the conceptual shift from pre-
logical to truth-functional negation is embedded within the information 
structure of the utterance. In terms of language genesis, the appearance of 
scope bearing operators correlates with the transition from protolanguage to 
language, because they put semantic recursion in place. Semantics precedes 
syntax (cf. Calvin and Bickerton, 2000: 136) in the sense that the only word 
order structuring principles we need in this stage are pragmatic principles based 
on topic-focus articulation. The OT ranking we need to model this stage is 
FNeg >> *Neg for the expression of negation, and the mirror principle α < β or 
its item-specific instantiation NegFirst (focus) for the placement of negation in 
pre-focus (typically pre-verbal) position. The constraint ranking for the stage of 
early language in which semantic recursion is in place thus corresponds with 
the ranking we adopted for the basic variety (stage 3 in table 3.1, section 3.3.6). 
 
3.4.5 Towards a syntactic expression of negation 
The mirror principle α < β provides a general mechanism to insert scope 
bearing operators in pragmatic word order. The focus-based version of 
NegFirst is a variant of  α < β with regard to negation. The next phase of the 
development I postulate is a transition from pragmatic based word order to 
syntax. It is possible that phrase structure rules come into this process to govern 
the introduction of syntactic functions like subject and object. I have very little 
to say about this step in the evolutionary process, except that it cannot come 
into place until utterances are conceptualized as propositions carrying truth-
values. The emergence of syntax leads to a weakening of the role of the mirror 
principle α < β in the structuring of utterances. As far as the placement of 
negation is concerned, I assume a transition from the focus based version of 
NegFirst to the syntactic version of NegFirst. Accordingly, the pre-verbal 
position is the first syntactic hypothesis to entertain about the placement of 
negation in a hierarchical phrase structure. The OT ranking we need to model 
this stage is FNeg >> *Neg for the expression of negation, and NegFirst 
(grammaticized version) for the placement of negation in pre-verbal position. 
The constraint ranking for the syntactic stage of early language thus 
corresponds with the ranking we adopted for the post-basic variety (stage 4 in 
table 3.1, section 3.3.6). 
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3.4.6 Genesis of negation 
The five stages described in sections 3.4.1 through 3.4.5 amount to a 
development from a pre-linguistic conceptual notion of pre-logical negation to 
a holophrastic negation, and from there to a further integration of the negator in 
the utterance structure. Once negation is recognized as an operator bearing 
scope of a proposition, we see truth-functional negation and the emergence of 
semantic recursion. As a consequence of this conceptual step, pragmatic 
principles of word order gradually give away to syntax. The evolutionary 
process we posit is summed up in table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Genesis of negation 
Stage 0 *Structure > Faith conceptual stage 
Stage 1 FaithNeg >> *Neg holophrastic stage 
Stage 2 FaithNeg >> *Neg, FocusLast Protolanguage 
Stage 3 FaithNeg >> *Neg, α < β/NegFirst 
(focus) 
language with semantic 
recursion 
Stage 4 FaithNeg >> *Neg, NegFirst 
(grammaticized) 
emergence of syntax 
 
In the zero stage, we have a conceptual representation of (pre-logical) 
negation, but no linguistic output. Proto-markedness constraints that ban 
structure are ranked above proto-faithfulness constraints that drive the user 
towards the expression of meaningful input, so there is no linguistic 
production. Reranking FaithNeg above *Structure, and postulating a related 
markedness constraint *Neg allows for the expression of negation in the 
holophrastic stage (stage 1). From a holophrastic stage, we move to a 
protolanguage with combinatorics based on topic-focus articulation (stage 2). 
The introduction of lexical categories leads to the conventionalization of 
negation as a focus operator. The relation between information structure and 
word order has been generalized to include the operator-scope configuration 
(stage 3). Semantic recursion is in place, and this was the criterion we decided 
to use to characterize the transition from protolanguage to language. NegFirst 
(focus) is the operator specific instantiation of the mirror principle α < β. The 
interpretation of utterances in terms of propositions carrying truth-values 
provides the basis for the emergence of syntax. It is not until syntax develops 
as a general ordering principle that the interpretation of NegFirst as 'negation 
precedes its focus' shifts to 'negation is preverbal' for propositional negation, 
and NegFirst (grammaticized version) enters the scene as the first syntactic 
hypothesis concerning the placement of negation (stage 4). From here on, 
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grammaticalization runs its course, and we enter the normal diachronic 
development of negation spelled out as the Jespersen cycle (see de Swart 
2008). 
Notwithstanding the difference in cognitive capacities between modern 
L2 learners and early humans, we can postulate that the development of early 
language proceeded in similar ways. In modern L2 learners, we can take the 
existence of a semantic propositional structure with a concomitant 
interpretation of negation as a truth-functional operator for granted, because the 
learners have a modern brain, and a mature knowledge of a full linguistic 
system (their L1). However, in the view of the ESF project, grammar is created 
'again', so L2 learners need not rely on a notion of proposition in their 
acquisition process. But following Tomasello and Call (1997), Hauser, 
Chomsky and Fitch (2002), Jackendoff (2002), Hurford (2003) and Gärdenfors 
(2003) and others, I assume that the cognitive capacity for predicative 
structures is available in early humans before language develops. The 
pragmatically based combinatorics in the protolanguage stage reflects this pre-
existing conceptual structure. In the evolution of language, the birth of the 
proposition is coupled with the emergence of truth-functional grammatical 
operators arising out of focus operators. In this way, the transition from 
protolanguage to full language is located in the emergence of semantic 
recursion. Semantics precedes syntax in the sense that semantic recursion can 
be expressed in a stage in which principles governing word order are still 
grounded in information structure (topic-focus articulation). Semantics drives 
syntax in the sense that syntactic rules about the placement of negation follow 
the emergence of lexical categories, and operator-scope configurations. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to reconstruct the evolutionary stages 
preceding full language by emphasizing the relevance of semantic recursion to 
the debate. My point of departure was Horn's (1989: xiii) observation that no 
animal communication systems include negative utterances, whereas all human 
languages do. I postulated that the emergence of truth-functional negation 
could provide us with a criterion to decide whether a particular system of 
communication qualifies as a full language. I used early L2 acquisition as a 
window on language genesis, and used data on the acquisition of negation from 
the ESF project to model the emergence of semantic recursion in early stages 
of L2. The key turned out to be a conceptual step that added a notion of 
operator to the predicate-argument structure that emerges out of the verb-noun 
distinction. The introduction of an operator-scope structure reflects the 
emergence of semantic recursion, and thereby the birth of language. A 
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grammatical notion of operator-scope is easily integrated in the utterance 
structure based on information structure. With semantic recursion in place, 
grammar develops beyond information structure, and the preverbal position 
emerges as the unmarked position for negation in the syntax. The 
reconstruction of this evolution in a sequence of constraint rankings indicates 
how the OT notion of 'emergence of the unmarked' can be used in developing 
hypotheses about language genesis. 
Syntactic recursion is frequently taken to be the hallmark of human 
language (cf. Hauser et al., 2002). If the sketch given here of the evolution of 
negation is plausible, the development of the semantic notion of proposition 
precedes the emergence of syntactic recursion, and might well be taken to be an 
important trigger for it. If the presence of semantic negation and syntactic 
recursion are indeed connected in the way suggested here, a possible 
implication is that the lack of syntactic recursion and the absence of truth-
conditional negation in animal communication systems other than human 
language might both be rooted in cognitive capacity that lacks semantic 
recursion. Accordingly, it might be worthwhile strengthening the semantic, 
conceptual dimension in the comparative research program on language 




I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Netherlands Organization 




Bartning, I., Schlyter, S., 2004. Itinéraires acquisitionnels et stades de 
développement en français L2. Journal of French Language Studies 14, 
1-19. 
Bernini, G., 1996. Stadi di sviluppo della sintassi e della morfologia della 
negazione in italiano L2. Linguistica e filologia III, 7-33. 
Bickerton, D., 1990. Language and Species. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
Bickerton, D., 1998. Language and Human Behavior. University of 
Washington Press, Seattle. 
Botha, R., 2003. Unravelling the Evolution of Language. Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Botha, R., 2004. Windows on language evolution: what are they and wherein 
lies their virtue? Stellenbosch Papers in Linguistics 35, 1-21. 
de Swart  
 
97 
Botha, R., 2006a. Pidgin languages as a putative window on language 
evolution, Language and communication 26, 1-14. 
Botha, R., 2006b. On the windows approach to language evolution. Language 
and Communication 26, 129-143. 
Botha, R., 2007. On homesign systems as a potential window on language 
evolution. Language and Communication 27, 41-53. 
Calvin, W., Bickerton, D., 2000. Lingua ex Machina: Reconciling Darwin and 
Chomsky With the Human Brain. MIT Press, Cambridge (MA). 
Corblin, F., 1996. Multiple negation processing in natural language. Theoria 
17, 214-259.  
Corblin, F., Tovena, L., 2003. L'expression de la négation dans les langues 
romanes. In: Godard, D., (Ed.), Les langues romanes. Problèmes de la 
phrase simple. CNRS editions, Paris, 281-344. 
Dahl, Ö., 1979. Typology of sentence negation. Linguistics 17, 79-106. 
Dimroth, C., Gretsch, P., Jordens, P., Perdue, C., Starren, M., 2003. Finiteness 
in Germanic languages. In: Dimroth, C., Starren, M. (Eds.), 
Information Structure and the Dynamics of Language Acquisition. 
Benjamins, Amsterdam, 65-93. 
Dunbar, R., 1998. Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language. Harvard 
University Press, Harvard. 
Fitch, T., Hauser, M., Chomsky, N., 2005. The evolution of the language 
faculty: clarifications and implications. Cognition 97, 179-210. 
Gärdenfors, P., 2003. How Homo Became Sapiens: On the Evolution of 
Thinking. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Giuliano, P., 2004. La négation linguistique dans l'acquisition d'une langue 
étrangère: un débat conclu? Peter Lang, Bern. 
Haspelmath, M., 1997. Indefinite Pronouns. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Hauser, M., Chomsky, N., Fitch, T., 2002. The faculty of language: what is it, 
who has it, and how did it evolve? Science 298, 1576-1579. 
Heine, B., Kuteva, T., 2002. On the evolution of grammatical forms. In: Wray, 
A. (Ed.), The Transition to Language. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 376-397. 
Heine, B., Kuteva, T., 2007. The Genesis of Grammar: A Reconstruction. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
de Hoop, H., de Swart, H., 2000. Adjunct clauses in optimality theory. Revista 
di Linguistica/Italian Journal of Linguistics 12.1, 107-127.  
Horn, L., 1984. Toward a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q-based and 
R-based implicature. In: Schiffrin, D. (Ed.), Meaning, Form and Use in 
Context: Linguistic Applications. Georgetown University Press, 
Washington. 
98 Negation in early L2 
 
Horn, L., 1989. A Natural History of Negation. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
Hurford, J., 2003. The language mosaic and its evolution. In: Christiansen, M., 
Kirby, S. (Eds.), Language Evolution. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Jackendoff, R., 2002. Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, 
evolution. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Jäger, G., 2003. Learning constraint sub-hierarchies. In: Blutner, R., Zeevat, H. 
(Eds.), Pragmatics and Optimality Theory. Palgrave MacMillan, 
Houndmills. 
Jespersen, O., 1917. Negation in English and Other Languages. Host, 
Copenhagen. 
Klein, W., Perdue, C., 1992. Utterance Structure: Developing Grammars 
Again. Benjamins, Amsterdam. 
Klein, W., Perdue, C., 1997. The basic variety (or couldn't natural languages be 
much simpler?). Second Language Research 13, 301-347. 
Kratzer, A., 1989. An investigation of the lumps of thought. Linguistics and 
Philosophy 12, 3-27.  
Mattausch, J., 2005. On the optimization and grammaticalization of anaphora, 
PhD dissertation, Humboldt University Berlin, published as ZAS 
Papers in Linguistics 38. 
Mattausch, J., 2007. Optimality, bidirectionality and the evolution of binding 
phenomena, Research on language and computation 5, 103-131. 
Mithun, M., 1999. The Languages of Native North America. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Nowak, M., Krakauer, D., Dress, A., 1999. An error limit for the evolution of 
language. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 266, 2131-6. 
Nowak, M., Plotkin, J., Jansen, V., 2000. The evolution of syntactic 
communication. Nature 404: 495-498. 
Payne, J., 1985. Negation. In: Shopen, T. (Ed.), Language Typology and 
Syntactic Description: Vol 1 Clause structure. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 197-242. 
Perdue, C., 1993. Adult Language Acquisition: Cross-linguistic Perspectives. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Perdue, C., Benazzo, S., Giuliano, P., 2002. When finiteness gets marked: the 
relation between morphosyntactic development and use of scopal items 
in adult language acquisition. Linguistics 40, 847-890. 
Pinker, S., Bloom, P., 1990. Natural language and natural selection. Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences 13, 707-784. 
de Swart  
 
99 
Pinker, S., Jackendoff, R., 2005. The faculty of language: what's special about 
it. Cognition 95, 201-236. 
Prince, A., Smolensky, P., 1997. Optimality: From neural networks to universal 
grammar. Science 275: 1604-1610. 
Rooth, M., 1985. Association with focus, PhD dissertation, University of 
Massachusetts at Amherst. 
van Rooy, R., 2004. Signalling games select Horn strategies. Linguistics and 
Philosophy 27, 493-527. 
Sanell, A., 2005. Parcours acquisitionnel de la négation en français L2 des chez 
apprenants suédophones, PhD, Stockholm University. 
Smolensky, P., Legendre, G., 2006. The harmonic mind: from neutral 
computation to optimality-theoretic grammar. Vol 1: Cognitive 
Architecture; vol. 2: Linguistic and Philosophical Implications. MIT 
Press, Cambridge. 
Stoffel, H., Véronique, D., 2003. L'acquisition de la négation en français par 
des adultes arabophones. Marges Linguistiques 5, 242-259. 
de Swart, H., 2006. Marking and interpretation of negation: a bi-directional OT 
approach. In: Zanuttini, R., Campos, H., Herburger, E., Portner, P. 
(Eds.), Negation, Tense and Clausal Architecture: Cross-linguistic 
Investigations. Georgetown University Press, Georgetown (in press). 
de Swart, H., 2008. Expression and Interpretation of Negation. Springer (to 
appear).  
Tallerman, M., 2007. Did our ancestors speak a holistic protolanguage? Lingua 
117, 579-604. 
Tesar, B., Smolensky, P., 1998. Learnability in Optimality Theory. Linguistic 
Inquiry 29, 229-268. 
Tomasello, M., Call, J., 1997. Primate Cognition. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Wode, H., 1981. Learning a Second Language: An Integrated View of 
Language Acquisition. Narr, Tübingen. 
Wray, A., 1998. Protolanguage as a holistic system for social interaction. 
Language and Communication 18, 47-67. 
Wray, A., 2000. Holistic utterances in protolanguage: the link from primates to 
humans. In: Knight, C., Studdert-Kennedy, M., Hurford, J.R. (Eds.), 
The Evolutionary Emergence of Language: Social Function and the 








4. The creation of pidgins as a possible window on language 
evolution 
Paul T. Roberge 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
Abstract 
For some two decades now, linguists have given serious attention to the idea 
that restricted systems – inter alia 'modern' pidgin languages – provide a 
'window' on certain facets of the emergence of language in the human species. 
Botha (2003: 197-201, 2006b) has identified a number of difficulties that 
would have to be overcome in constructing a pidgin window capable of 
yielding insights into language evolution. The window is still, at best, very 
much 'under construction,' for it lacks in its present forms various core 
components: 'Developing these components would require a substantial amount 
of work of a technical sort' (2006b: 12). But, he concludes, 'a well-constructed 
pidgin window on language evolution will reward us with insights and 
perspectives that are incentive enough for facing up to just those difficulties' 
(2006b: 13). This paper represents an attempt to restart work on the pidgin 
window construction project. My fundamental position is that the creation of 
'modern' pidgin languages does indeed provide such a window on language 
evolution, though not along the lines that have been proposed to date. 
 
4.1 Preliminaries 
When one tracks the scholarly literature on language evolution, it becomes 
apparent that writers are not necessarily discussing the evolution of the same 
thing. One needs to be explicit about what one understands by the two terms 
that are constitutive of the compound noun language evolution. Botha (2006a: 
131) characterizes language as a concept that designates 'a human capacity, 
referred to by such expressions as "the human language capacity" and "the 
human language faculty"; and the system(s) referred to by such expressions as 
"the first human language", "ancestral language", "the first form of human 
language" ' (Botha, 2006a: 131). In this sense language does not include speech 
or the mechanisms involved in its production and perception (which may have 
their own evolutionary histories). As for evolution, I understand (again 
following Botha, 2006a: 132) a process comprising various phases, 'central to 
which are the two referred to as "origin, emergence or first appearance (of 
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language in the human species)"; and "subsequent development (of language in 
the human species)".'  
There is no direct evidence for early forms of language until the 
invention of writing systems – most importantly Sumerian cuneiform and 
Egyptian hieroglyphs – approximately 5,000 years ago. By then, we are dealing 
with fully developed 'modern' language (Jackendoff, 2002: 232). As for timing 
the emergence of language, the physical record again yields no direct 
information. To establish relative chronologies, researchers have examined 
features of early hominids – brain size and configuration, vocal tract 
configuration, patterns of behavior, and artifacts – that are accessible and could 
plausibly be supposed to correlate with language development in some way 
(e.g., Bickerton, 1990: 133-45, 2003: 91-92). 
To appreciate the chronology problem, one need only ponder some of the 
time lines that have been proposed. Corballis (2003: 205), to cite but one 
proposal, supposes that 'language developed beyond protolanguage, probably 
gradually (Pinker and Bloom, 1990), over the past two million years.' He 
argues that language developed first as a primarily gestural system, with 
increasing vocal accompaniment.1 Speech became the dominant mode 
following the emergence of Homo sapiens, within the last 170,000 years (p. 
205). Autonomous vocal language, with a largely nongestural component, may 
have arisen sometime between 100,000 and 50,000 years ago in Africa (p. 
217). MacWhinney (2002: 235), however, would push the temporal scope of 
inquiry even further back into the remote past. His thesis is that language 
evolution 'operated across the full six million years of human evolution, not 
just the last 100,000 years.' His model distinguishes four major periods, defined 
by different configurations of co-evolutionary pressures or challenges. These 
are the attainment of bipedalism (from 8MYA to 4MYA), the solidification of 
group structure during face-to-face vocal interaction (from 4MYA to 2MYA), 
'the linkage of a broad set of symbolic processes to neural control mechanisms' 
(2MYA to 100KYA), with the linkages involving 'the growth of prosody, 
chant, gesture, dance, and a variety of other largely social expressions of 
language functioning,' and, finally, the linking of language to the production of 
material culture, which began in earnest about 60,000 years ago. During this 
last period language assumed its 'current dual patterning with organization on 
the phonological and syntactic levels,' although many abilities are traceable to 
precursors in the third period. 
                                                  
1The hypothesis that language initially arose in a gestural-visual modality finds endorsement 
from Givón (1995: 430-34, 1998: 88-89) but is opposed by Bickerton (1990: 142) and – if only 




The extreme time depth and the lack of extant data would appear to pose 
insurmountable obstacles to serious scientific inquiry into language evolution 
(cf., for example, Gould, 2002: 790; Slobin, 2002: 389). However, the problem 
has been taken up anew in recent years and approached in a number of 
interesting ways from the perspective of several disciplines, including 
linguistics, even if somewhat gingerly.2 Botha (e.g., 2003, 2006a), in particular, 
has contributed in a decisive way to the development of foundational concepts 
for the study of language evolution. Contrary to received opinion and intuition, 
the main obstacle to a better understanding of language evolution is not a 
paucity of factual information but rather a 'poverty of restrictive theory' (2003: 
7).3 In regard to the amelioration of 'evidential paucity,' he points out that 
accounts of the evolution of human language 'must, by their very nature, entail 
claims of a historical sort' that 'are put forward in the absence of direct evidence 
... about events and factors that may or may not have been involved' (2006a: 
130). The approach that linguists have embraced is to identify phenomena that 
can be observed in (or deduced from) actual instantiations of language and 
propose that they mirror or preserve the origins of language in Homo sapiens 
and its subsequent development. Comrie (2000), for example, considers 
situations in which people have created a language or part of a language ex 
nihilo, availing themselves only of certain minimal requirements for linguistic 
development. These situations involve feral children and related cases, creoles 
(albeit controversially), deaf sign language (in particular Nicaraguan Sign 
Language), and possibly twin languages. Other linguists have proceeded from a 
presumption that 'living linguistic fossils' discernible in 'modern' language can 
provide some insight into the processes by which human language emerged 
(Bickerton, 1990: 106). Restricted linguistic systems such as early child 
language, early adult second language acquisition, pidgin languages, and 
homesigns created by deaf children of nonsigning parents have been cited in 
the literature as 'fossils' of earlier stages of language.4 
Such contentions are at the heart of what Botha (2006b: 130) calls the 
'windows approach' to the study of language evolution. In general terms 'a 
phenomenon X is considered (to offer) a window on a distinct phenomenon Y 
                                                  
2Cf. Bickerton, 1990: 105-6, 2003; Hurford, 2003: 51-52; Newmeyer, 2003; Carstairs-McCarthy, 
2007: 503. 
3A theory will be restrictive to the extent that its characterization of a given entity 'makes it 
possible to discriminate in a non-arbitrary way' between that entity 'and all things which, though 
they may be related to it, are in fact distinct from it' (Botha 2003: 8). 
4Linguists have adopted various other approaches, too, including argumentation based on 
complex design (e.g., Pinker and Bloom, 1990)  – complexity being characteristic of human 
language – and computer modeling. 
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if by "looking at" X it is possible to "see" something of Y. A window on 
language evolution, accordingly, is a phenomenon that has properties believed 
to offer a 'view' on properties of some aspect or aspects of language evolution' 
(Botha, 2006a: 132). As we shall see in the following section, pidgins have 
been thought to offer such a 'window' on the evolution of language, but the 
term has not always been precisely defined. As a consequence, linguists who 
have been involved in the present discourse may not be referring to the same 
kind of contact variety (cf. Botha, 2006b: 2-3). By pidgin language I 
understand the linguistic creation of a new contact community that has need for 
a common means of communication for specific purposes but does not share a 
preexisting language that can fulfill this function. A pidgin is a restricted 
linguistic system that is used in limited domains (such as trade, labor) by 
people who retain their native languages. A pidgin language, therefore, has no 
native speakers (Bickerton, 1995: 29n.; Mühlhäusler, 1997: 6). One should bear 
in mind, however, that these criteria are necessary but not sufficient for a 
restrictive definition of the term. The related concept creole language has 
commonly been understood as an apparent 'synthesis di novo by the first 
generation of native speakers who received [a] Pidgin as their data input and 
proceeded to "create the grammar"' (Givón, 1979: 224). However, there is, as 
Baker (1995: 4) observes, 'currently no definition of Creole which is acceptable 
to all the people who study these languages.' 
 
4.2 Deconstructing the conventional pidgin window 
4.2.1 Pidgins as a potential window on protolanguage 
In his book Language and Species (1990), Bickerton proposes that the human 
capacity for language evolved in two stages. The first stage probably took place 
with the emergence of Homo erectus, roughly 1.5 to 2 million years ago 
(Bickerton, 1990: 136-40; similarly, Carstairs-McCarthy, 1999: 74, 98; 
Newmeyer, 2003: 69). Homo erectus developed what Bickerton calls 
protolanguage, a first approximation of which could be thought of as 'modern 
language minus syntax' (Jackendoff, 2002: 235) or 'just handfuls of words or 
gestures strung together' (Calvin and Bickerton, 2000: 137). More precisely, 
protolanguage designates a form of communication that contains arbitrary, 
meaningful symbols but lacks any kind of syntactic structure (for details see 
Bickerton, 1990: 122-26). The next stage of language evolution is supposed to 




thousand years ago (Bickerton, 1990: 165, 175).5 During the last 100,000 years, 
modern Homo sapiens displaced Homo neandertalensis at the same time that 
the archeological record shows a marked increase in the production of artifacts, 
which presupposes the possession of language by our species (Bickerton, 1990: 
175-77; Carstairs-McCarthy, 1999: 98). This second stage marks the 
emergence of language as we know it, or what for clarity one could call true 
language (Bickerton, 1990: 177), modern language (Jackendoff, 1999, 2002: 
235), full language (Carstairs-McCarthy, 1999: 98), full modern language 
(Botha, 2006b: 1), full human language (Bickerton, 1998), or fully developed 
human language (Bickerton, 1990: 137).  
Bickerton (1990: 177-81, 1995: 68-75, 1998, 2000: 276, 2007: 520-21) 
believes that the transition from protolanguage to full language must have 
occurred suddenly in our species. He explicitly rejects the possibility of a 
gradient transition or intermediate stage that might have served as a bridge 
between protolanguage and full language. The emergence of various syntactic 
elements needed to happen virtually simultaneously: 'The principles involved 
are across-the-board principles: they apply everywhere, to all structures. At any 
given time, either they were in place or they weren't. Once they were in place, 
what was to stop syntax becoming immediately like it is today?' (Bickerton, 
2003: 91). Bickerton (1990: 177) suggests a narrowing of the temporal range 
for both 'catastrophic' events – species origin and the emergence of full 
language – to a date of around 200,000 years ago. 
Full language built on protolanguage rather than superseding it. The 
transition to full language involved the development of systematic grammar, 
which would entail the sharpening of rudimentary protolinguistic nonreferential 
items into grammatical items (Bickerton, 1990: 181-85) and the exaptation of 
thematic roles out of a 'social calculus' to 'set up the categories AGENT, 
THEME, and GOAL' and produce the basis for syntax (Calvin and Bickerton, 
2000: 136; similarly, Bickerton, 1990: 185-88, 2000: 268-70). Syntax began 
with the mapping of thematic roles onto 'protolinguistic output' (Calvin and 
Bickerton, 2000: 137) in such a way that led to the imposition of the 
hierarchical structures defined by the X-bar theory and to recursivity 
(Bickerton, 1990: 191; Calvin and Bickerton, 2000: 138; but see Calvin and 
Bickerton, 2000: 223). Standing alone, argument structure cannot remove all 
ambiguity from syntax. In more recent work Bickerton has revised the 
evolutionary sequence to include a third phase, during which 'our ancestors 
must have been competing with one another to produce devices that would 
                                                  
5Following Crowe (1998), Corballis (2003: 213) dates this second “speciation event' to around 
170,000 years ago. 
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make ... syntax more readily parsable, hence easier to understand automatically' 
(Calvin and Bickerton, 2000: 146).6 
What is supposed to elevate Bickerton's story above mere speculation is 
his claim that protolanguage has left traces of itself in the contemporary world 
(Bickerton, 1990: 105-29). It is manifest in situations when full language has 
not developed: (i) on the one hand in the language of children under two years 
of age (Bickerton, 1990: 110-15) and (ii) on the other hand in experiments in 
teaching languagelike systems to apes (Bickerton, 1990: 105-10). It also 
surfaces when full language is disrupted. The more rudimentary a variety, the 
greater its window potential should be. Examples are (iii) cases of feral and 
abused children like Kaspar Hauser (Louden, 1999) and Genie, who are 
isolated from human contact and have no opportunity to acquire language 
during the critical period (1990: 115-18; cf. Heine and Kuteva, 2007: 203-5), 
(iv) pidgin languages in their early stages (1990: 118-22), and (v) possibly 
aphasia (1990: 127-29). Attributes of protolanguage are also discerned in the 
speech of nonproficient L2-learners (Calvin and Bickerton, 2000: 257). 
Just as the transition from protolanguage to full language must have been 
'catastrophic' in evolutionary terms, the transition from pidgins to creoles is 
(according to Bickerton) likewise abrupt, at least in the 'interesting' cases.7 
Bickerton (1981: 2, 4; 1990: 169; similarly, Calvin and Bickerton, 2000: 33) 
uses the term creole to refer to a language which arose out of a prior pidgin 
(created by adults) that had not existed for more than a generation and was 
acquired as a native language by children on plantations using polyglot slave 
labor (contract labor in the case of Hawaii). The structural distance between a 
pidgin and its associated creole is immense. Characteristic of Hawaiian pidgin 
English, for example – and, presumably, protolanguage – are five properties 
that cluster together: (1) 'guesswork' identification of null elements, (2) variant 
word orders unrelated to function, (3) a lack of structural means for embedding 
                                                  
6For a critical appraisal of the 'exaptationist theory' articulated in Calvin and Bickerton, 2000: ch. 
10, see Botha, 2003: 76-81. 
7Mutatis mutandis, of course.  Bickerton (1990: 171-72) cautions that all this does not furnish 
conclusive evidence that the original transition from protololanguage to full language took place 
in a similar way: 'First of all, evolutionary abruptness is not the same as everyday abruptness.  
An evolutionary change may be considered abrupt if it takes place in a few thousand years as 
opposed to a few hundred thousand.  Second, while the existence of some distinct transitional 
mode in the contemporary world would have increased the probability that some similar mode 
would have existed in the past, the absence of such a mode tells us merely that, in principle, it is 
possible to do without one.' That said, Bickerton is nevertheless inclined to swipe the 
intermediate stage hypothesis with Occam's razor (further on this point in Bickerton, 1990: 177-
81), though one can make cogent arguments for the opposite view. The issue of catastrophism 




and adjunction, (4) random absence of subcategorized arguments, and (5) the 
presence of some nonreferential items, but only at the 'meaningful' end of the 
range (Bickerton, 1990: 169). Creoles differ substantially from their antecedent 
pidgins in that they have all the basic features of established human languages: 
(1'} unambiguous identification of null elements through rule-supplied patterns 
rather than context, (2') word order permutations clearly related to function, (3') 
freely available devices for sentential expansion, (4') fully subcategorized 
arguments in place or linkable 'to their appropriate places by regular processes,' 
and (5') a full array of nonreferential elements (e.g., a 50-50 proportion of 
grammatical to lexical items in Hawaiian Creole English) (Bickerton, 1990: 
170-71). 
The central point is that in the early stages, 'which are the relevant ones 
for present purposes, pidgin structure is not just impoverished but nonexistent, 
and the pidgin itself is not a true human language in the sense of the present 
discussion' (Bickerton, 1995: 29n.; similarly, 1990: 169, 1995: 37, 2007: 511, 
516; Calvin and Bickerton, 2000: 33, 137, 257). Bickerton assumes that the 
diverse immigrant slave population, lacking a common lingua franca, 
pidginized the superstrate (European) language, to which they had only limited 
access. The primary linguistic data for children of their issue would be this 
'chaotic and virtually structureless' pidgin itself (Bickerton, 1995: 37).8 While 
slave children may have had access to the heritage languages of their parents, 
there was little incentive to acquire them in such a milieu. Yet, it is striking not 
only how creole children are able to compile a full-fledged language on the 
basis of input that is 'radically mixed and degenerate' (Bickerton, 2007: 513), 
but also how the grammar of a creole bears the closest resemblance not to 
grammars of indigenous and/or immigrant (substrate) languages, nor to that of 
the dominant (superstrate) language, but rather to the grammars of creole 
languages in other parts of the world. In previous work (1981, 1984) Bickerton 
explained these (in neither case undisputed) facts by appealing to a 
'bioprogram' for language that harks back to the emergence of Homo sapiens: 
'Creole grammar constitutes a kind of 'inner core grammar' from which more 
                                                  
8Hurford (2003: 50) comments that 'modern linguistics has tended to characterize the overt 
phenomena of language, the spatio-temporal events of primary linguistic data (PLD), as 
"degenerate.''' If the input for L1-acquisition is defective even in ordinary circumstances, then 
linguistically diverse creole societies would have had to confront children with conditions that 
were extreme indeed.  Even if we grant Bickerton his claim that the earliest cohorts of creole 
children were subject to exceptionally restricted primary linguistic data, they may not have 
lacked any more relevant input than their counterparts in 'normal' settings, as Lightfoot (e.g., 
2006) has argued. 
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complex and varied grammars may have evolved' (1984: 188); and further: 
'Creole languages form an unusually direct expression of a species-specific 
biological characteristic, a capacity to recreate language in the absence of any 
specific model from which the properties of language could be 'learned' in the 
ways we normally learn things' (Bickerton, 1990: 171). In his latest published 
statement to date, Bickerton reaffirms his position that the rapid deficit repair 
and apparent cross-linguistic parallels among creole languages illustrate the 
'robustness of the biological template' (2007: 514). 
Givón (1979: 223-26; 1995: 359-62, 402-4; 1998: 56-58) characterizes 
pidgins – along with early child language and agrammatic aphasia – as an 
extreme case of what he has called the pragmatic or pregrammatical mode of 
communication. Creoles possess a syntactic (or grammatical) mode of 
communication, like any other full language. Pidgins – at least in plantation 
societies using slave labor – exhibit 'an enormous amount of internal variation 
and inconsistency both within the output of the same speaker as well as across 
the speech community. The variation is so massive to the point where one is 
indeed justified in asserting that the Pidgin mode has no stable syntax' (Givón, 
1979: 224, emphasis in original; similarly, Givón, 1995: 30, 1998: 60). But 
Givón (1998: 60-61, 93-96) attempts to show that pidgins do conform to 
several 'rules' that may be called 'pre-grammar' or 'proto-grammar.' These rules 
reflect cognitively 'natural' (i.e., transparent, iconic) meaning-form pairings that 
are characteristic of the pregrammatical mode. Examples are: 'Units of 
information that belong together conceptually are kept close temporally'; and 
'predictable – or already activated – information [is] left unexpressed' (loc. cit.). 
Interestingly, protogrammatical rules are embedded in the grammatical mode 
of communication and often integrated with the morphosyntactic rules of full 
languages. Critical steps in the evolution of grammar, which is arguably the last 
major developmental phase in the evolution of language, would entail a 
progression from holophrasis and mono-propositional communication, to the 
appearance of protogrammar and multi-propositional discourse (akin to the 
pregrammatical pidgin mode), and then to the integration of protogrammar into 
the more 'arbitrary' (i.e., symbolic) encoding of the emergent grammatical 
mode (Givón, 1998: 92-99). 
Jackendoff (1999, 2002: 235-61) argues that we can extrapolate from 
modern human language a sequence of partially ordered evolutionary steps or 
stages in the emergence of language in our species. Some of these stages are 
prior to protolanguage in Bickerton's sense, and some later; each is an 
improvement in terms of expressive power and precision. Following the lead of 
Bickerton and others, Jackendoff looks for traces of these stages in 'degraded' 




to do (2002: 236). 'Degraded' forms of language include child language, late 
language acquisition, aphasia, and pidgins. In some instances Jackendoff 
claims to show not just that these earlier stages are still present in the brain, 'but 
that their 'fossils' are present in the grammar of modern language itself, 
offering a new source of evidence on the issue' (2002: 236, emphasis in 
original). He adds: 'It is of course never clear how relevant such evidence is for 
evolutionary concerns – in particular, to what degree ontogeny really does 
recapitulate phylogeny. Nevertheless, this is all the evidence we've got, so we 
must make the most of it, while recognizing that it should be taken with a grain 
of salt' (2002: 237). 
Protolanguage 'fossils' include single-symbol utterances (holophrasis), 
Agent First, Focus Last (the natural mirror image of which is Topic First), 
Grouping (modifiers tend to be adjacent to what they modify), and nominal 
compounding. These semantically motivated phenomena are observable in 
pidgin languages and in the Basic Variety (BV) posited by Klein and Perdue 
(1997), which is 'a kind of minimalistic acquisition of a foreign language up to 
a level where basic communication can take place but no further' (Johansson, 
2005: 239). In its technical sense, BV is to be understood as 'an instantiation of 
the essential properties of the human language capacity, and ... as the "initial 
fossilization point" of adult second language acquisition' (Meisel, 1997: 374).9 
Like (early) pidgins BV is fairly close to what Bickerton (1990) describes as 
protolanguage (Jackendoff, 1999: 276, 2002: 249). Bickerton (1990: 120, 122-
23) imputes to protolanguage a less stable word order than that in BV. 
Jackendoff opines that this may be partly because Bickerton's evidence comes 
from incipient pidgins, 'which are heavily influenced by the native language(s) 
of their users' (1999: 276; similarly, 2002: 249). 
Some parts of language are not subject to critical-period limitations and 
are immune to degradation when the transmission of language is disrupted, in 
particular the acquisition of vocabulary, the concatenation of words, and simple 
semantically based principles of word order. The survival of these features – 
and not others (such as the details of phonology, phrase structure, and 
especially inflectional morphology) – in degraded forms of language may serve 
as evidence for their 'evolutionarily more primitive character' (Jackendoff, 
1999: 276). Jackendoff's conclusion is that Universal Grammar is not simply 
                                                  
9That BV reflects creative processes underlying the human language faculty and linguistic 
organization independent of specific languages is not uncontested.  Meisel (1997) suggests a 
rather different view of BV, having found evidence that casts some doubt on the claim that it is 
an I(nternal)-language.  BV is essentially a type of early L2-interlanguage that is constrained by 
Universal Grammar but driven by nongrammatical cognitive processes.   
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'on or off' in abnormal situations. Those subcomponents that are particularly 
prone to disruption are 'significantly, the same ones in case after case. The 
robust remnant is protolanguage' (2002: 264). Jackendoff differs from 
Bickerton by portraying grammar not as a single unified system but as a 
'collection of simpler systems,' many of which are built up as refinements of 
preexisting interfaces between components. Hence, the evolution of the human 
language faculty can be seen as 'deeply incremental' (loc. cit.). 
 
4.2.2 Discussion 
Bickerton's language bioprogram hypothesis was initially very influential and 
provocative of further research. But it was also highly controversial and 
ultimately won few supporters in creolistics, even while enjoying a more 
sympathetic reception in other areas of linguistic inquiry, including some work 
on language evolution.10 The issues are well known and call for only brief 
recapitulation here: (a) Contrastive studies have found less similarity among 
creoles than Bickerton has claimed. (b) The typological similarities that do 
exist across creoles find better supported alternate explanations. (c) 
Longitudinal studies indicate that creoles developed some of their features over 
longer periods of time than Bickerton has wanted to believe.11 (d) 
Contemporary theory has moved away from the conventional notion of creoles 
qua nativized pidgins requiring the special intervention of children and from 
the proposition that creoles have a special status, reflecting Universal Grammar 
'in a direct or privileged fashion' (Lightfoot, 2006: 152; cf. also Ragir, 2002: 
282-83; Mufwene, 2008: 1n., 23-24). Slobin (2002: 386-87) is not convinced 
by any of the evidence or arguments for Bickerton's bioprogram. He calls the 
reader's attention to a body of data that shows how 'languages that are 
considerably more complex than pidgins can arise in interaction with adults, 
                                                  
10Cf., e.g., Nocentini, 1999: 472-74, albeit with some reservations and qualifications.  Pinker 
(2003: 22-23) examines the question of whether human language resembles culturally acquired 
abilities or looks more like a part of the standard human phenotype.  As evidence for the latter 
view and citing Bickerton (1981), he offers the proposition that creole children 'did not passively 
have the pidgin culturally transmitted to them, but quickly developed creole languages, which 
differ substantially from the pidgins and have all the basic features of established human 
languages' (p. 23).  Other types of evidence marshaled by Pinker will carry the larger point, but 
as we shall see presently, creolization cannot be assumed to be a special kind of L1-acquisition.  
Kihm (2002) offers a not unsympathetic but far more cautious assessment of the language 
bioprogram hypothesis and its implications for the study of language evolution. 
11The gradualist position on creole formation appears to have made its way to evolutionary 
linguistics, e.g., Aitchison, 1998: 24.  Tellingly, Li (2002: 91, my emphasis) writes: 'If 
creolization is a hint, a few generations probably constitute sufficient time for a grammar to 




before there are native speakers' (p. 386). The first generation of native 
speakers 'smoothes out' the language rather than creating new forms (Slobin, 
2002: 386; similarly, Mufwene, 2008: 3, 7, 16-23). The learning processes, he 
concludes, are normal 'and do not reveal special capacities of the language-
learning child beyond what is already known about the acquisition of 'full-
fledged' languages. A creole language develops over time, in contexts of 
expanding communicative use of a limited pidgin language. Child learners help 
to push the process forward, arriving at a grammar that is more regular and 
automated – but they do not appear to be the innovators' (p. 387; cf. also 
Mufwene, 2008: 12). The transition from pidgin to creole grammar does not 
therefore lend support to Bickerton's postulation of a relatively abrupt transition 
from protolanguage to full language. If creole lexis and grammar come largely 
from the contributing languages and/or from adult innovation, then creole 
languages 'cease to be of interest for our present enterprise, since neither in 
lexicon nor grammar do they illustrate creation anew of a language' (Comrie, 
2000: 995). 
Independently of whatever probative value the formation of creole 
languages may or may not be for the study of language evolution, there remains 
the idea that pidgins have the characteristics that are most likely to have been 
present in early forms of human language. Pidgins were developed largely 
through interactions between adults who are in possession of a fully developed 
faculté de langage and have native proficiency in one or more full modern 
languages. These facts raise the question of how the similarities between 
pidgins and early human language structure 'can be related to one another in 
systematic way, especially since it remains unclear how the structure of pidgins 
is affected by the presence of the various lexifier and substrate languages that 
characterize the genesis of pidgin languages' (Heine and Kuteva, 2002: 393). 
Unlike pidgin speakers, the creators of protolanguage would not have had 
preexisting full languages from which to draw resources (Mufwene, 2008: 
14n.). 
Botha (2006a: 134-36) examines Jackendoff's position that traces of 
ancestral language are recoverable from 'degraded' forms of modern language. 
The occurrence of certain properties in the latter is taken by Jackendoff as 
evidence for the conclusion that protolanguage was likewise characterized by 
these very properties. The thesis falters on Botha's criterion of groundedness, 
which requires that the attributes of a proposed window phenomenon be well 
understood (Botha, 2006a: 134). Jackendoff merely offers an ad hoc list of 
modern exemplars, without addressing the question of what it is about a form 
of language that makes it 'degraded.' It will turn out that 'degradedness' should 
be distinguished from restrictedness. In Botha's critique (2006a: 136-37) it is 
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further demanded that inferences about language evolution drawn from a 
putative window phenomenon be warranted. A windows approach should 
provide justification for drawing inferences about facets of language evolution 
from modern data that represent different kinds of entities. It is not sufficient 
merely to assert ipse dixit that 'degraded' forms of language are evolutionarily 
primitive or language fossils. Botha's third window evaluation criterion is that 
of pertinence (2006a: 138-40). The conclusions that Jackendoff arrives at 
through his 'degraded' language window are, in Botha's estimation, clearly 
about 'the right thing,' namely the evolution of language (vis-à-vis the evolution 
of an entity that is distinct from language or an aspect of language that is 
distinct from its evolution, 2006b: 138). The essential point is that to achieve 
pertinence, each 'pane' in Jackendoff's window must be individually grounded 
and warranted. That would involve, inter alia, underpinning by a restrictive 
theory of what a pidgin is, a matter that we shall take up in section 3.  
Mufwene's (2008) criticism of the pidgin (and creole) window 
concentrates on many of the foregoing points. He denies that creoles developed 
from pidgins at all (2008: 4, 12, 15) and prefers a strictly sociohistorical 
definition of creole languages, which are a group of vernaculars that emerged 
from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries under similar 
geographic, demographic, and economic conditions, viz. in (usually) tropical 
colonies settled by Europeans who typically spoke nonstandard varieties of 
metropolitan languages and who put in place plantation economies that utilized 
nonindigenous slave labor (Mufwene, 2000: 78). He emphasizes that what little 
the development of pidgins and creoles tells us about the evolution of language 
is not what has been claimed in the literature. The histories of these languages 
in (respectively) European trade and plantation colonies of the Early Modern 
era 'present nothing that comes close to replicating the evolutionary conditions 
that led to the emergence of modern language. Nor are there any conceivable 
parallels between, on the one hand, the early hominids' brains and minds that 
produced proto-languages posited by Bickerton (1990, 2000) and Givón (1998) 
and, on the other, those of both the modern adults who produced (incipient) 
pidgins and the modern children who produce child language, even if one 
subscribes to the ontogeny-recapitulates-phylogeny thesis' (2008: 2-3). 
Mufwene (2008: 14, 36) does make allowance for deeper-seated 
structural elements that are likely to survive the collision of languages during 
pidginization. Incipient pidgins can be expected to preserve those structural 
components that are 'the most robust' and 'perhaps the most deeply entrenched' 
in evolutionary terms. He readily acknowledges the probable correctness of 
Givón's (1998: 92, 105) observations regarding gradualness in the co-evolution 




adding that the development of creoles and pidgins is similar only in being a 
gradual process (2008: 33). Here, Mufwene's position is itself problematic, for 
the time scales of evolutionary processes and of the processes of pidginization 
and creolization are incommensurable (Botha, 2006b: 8). Aside from 
survivability and graduality, the one other parallelism between the development 
of pidgins and creoles and the evolution of human language lies in inter-
individual variation, the convergence of idiolectal systems through mutual 
accommodation, and the competition and selection of features during the 
emergence of communal norms (Mufwene, 2008: 2, 31, 35). 
 
4.3 Reframing the pidgin window 
At issue is whether key aspects of pidgins and pidgin formation could have had 
analogues in certain facets of language evolution. Arguments – pro et contra – 
have engaged the following factors: (i) the environments in which pidgins 
formed, (ii) the cognitive capacities of the people who created these codes, (iii) 
the linguistic properties of pidgins, (iv) the role of pragmatics, (v) the general 
nature of the processes involved in the formation of pidgins (e.g., gradualness, 
competition and selection of features), and (vi) the specific developmental 
processes involved (Botha, 2006b: 4). When reading the literature on what 
restricted linguistic systems might tell us about language evolution, one is 
struck by the emphasis on factor (iii) and the lack of an explicit recognition of 
pidgins as dynamic systems.12 In this section I argue that a properly constructed 
pidgin window would look out not onto language structure per se but onto 
process, namely, the sequence of linguistic developments that led to the 
elaboration of minimal codes into more complex systems. 
The prevailing occupation with recovery of the remotest conceivable 
language structure out of which modern complex forms emerged has fixed 
attention on 'early-stage' pidgins, the properties of which are supposed to 
mirror protolanguage. These highly restricted codes are what some linguists 
would prefer to call jargons, which are ad hoc, unstable, individual solutions to 
the problem of interethnic communication (secondary hybridization in the 
model of Whinnom, 1971). Jargons are characterized by a lack of morphology 
and syntactic rules (Mühlhäusler, 1997: 134). The principal communicative 
strategies are holophrasis, pragmatic structuring (often involving two-word 
concatenations), context-dependency, universals, and L1-transfer; cultural and 
personal factors appear to play a role as well (Mühlhäusler, 1997: 56, 119, 
128). There are no social norms, nor are jargons transmissible to subsequent 
                                                  
12A notable exception is Heine and Kuteva (2007), which was published in late 2007 and was 
unavailable to me when I prepared the prefinal version of this article. 
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generations in any consistent way; they are to a great extent invented and 
reinvented by individuals (Mühlhäusler, 1997: 119, 138). Even if jargon 
speakers do not, at the outset, seek to acquire a preexisting language as a whole 
language, social integration or increased contact may afford them with 
opportunities to modify their speech in the direction of a target language. 
Pidgins are the result of language creation rather than impaired or partial 
second language acquisition. Jargon speakers interacting with one another 
develop more complex, qualitatively different linguistic systems out of 
minimal, ad hoc codes, as communicative requirements become more 
demanding (tertiary hybridization, in the model of Whinnom, 1971). Pidgins 
are communal rather than individual solutions to the problem of interethnic 
communication. The transition from jargon to (stable) pidgin coincides with the 
formation of a language community and the emergence of socially accepted 
linguistic norms, which occurs when none of the languages in a heterogenous 
milieu serves as a target language (Mühlhäusler, 1997: 6, 138, 162).13 
Linguistically, pidgins differ from jargons in the following way: 'Generally 
speaking, stabilization implies the gradual replacement of free variation and 
inconsistencies by more regular syntactic [and] lexical structures. In the former 
area, a pragmatic mode of speaking begins to give way to a grammatical one, 
whereas in the latter lexical dependency on outside resources is supplemented 
with internal means of lexical expansion. Most important, new grammatical 
devices are independent of a speaker's first language or other individual 
language learning strategies' (1997: 138). That pidgins with no shared history 
exhibit recurring similarities in structural make-up suggests that 'people appeal 
to innate linguistic universals when under pressure for communication' or, 
alternatively, the observed similarities are relatable 'to more general pragmatic 
and problem-solving capacities found with human beings' (Mühlhäusler, 1997: 
162-63). Moreover and critically, when a highly diverse population participates 
in language construction, the L1-transfer that is characteristic of the jargon 
stage should not be of great significance for subsequent stabilization: 'The more 
different their areal linguistic background, the less likely is substratum 
influence, and the more speakers rely on universal strategies' (Mühlhäusler, 
1997: 119). Unlike jargons, which can become targeted in the direction of 
preexisting whole languages, directionality in pidgin formation is internal; that 
is, the real target in these circumstances is the linguistic system that speakers 
                                                  
13Whinnom's claim that pidgins are unlikely ever to have crystallized in other than multilingual 
situations (1971: 104, 106; similarly, Mühlhäusler, 1997: 138) is doubtless too strong.  I adopt 
here the weaker claim that most pidgin situations involve three or more groups of people, with a 
two-language situation leading to the development of a pidgin only when there is a 'profound 




are actually developing (Whinnom, 1971: 105; Baker, 1997: 104; Mühlhäusler, 
1997: 138; cf. also Thomason and Kaufman, 1988: 178). 
In the present framework the distinction between jargons and pidgins 
does not represent a binary opposition. Rather, these contact varieties are part 
of a continuous spectrum between pragmatic and syntactic modes of 
communication, with jargons at the one pole, full languages (including creoles) 
at the opposite pole, and pidgins defining the mid-range. In three important 
aspects – rudimentary attempts at intergroup communication by fully 
languaged individuals versus group language construction, the role of L1-
transfer, and the potential for targeting in the direction of a full language 
(resulting in interlanguage continua) – jargons differ significantly from pidgins 
under the restrictive definition of the latter term. Yet, some linguists who work 
on pidgin and creole languages 'have not regarded the distinction between 
jargon and stable pidgin as one deserving great attention: the two stages are 
often lumped together and compared jointly with creoles, which develop at a 
later stage' (Mühlhäusler, 1997: 138). To the extent that the distinction is drawn 
at all in the literature on language evolution, it is the jargon stage that is 
assumed to be of relevance.14 Conceptualization of an asyntactic protolanguage 
along the lines of 'modern' jargons seems reasonable and could even be correct. 
But such a window on language evolution would be grounded in a phenomenon 
that is actually quite distinct from stable pidgins, which are more advanced 
along a developmental continuum. To illustrate this point, let us briefly revisit 
the literature on our subject. 
As is clear from Jackendoff's discussion (2002: 247), the features of BV 
do seem to parallel those of jargons: (a) lexical competence, (b) absence of 
inflectional morphology, (c) omission of contextually supplied arguments, (d) 
no subordination, and (e) largely semantically-based principles of word order, 
most prominently, Agent First and Focus Last. In a subsequent passage 
Jackendoff (2002: 264) writes of the severe impairment that occurs in late 
language learning, yielding BV and incipient pidgins (by which he must mean 
jargons). Benazzo (2008, this volume) writes that the initial systems of adult 
language learners do not seem to be strongly influenced by their L1: 'A target 
language-like lexicon is organized on the basis of pragmatic and semantic 
principles which are largely independent of the Source/Target language 
specifics.' The earliest stage of L2-acquisition involves neither a process of 
                                                  
14Unlike most linguists who have been concerned with the pidgin window, Heine and Kuteva 
(2007: 166) do not confine themselves to jargons but also deal with pidgins that have reached 
more advanced stages of development.  Their principal case study, Kenya Pidgin Swahili, does 
not fall neatly along the jargon – (stable) pidgin – extended pidgin continuum but shows a great 
range of variability, including lects that approach Coastal Swahili (2007: 170). 
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relexification nor 'piecemeal imitation' of a native-speaker model. The 
differential treatment of BV and jargons would seem unwarranted. Both variety 
types represent a kind of minimal pragmatic response to communicative 
exigencies upon initiation of interlingual contact. Both originate in a common 
'pre-basic' mode of intergroup communication, at which point utterances are 
organized as nominal structures without verbs (cf. Heine and Kuteva, 2007: 
301). And both cease to be representative of early processes of human language 
formation as soon as L1-imposition and/or at least partial targeting become 
factors. 
An interesting way of conceptualizing the very earliest stage of human 
language is suggested by Heine and Kuteva (2002: 390-91, 2007: 29-31). Their 
view of language change is uniformitarian, that is, they presume that diachronic 
processes (primary hybridization in the terminology of Whinnom, 1971) were 
the same in the past – even the very remote past – as they are in the present. 
With regard to language structure, however, their view is distinctly 
nonuniformitarian. On the basis of evidence from grammaticalization, whereby 
lexical items acquire specialized grammatical meanings in a unidirectional 
progression, they propose that what they refer to as 'early language' (2007: 4, 
passim) – language at the point at which the forces of historical change came 
into being – had a structure that was less complex than that which is 
characteristic of modern languages (2007: 30). Early language can be thought 
of as an essentially lexical stage of language evolution that saw the emergence 
of – first – one type of wordlike units 'denoting thing-like, time-stable entities, 
that is, nouns,' and – secondarily – another type of units 'denoting non-time-
stable concepts such as actions, activities, and events, i.e., verbs' (2002: 390; 
similarly, 2007: 300, 302). But at this developmental stage, human language 
must have lacked function words and grammatical morphemes to express 
syntactic relations, spatial orientation or possession, and distinctions of 
personal deixis (pronouns) (Heine and Kuteva, 2002: 390-91, 394; 2007: 302-
3). Once a noun-verb distinction crystalizes, 'many other design features can 
crystalize around it (Jackendoff, 2002: 259), and grammaticalization now 
becomes the driving force of grammatical evolution' (Heine and Kuteva, 2007: 
303). 
In a similar vein Hurford (2003: 52-53) wishes to show how language 
systems could have become increasingly complex once humans had achieved a 
state of language readiness. Language can be viewed as a 'cyclic interaction 
across generations' between I(nternal)-language and E(xternal)-language (p. 
51). This way of looking at diachrony has been of importance for 
grammaticalizaton theory. Hurford offers a number of suggestions about what 




grammaticalization and on the premise that functional items originated in 
lexical stems. This leads him to hypothesize that the earliest languages had no 
articles, no auxiliaries, no complementizers, no subordinating conjunctions, no 
prepositions, no agreement markers, no gender markers, no numerals, no 
adjectives. In addition he speculates that the earliest languages had no proper 
names, no illocution markers, no subordinate clauses or hypotaxis, no 
derivational morphology, less differentiation of lexical categories (perhaps not 
even N, V), and less differentiation of subject and topic (2003: 53).15 
The structure hypothesized for early language resembles that of 'early' or 
'unstable pidgins' (Heine and Kuteva, 2002: 391-92; Hurford, 2003: 53). 
Beyond the jargon phase, however, pidgins display at least some 
grammaticalized elements (e.g., expressing negation, aspect, deixis) and 
hierarchical structure.16 Restricted though they may be compared to full 
languages, stable pidgins are not as linguistically primitive as what one might 
reasonably suppose the earliest conceivable human language to have been on 
the basis of grammaticalization theory. At its primal stage, Heine and Kuteva 
(2002: 394) conclude, human language does not appear to find a parallel in 
modern pidgins or other varieties that arise in situations of 'communicative 
stress.'17 It may be correct to suppose that pidgins exhibit degrees of 
grammaticalization that early language could not have shown, but such a 
conclusion would be reached from the perspective of a static outcome. 
In their most recent statement, however, Heine and Kuteva (2007: ch. 4) 
have explicitly cast pidgins as dynamic, developing systems, which is precisely 
the position that is taken here. In their view the question of whether one can 
establish reasonable analogues between early language and pidgins yields a 
decidedly mixed answer. There are four main reasons why pidgins are relevant 
for the reconstruction of early language, all of which have to do with the way in 
which a language having little grammatical complexity gains complexity: (i) 
the rise of functional categories through the combination of existing material in 
novel ways; (ii) the relatively quick rate of innovation (within a few 
generations as opposed to centuries); (iii) the emergence of 'auxiliary' functions 
among regularly used collocations of two lexical items leading to the creation 
of grammaticalized forms; and (iv) the potential for newly evolving patterns 
                                                  
15Hurford (loc. cit.) notes that one could apply similar ideas to semantics (e.g., no polysemy, no 
metaphor, fewer hyponyms) and phonology (simple vowel systems, CV syllable structure). 
16Mufwene (2008: 4n.) finds no evidence that idiolects of which pidgins are constituted are not 
internally systematic. 
17Givón (1979: 225, emphasis in original) defines communicative stress as follows: 'The Pidgin-
speaking community is thrown together without a common language but has urgent tasks to 
perform.' 
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and categories to arise independently of resources in the languages available to 
pidgin speakers (Heine and Kuteva, 2007: 195-98). Factors that differentiate 
modern pidgins from the situation of early language and appear to militate 
against a pidgin window are the following (Heine and Kuteva, 2007: 193-95): 
(v) Pidgins begin their life cycle as heavily reduced and simplified versions of 
full languages; the direction of change (from grammatically complex to less 
complex forms of language) is exactly the opposite of how language evolution 
must have proceeded. (vi) There are usually a number of preexisting linguistic 
features that survive pidginization; that is, these features are drawn directly or 
adapted from full languages in the mix. (vii) Pidgin speakers had at all times at 
least one 'functionally adequate' language from which to draw resources. (viii) 
Frequently, though, individual multilingualism is the rule in social encounters 
that give rise to pidgins. (ix) Leaving aside the issue of whether early-language 
speakers would have been able to access the same cognitive endowment as 
modern-language speakers, Heine and Kuteva (2007: 195) aver that 'pidgin 
speakers were able to draw on cognitive skills that would enable them on the 
basis of the communicative networks they were exposed to – in particular skills 
that were available them to establish and express relations among different 
concepts.' (x) Pidgins are limited to a small number of social domains. There is 
no reason to suppose that early language was so restricted. As regards points v-
x, I believe that the contrasts drawn between modern pidgin formation and the 
transition to full modern language from a protolinguistic state will prove 
largely illusory, if one proceeds from the restrictive definition of pidgin that is 
proposed above and from a constructive model of pidgin formation. 
 
4.4 A constructive model of pidgin formation 
Baker observes that a common thread through different accounts of how pidgin 
and creole languages were formed is failure: 'People tried to acquire a 
European language and failed, or they tried to maintain their traditional 
language and failed'; either way, these contact languages 'were the result of 
failure' (1995: 6; similarly, 1990: 107, 1994: 65-66, 1997: 91). Most pidgins 
and creoles, Baker believes, should not be seen as imperfect and incomplete 
attempts at second language acquisition. They are, initially at least, 'self-
evidently successful solutions to problems of human intercommunication – 
languages made by and for their users over generations, drawing on the range 
of available resources, and tailored to their users' specific and changing 
communicative needs' (1990: 117; similarly 1995: 6, 13). 
A no-less common theme through different accounts of language 
evolution is that pidgins are restructured and radically stripped down forms of 




393, 2007: 168; Mufwene, 2008: 13). Heine and Kuteva (2002: 391), for 
example, situate pidgin formation in the following context: 'In languages used 
in stress situations, where linguistic communication is seriously impaired, 
where people have only "inadequate" linguistic models at their disposal, 
everything that is not vital tends to be stripped off and hence language structure 
may be reduced to its most essential, and least dispensable, characteristics. 
Such characteristics are the ones most likely to have been present also in earlier 
forms of human language.' As regards developmental processes, Botha (2006b: 
9) points out that on a priori grounds, it would seem unlikely that reduction 
(loss of referential and nonreferential power) and simplification (regularization) 
would have played a role in the first appearance of language. Conceptualization 
of a pidgin as a 'degraded' variety entails the unexamined assumption that its 
lexical source language constitutes a target language, even if access is limited: 
'To comment on an all-too-frequent misconception – simplification of the 
lexical source language by people who did not know it could play no role at all, 
because you can't simplify what you don't know' (Thomason and Kaufman, 
1988: 178, emphasis in original). If it turns out that pidgin speakers were not 
attempting to acquire a preexisting language, then 'degradation' is merely an 
artifact of contrastive analysis. 
Baker's 'creativist' or 'constructive' approach (1990, 1994, 1995, 1997, 
2000) rejects entirely the propositions that each pidgin and (subsequently)/or 
creole can be regarded as a restructured form of a preexisting language and/or 
the product of a special kind of second-language acquisition. The process is 
one of language creation (Baker, 1990: 111, 1995: 4, 1997: 91, 2000: 48); that 
is, pidgins and creoles are in essence what those who created them wanted 
them to be (1995: 13, 2000: 48). Whenever two or more groups of people 
lacking a common language enter into sudden and sustained contact and have a 
mutual interest in both intercommunication and maintenance of group identity, 
they are likely to start constructing a basic 'medium for interethnic 
communication' (MIC), although for present purposes we should perhaps want 
to adjust this term to 'medium for intergroup communication' or simply 
'medium for intercommunication.' Their 'real, if unconscious, aim' was the 
development of a new language, suited to their immediate communicative 
needs, which they 'subsequently expanded and adapted ... as their growing or 
changing needs demanded, drawing at all times on the resources available' 
(1990: 111; similarly, 1997: 96) and by innovating. 
The main function of the MIC is to serve as a supplementary code that 
enables communication between people who do not share a preexisting full 
language and for whatever reason cannot or do not acquire one. Local 
conditions may extend the functional role of the MIC beyond supplementation 
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to less marked contexts and bestow upon it a measure of social indexicality. In 
colonial plantation societies, for example, locally born slaves would have had 
far more in common with one another, due to their upbringing in the same 
territory, than with slaves imported from abroad. Among their shared 
knowledge would be proficiency in a more elaborated form of the MIC. In fact 
the emerging language of locally-born slaves would have become not only a 
more developed form of the MIC but what Baker calls a 'medium for 
community solidarity' (MCS), which is 'a form of speech closely related to the 
basic [or elaborated] MIC but sufficiently different from the latter to serve as a 
badge of identity for locally-born slaves enabling them to recognize each other 
as such on the basis of speech alone' (Baker, 2000: 54). The conventional 
distinction between pidgins and creoles based on whether they are the first 
language of some of their speakers serves no useful purpose (Baker, 1995: 4, 
1997: 91, 2000: 48n.). All pidgins and creoles are – or were, formerly – MICs; 
many subsequently became MCSs (Baker, 2000: 48n.). 
Botha (2006b: 9) refers to Baker's views in his own assessment of pidgin 
languages as a putative window on language evolution and expresses regret 
that 'what his creativist account of the genesis of pidgins and creoles might 
enable us to learn about the first emergence and subsequent development of 
human language is a question that he is not concerned with.' In the following 
section I explore the logical basis of the pidgin window within a constructive 
framework, in the sense that the analysis I outline will satisfy Botha's (2006a) 
three evaluation criteria: groundedness (the window proceeds from a restrictive 
definition of pidgin), warrantedness, and pertinence. 
 
4.5 Are there creative linguistic processes in pidgin formation? 
Botha (2006b: 9) suggests that 'in an assessment of the windowhood of pidgins, 
it may be useful to draw a distinction between the creation and recreation of 
linguistic objects.' Processes of creation would produce new linguistic 
structures and grammatical categories de novo, that is, without reference to 
other, preexisting linguistic objects. Processes of re-creation, by contrast, 
would produce new linguistic objects by 'doing something' to other, preexisting 
linguistic structures and categories. If creative processes can be shown to have 
played a role in the instantiation of a MIC, 'the next pertinent question would 
be whether they are likely to have had analogs in the evolution of language' 
(Botha, 2006b: 10). 
In the literature, re-creation often denotes the replication of language 
systems in normal, intergenerational language transmission. Of course, these 




They undergo modifications that are (or are not) stabilized by selection. 
Initially, selected innovations are manifest in structured variability, which a 
speech community can maintain indefinitely. However, actual usage and/or 
social valuation may gradually bring about the elimination of one of the 
competing variants. In targeted second language acquisition speakers attempt to 
re-create a preexisting language, even though the primary aim may be more one 
of effecting communication than of achieving full, nativelike proficiency. 
Replication 'errors' in interlanguage versions of the target language will reflect 
the imposition of L1-elements as compensation for speakers' limited 
proficiency, alongside adaptation of target-language resources (e.g., 
overgeneralization, neologism) and avoidance of features that are difficult to 
perceive and parse (most famously inflectional morphology, tonal distinctions). 
The general view probably is that most, if not all features of pidgins and 
creoles derive from preexisting languages and are of the re-creative type (cf. 
Baker, 1994: 65, 1997: 96). Mufwene (2008: 26) goes so far as to assert that 
'one is hard pressed to find in creoles any grammatical features that have not 
been selected from the nonstandard varieties of relevant European vernaculars 
or in their substrate languages.' 
In principle the 'resources available' during pidgin formation include all 
of the languages known to the participants, as well as certain universal aspects 
of the human linguistic capacity. In practice, however, the contribution of 
nonlexical input materials depends on the contact environment. In many 
contact situations the lexifier (superstrate) language is socially remote. Recall, 
too, that the more diverse the group that bears the burden of constructing a 
MIC, the greater the degree of discontinuity between the developing system 
and languages in the mix. A highly heterogeneous linguistic environment tends 
to prevent the selection of linguistic forms characteristic of any single group of 
speakers: 'Put differently, in the absence of sufficient overlap and agreement 
among the speakers of the various jargons in such a situation, universally 
motivated solutions need to be adopted' (Mühlhäusler, 1997: 138). 
Creative processes would produce new objects out of content 
morphemes and their pragmatically motivated juxtaposition. To substantiate 
this claim, we should want to examine the formation of a basic MIC, but once 
again, there is a significant empirical obstacle. Such a phenomenon has never 
been studied in situ and is recoverable only through reconstruction.18 
Longitudinal studies of some extended pidgins (especially Tok Pisin) and 
creoles (Hawaiian Creole English) in the Pacific have yielded data closer to the 
initial point of contact (Baker, 2000: 48; cf. also Thomason and Kaufman, 
                                                  
18According to Baker (2000: 48), no data from the first half century of contact are currently 
known for any Atlantic territory where an English-based creole is subsequently attested. 
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1988: 181, Mühlhäusler, 1997: 187).19 My own research program on the 
formation of a MIC in southern Africa during the second half of the 
seventeenth century and its subsequent elaboration in the eighteenth century 
provides important supporting evidence for the constructive model. 
A caveat is perhaps in order here. In several respects my position runs 
contrary to prevailing views on language contact in colonial southern Africa 
during the Dutch East India Company era. Den Besten (2006b) sees the 
formation of the Cape Dutch Pidgin mainly in terms of substrate choices and 
superstrate choices, both of which would, of course, indisputably presuppose 
existing structure. He does acknowledge that creative solutions to the problem 
of intergroup communication played a role and may tell us something about 
language evolution. 'Yet,' he asks, 'even these instant grammaticalizations 
presuppose structure. However is creation ex nihilo possible at all?' In what 
follows I shall address myself to this specific question by tracing the 
development of the earliest attested meaningful entities in the Pidgin. 
From the 1590s, English and Dutch ships en route between Europe and 
the Indies regularly put in at Table Bay, for the refreshment of tired and sick 
crews. The Dutch East India Company established a permanent outpost there in 
1652, which inevitably, perhaps, proved expansive. The indigenous Khoikhoi 
used jargonized and in some cases more advanced interlanguage versions of 
Dutch. With the introduction of a slave-labor economy in 1658, the contact 
situation in the Cape Colony gave rise to a basic, stable MIC by roughly 1713, 
which we shall call the Cape Dutch Pidgin. Slaves were drawn first from 
Angola and Dahomey. Subsequently, the Cape Colony turned east for most of 
its slaves – to the Indonesian archipelago, the Indian subcontinent, Ceylon, 
Madagascar, the Mascarene Islands, and Mozambique, acquiring the most 
diverse slave population of any known slave society (Shell, 1994: 40-46). 
Moreover, this society interacted not only with the dominant European caste 
and among themselves, they also had to communicate with native peoples in a 
bonded workforce. Proletarianization of indigenes commenced with the 
seasonal employment of itinerant Khoikhoi as wage laborers and culminated in 
their enserfment by the last quarter of the eighteenth century (cf. Shell, 1994: 
26-34). Many San (Bushmen) people were kidnapped by armed settler 
commandos and forced to work on farms. Members of a labor caste – enslaved, 
enserfed, and impressed – created and elaborated a MIC not through the 
targeted, albeit imperfect acquisition of the Dutch spoken by the dominant 
                                                  
19The principal case study of Heine and Kuteva (2007: ch. 4), Kenya Pidgin Swahili, 'was spoken 
in up-country Kenya in the 1960s and 1970s, when the first-named author had a chance to work 




European caste but rather by constructing a system that suited their 
communicative intent. 
At the initial point of contact, all parties used reduced versions of their 
own languages together with gestures in order to achieve basic communication. 
These encounters led to the negotiation of sound-meaning correspondences that 
are a prerequisite for the construction of an actual MIC. To illustrate this 
process, let us consider some data from the rudimentary Dutch-English-
Khoikhoi trade jargon that arose in precolonial southern Africa. On September 
9, 1601 the fleet of Sir James Lancaster put in at Saldania, as Table Bay was 
known to mariners at the turn of the seventeenth century.20 An anonymous 
diarist describes how his comrades used gestures supplemented by 
vocalizations thought to be universally understood in order to obtain livestock 
from the Khoikhoi: 
 
(1) Then [the General] himselfe went presently a-land to seeke some 
refreshing for our sicke and weake men; where hee met with certaine 
of the Countrey people, and gave them divers trifles, as Knives and 
peeces of old Iron and such like, and made signes to them to bring him 
downe Sheepe and Oxen; for he spake to them in the Cattels Language 
(which was never changed at the confusion of Babel), which was 
Moath for Oxen and Kine, and Baa for Sheepe... . Now within twelve 
dayes they ceased to bring us any more Cattell. But the people many 
times came downe to vs afterward; and when we made them signes for 
more Sheepe, they would point vs to those wee had bought [grazing] ... 
The people of this place are all of a tawnie colour, of a reasonable 
stature, swift of foot, and much giuen to picke and steale: their speech 
is wholly uttered through the throate, and they clocke with their 
tongues in such sort, that in seven weeks which wee remained heere in 
this place, the sharpest wit among us could not learne one word of their 
language; and yet the people would soone vnderstand any signe wee 
made to them (Raven-Hart, ed., 1967: 23).21 
 
While individual, ad hoc verbal solutions to the problem of intergroup 
communication would be the expected development during the jargon phase, 
                                                  
20After the Portuguese admiral Antonio de Saldanha, who anchored his fleet in the present Table 
Bay in 1503.  A century later, the Dutch applied the surname to what is today Saldanha Bay, 
which lies roughly 90 kilometers northwest of Table Bay. 
21Cognates are presumably attested in Nama gamab 'ox', gamas 'cow', gŭb 'wether', gŭs 'ewe' 
(Rust 1969: 69, 136), Korana gomab, gomăs, gŭb, gŭs (Meinhof 1930: 83-84). 
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there are early on indications of lexicalization. Edward Terry, a chaplain in an 
English fleet that landed at the Cape in 1616, relates how 
 
(2) there are great store of cattle, as little beeves, called by the barbarous 
inhabitants Boos; and sheep, which they call Baas, who bear a short 
coarse, hairy wool (Raven-Hart, ed., 1967: 82, my italics). 
 
English and/or Dutch onomatopoetic words imitating the lowing of cattle and 
bleating of sheep were quickly conventionalized as trade terms for these 
animals.22 The lexicalization of these terms for 'ox, cow' and 'sheep' is 
confirmed by the witness of other European travelers: bou 'an ox', bae 'a sheep' 
(Cornelius Matelief, 1608, in Raven-Hart, ed., 1967: 38), booes 'beeves', baas 
'sheepe' (Christopher Farewell, 1614, in Raven-Hart, ed., 1967: 66), boe 'an ox', 
ba 'a sheep' (Hondius 1652 [1952: 29]). Nienaber (1963: 411-12) related 
boo/bou to an English variant boo(h) for the lowing of an ox, which is 
supported by Dutch boe 'moo'. 
By the establishment of the Dutch East India Company refreshment 
station at the Cape in 1652, another form, boeba has appeared and is 
consistently glossed as 'ox or cow' (Ten Rhyne, 1686 [1933: 154]) in our 
source material. 
 
(3) vraeghden hun off se ossen off boebas hadden; daerop een hunner 
alleen (synde doen met haer 15 à 16 sterck) antwoorde, seggende: 
'Caep, Caep,' daer uijt te verstaen was met de boebas, schaeps ende 
cramerij, alsoo hier voor haer ende 't vee (soo se mede wesen) niet te 
eeten viel, vertrocken waren (extract from the journal kept by the 
bookkeeper Fredrick Verburgh, November 3, 1652, in Van Riebeeck, 
Daghregister. Bosman and Thom eds., 1952: 399) 
'Asked them whether they had any oxen or boebas, to which one of 
them all (they were 15 or 16 strong) answered, saying: 'Cape, Cape.' 
From this was to be understood that they had left with the boebas, 
sheep, and wares, there being nothing here (as they showed us) to eat 
for them and their cattle.' 
 
(4) Bravas com Kapiteyn, die Kapiteyn ons van witte boeba geme (Ten 
Rhyne, 1686 [1933: 140]) 'Great is that chief, the chief (who) will give 
us white oxen.' 
 
                                                  




The sigmatic plural marker in boebas (3) reflects the gratuitous addition of the 
Dutch writer; the actual pidgin form is boeba in (4). Den Besten (1986: 197, 
1987: 15, 1989: 219) derives boeba from Dutch boe 'moo', to which the 
Khoikhoi inflectional morphemes -b- (masc. sg.) and -a (acc.) appear to have 
been affixed.23 Integration of boe into local Khoikhoi dialects as a loan word is 
certainly thinkable, though one would then be hard-pressed to explain an 
apparent reinflection in buba-a [sic] (Valentyn 1726 [1973: 80]), presumably 
with the same accusative suffix, and possibly also in bubaâ (Kolbe 1719 [1727: 
1.430]). There is no plausible reason to suppose that boe was borrowed into 
Khoikhoi and then reintroduced into the Cape Dutch Pidgin with L1-
morphology. It is far more likely that boeba was generated in the MIC out of 
the raw concatenation of boo/boe + baa, to denote 'livestock, collectively cattle 
and sheep'. Ten Rhyne (1686 [1933: 134n.]) reported boebaes toebak, which I 
would interpret as the MIC exponent of 'livestock tobacco', referring to one of 
the commodities that Europeans offered in exchange for Khoikhoi oxen, cows, 
sheep, and skins.24 The interpretation of this compound is informed by the 
composite meanings of the morphemes, pragmatics, and context. 
The larger point is the arbitrariness of linguistic signs, the capacity for 
which is central to language and a prerequisite for language genesis (cf. 
Comrie, 2000; Hurford, 2003: 48), and their mutability over time. The nascent 
Cape Dutch Pidgin early on acquired two referential morphemes – themselves 
the product of sound symbolism – from which its users then created a 
compound of an exocentric type. Boeba is independent of the morpheme-
source languages (Dutch and English) and the substrate Khoikhoi dialects (cf. 
Nama /goan 'livestock', Rust, 1969: 114). Taking the philological record at face 
value, one surmises that the cohort of Europeans which landed at the Cape in 
1652 under the command of Jan van Riebeeck construed boeba as the local 
term for 'cattle'. Indigenes appear to have accepted the narrowing of the 
compound's semantic scope for trading purposes, perhaps after the introduction 
                                                  
23Nienaber (1963: 412) interpreted boeba as containing an onomatopoetic expressive sign but did 
not attempt to parse it further. 
24According to Ten Rhyne (1686 [1933: 134]), 'mercaturae peritum, quandoque plures cum 
aliquot militibus ad eos delegat Gubernator nostras cum tabaci, vel Virginiani' (the governor, our 
countryman, sends to them [i.e., the Khoikhoi] one [person] or more experienced in trade, 
accompanied by some soldiers, with tobacco, actually Virginian).  In a footnote explaining 'cum 
tabaci, vel Virginiani,' Ten Rhyne added 'Boebaes toebak illis dicti' (boebaes toebak [is] said by 
them [i.e., the Khoikhoi]).  Nienaber (1963: 476) rightly wondered whether Ten Rhyne has 
correctly identified boeba, which he listed among the 'Mere Hottentottonica' and glossed as 'ox 
or cow' (Ten Ryhyne 1686 [1933: 154]); similarly, Valentyn and Kolbe, loc. cit.).  The sigmatic 
element in boebaes toebak could be the West Germanic genitive singular ending, as Den Besten 
(2006a: 119) believes. 
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of Dutch schaap into the developing MIC, as in etom schaep 'eating sheep' 
(Dutch eten 'eat') in reference to the gift of a prime wether presented to the 
leader of a Dutch trading party as a gesture of good will (Ten Rhyne, 1686 
[1933: 136n.]). In order for semantic shift to bring about a noncompositional 
relexicalization (with two pidgin words becoming one), the phonological form 
of boeba in the meaning of 'livestock' cannot have retained any iconic 
similarity with attributes of its referent. 
As pointed out above, the influence of preexisting full languages is most 
likely to occur in the jargon phase, especially when only two languages are 
involved and none of the parties are concerned with accurate replication. 
European and Khoikhoi influences have been cited as the major factor in the 
generation of the syntactic compound boebasibier 'milk', which Ten Rhyne 
(1686 [1933: 154]) listed under the rubric 'Corrupta Belgica.' Nienaber (1963: 
383) proposed two possible resolutions: boebasi-bie(r) 'cow-ADJ 
beer/drink/milk' in which -si- is to be equated with the Dutch adjectival suffix   
-s (inflected form -se), or boeba-si-bie(r) 'cow POSS beer/drink/milk' in which 
si is a monophthongized allomorph of the Early Modern Dutch possessive 
pronoun sij(n) 'his, its' (zijn/z'n in contemporary spelling) or (more plausibly in 
Nienaber's view) a Khoikhoi possessive morpheme di, of which ti and si are 
variant forms. Den Besten (2006a: 118, 2007: 152-53) favors an adaptation of 
the Dutch possessive construction [DPi – pron.i – NP], as in die hond z'n neus 
(that dog POSS nose) 'that dog's nose', out of which arose the Afrikaans 
construction with invariant se (die kinders se boeke [the children POSS books] 
'the children's books'). Nienaber (1963: 383) related the third constituent of the 
compound to a Khoikhoi stem bi- (cf. Korana bĩ-b 'milk', Meinhof, 1930: 81), 
which Europeans may have misapprehended as bier 'beer' (cf. Den Besten, 
1989: 221). 
Yet, substrate and superstrate calquing cannot be regarded as the primary 
means of lexical expansion in the Cape Dutch Pidgin. The philological record 
shows evidence of pidgin-internal, word-level compounding in the nonce form 
boeba kros 'ox skin', which is preserved for posterity in the journal of Pieter 
van Meerhoff from 1661 (Godée Molsbergen, ed., 1916: 54). The writer 
directly quotes two pidgin-speaking Khoikhoi companions who have called his 
attention to a party of armed Namaquas standing above them on a hill. Kros is 
derivable from Khoikhoi root khō- 'skin, hide' (Nama khō-b, Korana khō-b) 
plus the diminutive suffix -ro and the feminine singular termination -s (cf. 
Nienaber, 1963: 332-33; Den Besten, 1987: 15). The form entered the Cape 
Dutch Pidgin and eventually Afrikaans as monomorphemic karos ~ kros 
'kaross, i.e., a wrap, cloak, or blanket made of skins'. What Van Meerhoff's 




Boeba kros is correctly assigned its semantics from context, but unlike boeba 
'livestock', it is not the product of free or 'unregulated' concatenation (the term 
is from Jackendoff, 2002: 250). At this more advanced point in the 
development of the Cape Dutch Pidgin, the mapping between semantic roles 
and linearly ordered form is mediated by the principle that groupings of 
meaningful elements can be structured from heads. 
By all accounts, the presyntactic mode of communication is lexically 
driven; the provision of a minimal lexicon containing regularly used items is a 
prerequisite for language formation (Givón, 1995: 30, 360, 1998: 56, 92; 
Comrie, 2000: 1000; Mufwene, 2008: 25). With tertiary hybridization, 
stabilization of myriad jargons into a pidgin implies a transition from 
noncombinatorial juxtapositions of meaningful elements to true phrase 
structure. The primary mechanism by which larger objects are created is the 
interpretation of concatenated lexical items as asymmetric structures organized 
around a head. The X-bar-theoretic format and category labels are available to 
MIC creators through Universal Grammar, while communicative success 
determines the selection of features (semantic and formal) for individual lexical 
items and their relations with other elements. 
From the second half of the seventeenth century, developers of the Cape 
Dutch Pidgin expanded their MIC structurally as well as lexically in response 
to changing communicative needs. The first step to actual syntax was the 
crystallization of the Head Principle, which enabled a basic merge operation 
combining two lexical items, one of which projects a functional or lexical 
category. Syntactic combination was augmented by a simple move operation. 
The basic structure of a Cape Dutch Pidgin sentence may be 
reconstructed as a speech-act or assertion projection, the value of which could 
either be either positive (∑P) or negative (NegP): 
 
(5)     ∑P/NegP 
           
 
                 ∑'/Neg' 
        
 
     ∑/Neg         XP 
 
This structure is not drawn from any of the full languages represented at the old 
Cape. It is the result of a process of creation that is wholly independent of the 
'available resources,' save for lexical sourcing. 
Consider our old friend boeba kros 'ox skin' in its full context: 
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(6) Mr. Pieter, Namaqua ... . Namaqua boeba kros moscoqua (Journal of 
Pieter van Meerhoff, 1661; in Godée Molsbergen, ed., 1916: 54). 
 
Resolution of moscoqua has been a traditional crux, and arguments 
buttressing the present interpretation are reserved for a full discussion 
elsewhere. The constituent qua may be plausibly seen as Dutch kwaad 'angry' 
(Godée Molsbergen, ed., 1916: 54n; Den Besten, 1986: 214-15, 1987: 15, 
38n.), the apocope of final -d being a common phonotactic adjustment among 
Khoikhoi speakers (Nienaber, 1963: 361). The morpheme mosco, which 
alternates with moeske and musku in our Cape Dutch Pidgin source material, 
represents the agglutination of Khoikhoi mu-ts ko (see-2 sg. ASP) 'Have you 
seen?' (cf. Meinhof, 1930: 61). The structure of the Cape Dutch Pidgin 
sentence in (6) is shown in (7): 
 
(7)     ∑P 
     
              NPi                  ∑' 
           
    NP         N  ∑          AP 
                 
     N      N N        mosco NP          AN 
                               
      boeba kros             
   Namaqua    ti            A 
                                
               qua 
 
Cape Dutch Pidgin mosco and its variants have the illocutionary force of a 
question ('Haven't you caught sight of X? Don't you see that X is the case?'), 
affirmation ('You are surely aware that X is the case'), or command ('Look!'), 
with the intended perlocutionary effect of making the interlocutor pay heed to 
what is in plain sight or establishing what should be shared knowledge or a 
familiar truth. A full and complete rendering of (6) would be: 'Master Pieter, 
Namaquas! Look! You can see that the Namaquas have shields made of dried 





4.6   The pidgin window within a constructive model of language genesis 
We turn now to the matter of furnishing a warrant or license for inferences 
drawn about facets of language evolution from phenomena of pidgin formation. 
Botha (2006b: 12) articulates this requirement as follows: 'Why is it justified at 
all to draw conclusions about facets of language evolution – language evolution 
being the kind of entity that it is – from data about properties of aspects of 
pidgins – pidgins being the different kind of entity they are?' In other words 
what is needed is a bridge theory for moving inferentially from the domain of 
pidgins to that of the development from simple to more complex systems 
subsequent to the first appearance of protolanguage. 
The presence of a lexicon that allows for arbitrary sound-meaning 
correspondences is presumed to be the minimal requirement for the creation of 
grammar. The constructive model of pidgin formation postulates a lexicon 
(however impoverished) as a minimal level of input for a basic MIC within a 
sufficiently large community. The pressures driving the stabilization of pidgins 
in European colonies where tertiary hybridization is a factor can be related to a 
need for predictability and learnability. Having created a basic MIC, 
participants in contact situations could gradually expand the potential of the 
developing system 'unless or until changing circumstances deprived it of its 
usefulness or desirability' (Baker, 1995: 13). If a pidgin is deployed in new 
domains, its users will generate the linguistic objects necessary to meet the 
communicative exigency. True enough, pidgin speakers have one or more fully 
developed languages from which to draw resources. In contact situations 
bringing together highly diverse populations, however, innovative solutions to 
the problem of interethnic communication are preferred over the adoption of 
patterns that are characteristic of one group. Simply put, 'people can create new 
rules' (Baker, 1995: 8). Transfer from preexisting full languages is relatively 
limited. The contribution of the contact languages seems to depend on how far 
the MIC has developed and what speakers of these languages could offer to 
advance that development (Mühlhäusler, 1997: 182, 186; Baker, 1997: 106). 
The bridge theory licensing the application of inferences from the 
creation and elaboration of pidgins to the development of modern language out 
of protolanguage would begin with a dominant postulate in evolutionary 
linguistics, namely, the emergence of a lexical component prior to the syntactic 
one (Bickerton, 1990: 131). Recent 'holistic' proposals that words arose out of 
secondary fractionation of longer, noncompositional utterances have been 
challenged on empirical and conceptual grounds; see the extensive and 
thoroughly documented discussion in Tallerman (2007). We may plausibly 
suppose a synthetic model of protolanguage in which nouns and verbs are 
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categories that already have a mental representation in early hominids and have 
come to be represented as words (Tallerman, 2007: 580). A theory of 
protolanguage needs only to account for the development of nouns and verbs 
(Tallerman, 2007: 596); all other syntactic categories and the principles that put 
words together into structures are presumed to have come later. 
A second aspect of the bridge theory would follow from the observation 
that 'the selection pressures driving evolution from one stage to the next, can be 
related to the increasing complexity of proto-human society' (Johansson, 2005: 
239). If this assertion is defensible, then it is reasonable to derive the following 
corollary: Human language commenced with the emergence of more or less 
discrete communication patterns among and within small groups between 
which there was little contact at the outset.25 It is the establishment of cross-
group communication networks that triggered the structural elaboration of 
linguistic systems commensurate with the emergence of new communicative 
domains among our hominid ancestors. As with pidgin formation, the 
negotiation of these systems implies the creation of and competition among 
linguistic features, which were selected and grouped together according to their 
communicative efficacy and social functions. 
Here, one should recall that pidgins are typically used in a limited set of 
domains requiring communication between groups of people who do not share 
a common language. It is the interlingual function that is at the core of a 
restrictive definition of pidgin. Heine and Kuteva (2007: 195) can find no 
reason to assume that early human language was similarly restricted. Perhaps, 
but it does not follow that an elaborated protolanguage serving as an auxiliary 
code would have been immediately institutionalized beyond the narrow social 
context of intergroup communication among early hominids. It would be 
difficult to deny that pidgins are 'incapable of filling the needs of first-language 
communicators and inadequate even for some of the requirements of their 
second-language users' (Mühlhäusler, 1997: 162). But then it must also be true, 
mutatis mutandis, that elaborated protolanguage might have been a rather more 
powerful device than would have been necessary to meet ordinary, in-group 
needs prior to the permanent establishment of broader communicative 
networks. 
Whereas agents of pidgin formation are equipped with a modern 
language faculty, early hominids probably lacked more than an inchoate 
version of that endowment. The question that presents itself is whether the 
same or similar creative processes discernible in pidgin formation could have 
                                                  
25Even Mufwene (2008: 8) concedes that what 'the relevant colonial histories' show is not only 
that contact 'has generally played a central role in recent language speciation,' but 'most likely 




taken place with a relatively less evolved language faculty. At some point in 
the evolution of syntax a transition was made from noncombinatorial to 
combinatorial organization. All relevant cognitive capacities being in place, we 
should expect the same processes to have effected a variety that was 
developmentally more advanced than protolanguage. Contact between groups 
of early hominids expanded the repertoire of meaningful elements and 
facilitated the creation of new combinations. Early hominids could then arrive 
at an analysis of regularly occurring collocations as constituents of larger 
objects. This analysis would have begun with 'the most local relation' 
(Chomsky, 1995: 397), viz. the head-complement relation. For a given pair, α 
and β, one or the other projects and is the head, while the other serves as a 
complement, whence [α [α, β]] or [β [α, β]]. This basic configuration was 
subsequently associated with an operation (merge) that would form larger 
objects out of those already extant. At a still later evolutionary stage, this 
simple structure became a more complex object constructed from additional 
elements, most notably, morphemes that implement the specifier relation to the 
head. In modern full language heads become the labels of the complexes 
formed (Chomsky 1995: 398). In evolutionary terms these labels obtain from 
semantic primes such as 'affirmation,' 'negation,' 'time-stable,' 'non-time-stable,' 
'temporal location anterior to the time of reference' that are reified in modern 
language as ΣP, NegP, NP, VP, T(ense)P, and the like. 
 
4.7 Summation 
The creation of pidgin languages does indeed provide a window on language 
evolution, though not along the lines proposed by Bickerton (e.g., 1990), 
Jackendoff (1992, 2002), and others. The essence of pidgin formation is 
language construction rather than targeted, albeit imperfect L2-acquisition. Of 
greatest probative value is the instantiation of pidgin structures that are not 
selected from pre-existing 'input materials' but reflect language-independent 
solutions to the problem of intergroup communication. This type of linguistic 
creation occurs during tertiary hybridization, when a lexifier language is 
socially remote, and the linguistic milieu is highly diverse. 
The pidgin window proposed here looks out not onto an antecedent 
protolanguage, that is, the stage characterized by the 'development of a 
phonological combinatorial system to enlarge open, unlimited class of symbols 
(possibly first syllables, then phonemes)' and 'use of symbol position to convey 
basic semantic relations' (Jackendoff, 2002: 238). Rather, the window offers a 
view on the progression of the first forms of language to more elaborated, 
interconnected linguistic systems, with hierarchical relations and lexical and 
functional categories. 
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5. The genesis of grammar: on combining nouns 
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Abstract 
That it is possible to propose a reconstruction of how grammar evolved in 
human languages is argued for by Heine and Kuteva (2007). Using 
observations made within the framework of grammaticalization theory, these 
authors hypothesize that time-stable entities denoting concrete referential 
concepts, commonly referred to as 'nouns', must have been among the first 
items distinguished by early humans in linguistic discourse. Based on 
crosslinguistic findings on grammatical change, this chapter presents a scenario 




In Heine and Kuteva (2007), a scenario of grammatical evolution is proposed, 
leading from lexical to functional forms and structures. Applying 
grammaticalization theory as a tool for reconstructing the rise and development 
of grammatical forms and constructions, these authors argue that 
generalizations about grammatical change in modern languages can be 
extended to the reconstruction of early language evolution by extrapolating 
from the known to the unknown, and they conclude that this evolution can be 
described in terms of six stages or layers, as summarized in table 5.1. 
The goal of the present chapter is to look at one specific issue arising 
from the conclusions reached in that work: We will be concerned with what 
may happen when there is only one type of word and the only way of 
expressing new concepts is by combining different tokens of this type. To 
narrow down the scope of this problem, discussion is restricted to stage I and to 
one specific combination, namely that of two nouns. Our choice of nouns is 
deliberate: On the basis of the reconstructions listed in table 5.1, nouns, or 
noun-like time-stable referential entities are hypothesized to have been the first 
linguistic entities to have arisen. The question to be looked into in this chapter 
is what one can do with nouns, more specifically with combining two nouns, 
and what people in the past may have achieved by doing so. 
 
140 The genesis of grammar: on combining nouns 
 
Table 5.1: Layers of grammatical evolution (Heine and Kuteva, 2007). 
Layer New categories introduced Hypothesized main grammatical innovations 
I Nouns One-word utterances 
II Verbs Mono-clausal propositions 
III Adjectives, adverbs Head-dependent structures 
IV Demonstratives, adpositions, aspect 
markers, negation 
Elaboration of phrase 
structures 
V Pronouns, definite (and indefinite) 
markers, relative clause markers, 
complementizers, case markers, tense 
markers 
Temporal and spatial 
displacement, the beginning of 
clause subordination 
VI Agreement markers, passive markers, 
adverbial clause subordinators 
Obligatory expressions, 
elaborated clause subordination 
 
 
5.1 Types of combining  
In order for new grammatical categories to arise there is one necessary 
requirement: There have to be at least two different linguistic forms that are 
combined. Most, if not all, languages have productive patterns of combining 
two nouns, A and B – be that in the form of compounding, of attributive 
possession, or of any other morphosyntactic or pragmatic construction. 
Underlying these patterns there appear to be semantic strategies giving rise to 
at least four different types of combining. These types are illustrated in (1) with 
examples from English compounding; as we will see below, compounding is 
not the only way in which nouns can be combined. 
 
(1) English compounds 
Type of combining Example 
a Modifying apple tree 
b Additive whisky-soda 
c Appositive poet-doctor 
d Alternative egg head 
 
We will now briefly look in turn into the main distinguishing properties 
of these four types of combining. 
Modifying. In this type of combining, illustrated in (1a), A is a modifier 
of B, that is, [A - B] is a specific kind of B or, alternatively, A delimits the kind 
of referents that B stands for – in other words, the resulting C is more specific 
in meaning than B. Thus, in the compound apple tree, apple modifies tree, and 
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an apple tree is a kind/type of tree. Modifying combining has been described as 
being endocentric and involving a modifier-head structure; thus, in the 
compound apple tree, apple is the modifier (A) and tree its head or hypernym 
(B); similarly, in the Korean compound nwun-mwul (eye-water) 'tears', nwun is 
the modifier and mwul the head (Sohn 1994: 416). Rather than a modifier-head, 
modifying compounds may have e.g. an argument-predicate structure, as in 
truck driver (object verb). Modifying combinations differ from some other 
kinds of combining in that A and B tend to have different argument status (e.g., 
different case markings). In the literature on compounding, modifying 
combinations, also called subordinating compounds or sub-compounds, 
determinative compounds, or referred to by the Sanskrit word tatpurusha, are 
assumed to be worldwide the predominant type of compounds. 
Additive. Additive combining consists of two (or more) parts expressing 
"natural coordination" of semantically closely associated concepts that are 
expected to co-occur, as in Korean son-pal (hand-foot) 'hand and foot', 
Mordvin t'et'a.t-ava.t (father.PL-mother.PL) 'parents', Tagalog araw-gabi 'day 
and night', Tibetan srab-mthug (thin-thick) 'density'; Khalkha xaluun xüjten 
(heat cold) 'temperature', and the two members A and B represent referentially 
distinct units (see Wälchli 2005 for detailed discussion). Thus, the compound 
whisky-soda consists of two separate entities, whisky and soda. The meaning of 
additive combinations is taxonomically superordinate in respect to its parts A 
and B. Nevertheless, it need not, and frequently is not, restricted to A and B but 
may include other items of the same class as A and B. In the Trans-New 
Guinea language Sentani, pigs and dogs are prominent domestic animals and 
the word for 'animal' is obo-joku (pig-dog), which is not restricted to these two 
kinds of animals. Similarly, the compound KNIFE-FORK in American Sign 
Language (ASL) means 'silverware', that is, it is not restricted to knives and 
forks;1 in fact, generalizing coordination of this kind constitutes 
crosslinguistically the most widespread sub-type of additive compounding 
(Wälchli 2005: 80). But the meaning of an additive compound can also be more 
specific than that of its members; the compound haṛam-buṛia ('old man-old 
woman') 'old couple' of the Austroasiatic Munda language Mundari, for 
example, is restricted to one specific sub-set of old men and women (Sinha, 
s.a.: 112-4). In works on compounding, additives are also referred to as co-
compounds or – somewhat misleadingly2 – by the Sanskrit word dvandva; they 
are particularly common in easternmost Europe, Asia, and New Guinea 
(Wälchli 2005: 8, 19-20). 
                                                  
1
 Note that English silverware is not restricted to items made of silver (Fritz Newmeyer, p.c.). 
2
 The Sanskrit term dvandva is derived from dvamᶆ-dva (two.two) 'pair', which is not an 
additive (or co-compound) but a word reduplication (Wälchli 2005: 17). 
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Appositive. The two members A and B are referentially not distinct but 
intersective, where each one limits the meaning of the other: A poet-doctor is 
conceived as both a poet and a doctor, but not any kind of a poet and not any 
kind of a doctor, a servant girl is one individual who is both a servant and a 
girl, and King Richard is both a king and a person named Richard, but he is not 
any king nor any person named Richard –  in other words, A and B represent 
different facets of the resulting unit C, which is taxonomically subordinate, or 
hyponymic, to its parts A and B (Bauer 1978: 68; Wälchli 2005: 161).3 Unlike 
in modifying combinations, in appositive ones the two members have the same 
participant status, receiving, e.g., the same case marking. In the literature on 
compounding, the Sanskrit term karmadharaya tends to be used for appositive 
combinations. 
Alternative. The meaning of an alternative combination C is largely or 
entirely independent, or "outside" of that of A and B, it cannot be derived 
literally from the latter. An egg head is neither an egg nor a head, nor a 
combination of eggs and heads, and the compound yún-yŭ  (cloud-rain) 'sexual 
intercourse' of Mandarin Chinese or giӑng-hoa (moon-flower) 'flirtation, 
ephemeral love' of Vietnamese (Wälchli 2005: 150) bear little direct 
resemblance to their respective components A or B. The grammatical form of 
an alternative construction can frequently not be derived from its constituents 
or their combination. Thus, a must-have is not a verb but a noun, and while egg 
head is a noun, it does not show morphological agreement with head (e.g., The 
egg head blew *its nose; Bauer 1978: 13). Alternative combinations frequently 
derive from metonymic or metaphorical processes whose non-figurative origin 
may no longer be transparent. The Sanskrit term bahuvrihi used for alternative 
compounds, which are also called indirect compounds, is itself an alternative 
compound: bahu-vrihi (much-rice) means 'rich person' – a person who owns a 
lot of rice. But there need not be metonymic or metaphorical processes 
involved. In the homesign variety of Nicaragua, homesigns for 'fruits' are a 
sequence where preparation of the fruit for eating is followed by the sign EAT, 
as in (2). 
 
 (2) Fruit names in the homesign community of Nicaragua (Morford 2002: 333) 
 PEEL EAT 'banana' 
 RUB-ON-SHIRT EAT 'apple' 
 SLICE-OFF-TOP-WITH-MACHETE EAT 'pineapple' 
 
Underlying the process leading to noun combining there appear to be 
specific goals of creating novel concepts by combining existing forms in new 
                                                  
3
 Appositives thus contrast with additives in that there is no natural semantic relationship 
between A and B, and C is taxonomically subordinate in respect to A and B. 
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ways. These goals have to do e.g. with sub-classifying existing concepts 
(modifying combining), conflating two concepts into a new one having 
properties of both (appositive combining), coordinating two concepts (additive 
combining), or creating entirely new concepts (alternative combining).  
Such new concepts may arise in many different ways, e.g. via 
technological innovations, e.g., when German speakers drew on the compound 
Fahrrad (ride wheel) to designate bicycles or Kraftfahrzeug (power.ride.thing) 
to designate cars, or via new environmental stimuli, e.g. when German 
speakers created the modifying compound Waldsterben (forest.dying). Or they 
may result from the replication of models of combining found in other 
languages, e.g., when speakers of some European languages drew on 
alternative combining to form equivalents of the English term skyscraper, cf. 
German Wolkenkratzer (lit.: 'clouds scratcher'), French gratte-ciel ('scratch-
sky'), etc.  
While compounding is the grammatical domain which is most 
commonly associated with this process, it is not the only one. For example, 
appositive combining is crosslinguistically more likely to involve appositional 
constructions than compounding, as in the following English example 
containing two instances of appositive noun phrase combining: I don't know 
Newman the actor, but I do know Newman the linguist. Additive combining in 
English is typically expressed by means of the linking element and, e.g. kith-
and-kin, but it may as well involve simple juxtaposition, that is compounds, as 
in expressions for drinks (vodka-Martini, whisky-soda) or joint ventures (Rank-
Xerox, Shell-BP, Daimler-Chrysler).  
Combining nouns appears to be a fundamental human activity. It 
surfaces in language use on the one hand in the form of conventionalized or 
fossilized words or phrases; on the other hand it is present in the form of a 
productive strategy used to constantly create new concepts. The evidence 
available suggests there is a fairly unidirectional process from latter to the 
former, whereby new combinations of nouns constantly emerge for the 
expression of novel concepts, and where some of these combinations end up as 
conventional grammatical constructions or as unanalyzable lexicalized 
expressions.  
In the following sections we will be concerned with some manifestations 
of this process, in accordance with the basic question that is the subject of this 
paper, namely what one can do when combining two nouns. This is a wide field 
and we will therefore need to impose a number of restrictions on our treatment. 
One such restriction concerns the number of nouns to be combined: Especially 
in additive combining, more than two nouns may be involved, as in example 
(3): In American Sign Language there is a type of additives (co-compounds) 
which may consist of three to four signs for basic-level concepts strung 
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together (optionally followed by a sign for 'etc.') in order to form 
superordinate-level concepts. 
 
 (3) Additive compounds in American Sign Language (Wälchli 2005: 19-20) 
a APPLE-ORANGE-BANANA-ETC.                                            'fruit' 
b BEANS-CARROTS-CORN-ETC.                                        'vegetable' 
c RING-BRACELET-NECKLACE-EARRINGS-ETC.             'jewelry' 
 
But perhaps more importantly, noun combining need not be but 
frequently is recursive, where one noun is embedded in another noun which 
again is embedded in yet another noun. The magnitude of productivity that 
modifying noun combining may have can be illustrated with example (4), 
involving German compounding. We have never heard any German speaker 
uttering this compound, and it probably never will be uttered; still, (4) is a 
grammatically correct instance of productive recursive compounding.  
  
(4) German  
Auto-  bahn- rast- platz- toiletten- reinigungs- personal- bedarf- 
car-     line-   rest- place- toilette-  cleaning-     staff-        need- 
 
abstell-  schrank- schlüssel- dienst-   telefon- nummer 
storing- locker-    key-          service- phone-  number 
'the phone number of the key service for lockers of the cleaning staff of 
public conveniences of rest places of highways'   
 
In much of this chapter, however, we will be concerned only with 
combinations of two nouns. 
Another restriction concerns the different types of combining that we 
discussed above: Wherever possible we will confine discussion to only one of 
these types, namely modifying combining. In English and other Germanic 
languages, this is the prevalent type of combining, but this is not necessarily 
the situation to be found in many other languages. 
 
5.2 Compounding 
The question that we are concerned with in this section is how the combining 
of to nouns or noun phrases may lead to compounding. Definitions of 
compounding have either a morphological or a semantic nucleus. In the former 
case, a compound tends to be defined simply as a word (or free morpheme or 
lexeme) that consists of more than one word, while in semantically based 
definitions it is proposed that a compound has a meaning that is not the same as 
the sum total of its constituent words. Neither of these definitions is really 
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unproblematic; still, we are satisfied in assuming that a given expression 
qualifies as a compound if it corresponds to both kinds of definitions.  
Compounding is sometimes not easy to delimit, in that the boundary 
between compounding and possessive constructions may be gradual. In 
Koyraboro Senni, a Nilo-Saharan language of West Africa, for example, there 
is a distinction between tight and loose compounds; in the former, the initial 
and the final constituents form a composite noun stem, while in the latter the 
two constituents can independently have definite and plural marking and "are 
not reliably distinguishable from possessives" Heath (1999b: 107). Similar 
problems exist with the boundary between compounding and derivation: In 
modifying compounds, high-frequency heads may have properties of 
derivational elements, and for some of them an analysis in terms of derivation 
seems to be preferable; we will return to this issue below. 
While not being the only kind of noun-noun combining, compounding 
constitutes the process most commonly associated with noun-noun combining. 
The English examples that we provided in (1) illustrate the four major types of 
noun-noun compounds to be found in the languages of the world, and table 5.2 
summarizes salient properties of these types. Note, however, that this does not 
conclude the types of compounds that have been distinguished; mention should 
be made specifically of incorporating compounds, where a noun is incorporated 
into a verbal root (e.g. backstabbing, breastfeeding). This is not really a 
common phenomenon in English; but in some other languages incorporating 
compounds are highly productive. Compounding may be right-headed, as in 
English, or left-headed, as in Vietnamese. 
 
Table 5.2: Distinguishing semantic properties of noun-noun compounds (A, B 
= members of a compound, C = meaning of the compound; corresponding 
Sanskrit terms in parentheses). 
 













A is a 
modifier of 
B 
A and B are both kinds 
of C. C is one referent 
consisting of the 
intersection of A and 
B 
A + B = C, 
where A and 
B are distinct 
referents 
C is neither A nor B, 
nor A + B. As in (1a) 
there is a head-
modifier structure, 
but the meaning of C 
is external to the 
structure A + B 
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From noun combining to compounding 
All evidence available suggests that noun-noun compounding typically arises 
via a process whereby free, referential nouns are combined in accordance with 
established conjoining patterns of the language concerned. This process tends 
to be referred to as condensation, which starts with loose combinations that are 
gradually transformed into tighter ones. And it is by and large a unidirectional 
process: The development from morphosyntactically loose combinings of 
nouns to tight compounds forming phonologically and semantically one single 
word is ubiquitous, while a development in the opposite direction is fairly rare.  
One common strategy of combining – one that is available in some form 
or other in most languages – can be seen in attributive possession ("genitive 
constructions"), where specific attributive head-modifier combinations of free 
nouns turn into regularly used noun-noun compounds (e.g. [B's A]). This is the 
process that can be held responsible crosslinguistically for many instances of 
modifying compounds but it is not confined to this type of compounds.  
A second established conjoining strategy consists of coordination (i.e., 
[A and B], typically though not necessarily involving some linking device, 
such as the conjunction and in English (kit- and-kin). Coordination is 
crosslinguistically the main source of additive compounds (Wälchli 2005: 250), 
but it may as well give rise to alternative compounds, cf. English bread-and-
butter. 
The third major strategy of forming noun-noun compounds is provided 
by simple juxtaposition. Juxtaposition can be ad hoc, but more commonly it 
follows structural templates as they exist for apposition or for linking 
contrastive discourse functions such as presenting given vs. new, or less 
specific vs. more specific information. Juxtaposition is the paradigm strategy 
for creating appositive compounds. 
Evidence for the hypothesis that noun-noun compounding has its origin 
in the combination of independent nouns is of the following kind. First, in a 
number of languages, modifying compounds exhibit morphosyntactic relics of 
possessive constructions. One such relic can be seen in case morphologies. 
Quite a number of German compounds contain the genitive case suffix -s 
(GEN) whose presence is hard to account for unless one assumes that the 
diachronic source of the compound is a modifier-head construction of 
attributive possession. This relic4 is not restricted to modifying compounds 
(5a), it is in the same way found in alternative compounds, cf. (5b). Such 
                                                  
4
 These German segments inserted between two parts of a compound are not always 
morphosyntactic relics. For example, Geburtstag (birth.day) has a feminine modifier noun 
Geburt 'birth', but feminine nouns do not take the genitive suffix -s (Fritz Newmeyer, p.c.). 
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possessive case markers may still be functional, but they may as well have been 
lost, surviving only in compounds. In Swedish, the genitive case ending -s also 
appears in compounds, e.g., bord-s-ben (table-GEN-leg) 'table leg', but there is 
also an older genitive form that is no longer used but has survived in 
compounds, e.g., kyrko-gård (church.GEN-yard) 'churchyard' (Dahl 2004: 
225). 
 
 (5) German 
a Kalb.s.braten           (veal.GEN.roast)           'roast veal' 
 Schwein.s.leder       (pig.GEN.leather)          'pigskin' 
b Esel.s.brücke           (donkey.GEN.bridge)    'dog's ear' 
 Kind.s.kopf              (child.GEN.head)          'silly ass'  
 
Additive compounds may bear witness of their origin in coordinating 
constructions in relics of linking elements: In some languages there are also 
fossilized comitative markers, additive focus particles, or verbal sequence 
markers, suggesting that additive compounds (or co-compounds) developed 
from coordination or similar constructions (Wälchli 2005: 249). Using such 
relics as evidence, it has been possible to demonstrate that in the transition 
from (Early) Vedic to Sanskrit, additive compounds developed from 
coordination (Wälchli 2005: 17, 247). 
Another kind of relic consists of word order properties, in that a 
compound may exhibit a type of word order that can only be explained with 
reference to its possessive genesis (Wälchli 2005: 246ff.).  
A second piece of evidence comes from historical observations: In a 
number of instances it is possible to establish that a given compound cannot be 
traced back to earlier phases of the history of the languages concerned while 
the nouns making up the compound can. Thus, the English alternative 
compound skyscraper presumably did not exist prior to the appearance of the 
relevant buildings whereas its constituents were there earlier as independent 
words. Even in languages for which we have no historical records it is possible 
to show that independent nouns were combined into compounds, while a 
process in the opposite direction does not seem to occur. For example, in the 
Niger-Congo language Ewe of Ghana and Togo there is a wide range of 
compounds which must have arisen after Ewe speakers came into contact with 
European civilization, e.g., ga-ŋkúí (metal-eye.is.it) 'spectacles', ga-sɔ ́  (metal-
horse) 'bicycle', or ga-mɔ ́ (metal-way) 'railway', while the constituents of these 
compounds, ga 'metal', ŋkú 'eye', sɔ ́  'horse', and mɔ ́ 'way', already existed as 
independent nouns prior to this contact situation. 
But perhaps the main piece of evidence comes from synchrony: In many 
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languages, compounding forms a productive process, where independent nouns 
can be combined creatively into new nouns expressing new meanings. 
Accordingly, we constantly witness how new compounds arise and evolve. 
This process can be observed in actual language use, in that novel compounds 
are emerging all the time. Conversely, a process whereby compounds regularly 
develop into simple nouns is uncommon. To be sure, it may happen that in the 
course of time some specific compound may be lexicalized to the extent that it 
is no longer conceived as a compound and is reinterpreted as a simple noun. 
But even in such cases, the earlier development was one where independent 
nouns were combined into compounds.  
The process leading to compounding is first and above an instance of 
lexicalization, whereby new lexemes are formed. But it can also be interpreted 
as a manifestation of grammaticalization, in that it leads to more grammatical 
forms and constructions and involves a process that is largely unidirectional. 
For example, when combinations of nouns turn into modifying compounds, this 
involves the following grammaticalization parameters (see Heine and Kuteva, 
2007: section 1.2):  
Extension: The use of a noun is extended to one specific context – that is, 
in combination with some other noun, and in this context its meaning may be 
modified.  
Desemanticization: The modifying noun loses in referential and semantic 
properties. Furthermore, the compound acquires a meaning that is either more 
specific or entirely different than the combined meanings of the constituents.  
Decategorialization: The modifying noun loses seminal nominal 
properties – it may not be modified or receive affixes such as plural markers, 
thus turning into an invariable form.  
Erosion: The two nouns tend to lose their individual stress or intonation 
patterns, taking a pattern that is characteristic of single nouns. Furthermore, one 
or both of the constituents may lose in phonetic autonomy, merging with or 
being assimilated to the other constituent. For example, the English noun man 
occurs commonly as a head of modifying compounds, e.g., businessman, 
draughtsman, Dutchman, fisherman, foreman, hitman, policeman, postman, 
salesman, or spokesman, and in some of these combinations it differs from the 




                                                  
5
 Fritz Newmeyer (p.c.) draws our attention to the fact that intonation in English compounds is 
complex. For example, for most American speakers (maybe British as well) it is APPLE cake, 
but apple PIE, or MAPLE Street, but Maple ROAD. 
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5.3 Noun modification  
As we saw above, a paradigm case of noun combining is provided by 
modifying compounds. But this is not the only way in which noun combining 
may lead to modification. An alternative way can be seen in the rise of a 
structure where the two nouns remain distinct words but one assumes the 
function of a modifier, typically that of an adjectival modifier. 
Crosslinguistically, there are specific conceptual domains, such as sex, plants 
or plant parts, and metals, that tend to provide the source for a development 
whereby a combination [noun-noun] gives rise to a modifying combination 
[noun-adjectival modifier], in that one of the nouns gradually acquires 
properties of a modifier of the other noun. 
Nouns typically denote tangible and/or visible things that refer, while 
adjectives denote qualities relating to such conceptual domains as dimension 
('large', 'small'), age ('old', 'young'), color ('green'), or value ('good', 'bad'). In 
many languages a diachronic process can be observed whereby specific groups 
of nouns are grammaticalized to adjectives, such groups concerning nouns 
stereotypically associated with some specific quality. Thus, we find in English 
names of flowers such as orange or pink, or metal names such as bronze, brass, 
or silver that have been grammaticalized to adjectivals. Another group of nouns 
widely grammaticalized to adjectivals concerns sex-specific human items such 
as 'man' and 'woman' or 'father' and 'mother', which in many languages are 
recruited to express distinctions in sex. Thus, in the Swahili examples of (6), 
the nouns mwana(m)ume 'man' and mwanamke 'woman' are restricted in their 
meaning to denoting the qualities 'male' and 'female', respectively, and they 
occur in the syntactic slot reserved for adjectives, namely after the noun they 
modify, and they agree in number with their head noun.  
 
 (6) Swahili (Bantu, Niger-Congo) 
 kijana          mwana(m)ume 'boy' 
 youth man 
 kijana          mwanamke 'girl' 
 youth woman 
 
This process involves on the one hand the parameter of 
desemanticization, whereby the nominal meaning is bleached out except for 
some salient property, referring to the color or sex of the item concerned. On 
the other hand it involves decategorialization, in that nouns in such uses lose in 
morphosyntactic properties characteristic of nouns, such as taking modifiers, 
determiners, and inflections and occurring in all the contexts commonly 
associated with nouns. 
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To conclude, there is a diachronic process to be observed 
crosslinguistically whereby adjectival modifiers can emerge as a result of the 
grammaticalization of noun-noun combinations and, in accordance with our 
extrapolation procedure, we hypothesize that such a process may also have 
taken place in early language evolution.  
   
5.4 Derivation and inflection 
We argued in section 5.2 that the combining of free nouns can lead to 
compounding. But compounding is not necessarily the end of development: 
Nouns serving as heads in modifying compounds may gradually lose in 
nominal properties and acquire the properties of derivational forms. The 
following example illustrates the way this may happen. The English nouns style 
and fashion have attained some currency in their use as heads of modifying 
compounds; Bauer and Renouf (2001: 106-7) found examples such as Turkey-
style, windmill-style, bunting-style, or frog-fashion in his text collection, and he 
observes that in such combining formations, -style and, somewhat less, -fashion 
are grammaticalizing to affix-like heads, acquiring a grammatical function 
paraphrasable as 'in the manner of an X'. 
We do not know whether English -style or -fashion will develop further 
into productive functional categories, but this example shows how the process 
begins: The head of a modifying compound is used productively in contexts 
where its nominal meaning is backgrounded and a schematic function is 
foregrounded. This process is not restricted to compounding in spoken 
languages, it is also found in signed languages. In American Sign Language the 
noun for INDIVIDUAL (or PERSON) is juxtaposed to another word to create a 
compound structure, and this structure has acquired properties of derivation, 
where INDIVIDUAL assumes the function AGENT, that is, that of an agent 
noun marker (Sexton, 1999: 118-21). The modifying member of the compound 
is either a noun (7a) or a verb (7b): 
 
(7) American Sign Language (Sexton 1999: 118-21) 
a ROCKET  +  AGENT  'astronaut' 
b SERVE  +  AGENT  'waiter or waitress' 
 
That this is a gradual process affecting different compounds in different 
ways is suggested by the fact that the compound structure differs from one 
instance to another in its degree of decategorialization on the way from 
compounding to derivation. For example, whereas 'astronaut' and 
'waiter/waitress' show no signs of decategorialization, being simply juxtaposed, 
others, such as 'teacher' (< TEACH + AGENT), are suggestive of cliticization. 
But this example also exhibits another possible outcome of compounding: 
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Rather than becoming a productive grammatical form, the head noun can 
merge with its modifier to become a new, unanalyzable noun. This appears to 
have happened in ASL with the compound [STUDY + AGENT], which has 
merged almost completely into a single lexical noun meaning 'student'. 
Many languages have gone further than English or ASL in developing 
modifying noun-noun compounds into new functional categories of derivation. 
We will now look at a number of such languages to determine the nature of this 
process. 
Ewe. The first language to be considered is Ewe, a Niger-Congo 
language spoken in southern Togo and southeastern Ghana. There is a highly 
productive pattern of modifying noun-noun compounds, and like in English, 
the head follows its modifier. The Ewe noun tɔ ́ 'father, owner, master' is used 
regularly for a range of functions6 when used as the head noun in modifying 
compounds: It is used fairly productively to denote an owner or a person 
having the properties described by the first constituent, or a member of a 
nationality or nation, as the examples in (8) show. 
 
 (8) The Ewe noun tɔ ́'father, owner, master' as the head of compounds. 
 Form Meaning First component 
 agble-tɔ ́ 'farm owner' agble 'field, farm' 
 fe-tɔ ́ 'creditor, debtor' fe 'debt' 
 aʄé-tɔ ́ 'house master' aʄé 'homestead' 
 Eʋe-tɔ ́ 'Ewe person' Eʋe 'Ewe (people)' 
 Dzáma-tɔ ́ 'German person' Dzáma 'German (people)' 
 
tɔ ́  is the traditional word for 'father' in Ewe (in modern Ewe it has been 
replaced by fofó), but it is not the only kinship term that exhibits a regular 
compounding pattern; the examples in (9) show that the noun nɔ 'mother' does 
so, too:  As the head of modifying noun-noun compounds it denotes in specific 
contexts a person who 'is subject to, is ruled by, or suffers from' (Westermann 




                                                  
6
 The following is an example of the uses this noun has outside compounds:  xɔ sia tɔ ́ (house this 
owner) ‘the owner of this house’. 
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(9) The Ewe noun nɔ  'mother' as the head of compounds. 
 Form Meaning First component 
 dɔ-nɔ 'sick person' dɔ 'sickness' 
 ŋkú-nɔ 'blind person, he who has bad eyes' ŋkú 'eye' 
 kpó-nɔ 'hunchback' kpó 'hunch' 
 tókú-nɔ 'deaf man' tó 'ear', kú 'die' 
 
In addition, there is a third noun, viˊ 'child (of)',7 that has acquired uses as a 
derivational suffix as the head in noun-noun compounds, denoting a 'young X', 
where 'X' stands for the category of animate nouns, cf. (10). 
 
(10) The Ewe noun viˊ 'child' as the head of compounds. 
 Form Meaning First component 
 ŋútsu-ví 'boy' ŋútsu 'man' 
 yevú-ví 'young European' yevú 'European' 
 nyi-ví 'calf' nyi 'cow' 
 detí-ví 'young oilpalm tree' detí 'oilpalm tree' 
 
More than the other two nouns, viˊ (-ví as a suffix) has turned into a full-
fledged derivational suffix and, in fact, it belongs to the most productive 
derivational suffixes of Ewe: In addition to denoting animates that are not yet 
grown up, as in (10), it has a range of grammatical functions, which have been 
described in detail in Heine, Claudi and Hünnemeyer (1991: 79-97). Most of 
all, it is a diminutive suffix with inanimate count nouns, used literally (11a) or 
in a metaphorically or otherwise transferred sense (11b). Other salient 
functions are: When the first constituent is a non-count noun denoting an 
abstract or mass concept, -ví tends to express a delineated part of that concept 
(11c), and when it stands for some socio-cultural or political unit, -ví denotes 




                                                  
7
 There are two nouns for ‘child’ in Ewe, where one, ɖeví, is non-relational (e.g., when I say I see 
a child) while viˊ is relational (e.g., my own child). It is exclusively the latter that is used in 
compounds. 
8
 In this respect, -ví resembles -tɔ ́ (see above); still, the two nevertheless differ in meaning, see 
Heine, Claudi and Hünnemeyer (1991: 85). 
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(11) The Ewe noun viˊ 'child' as the head of compounds. 
 Form Meaning  First component 
a kpé-ví 'small stone'  kpé 'stone' 
 du-ví 'small village'  du 'small village' 
b afɔ-ví 'toe'  afɔ 'foot, leg' 
 ŋkú-ví 'pupil'  ŋkú 'eye' 
c súkli-ví 'a piece of sugar, sugar cube' súkli 'sugar' 
 núnono-ví 'a mouthful of liquid'  núnono 'drinking' 
d dume-ví 'a native of a village'  du(me) 'village' 
 Eʋe-ví 'an Ewe person'  Eʋe 'Ewe (people)' 
 
Like -tɔ ́and -nɔ, -ví also occurs in lexicalized uses, that is, in mono-morphemic 
units; the Ewe noun xeví 'bird', for example, can be interpreted reasonably only 
as one morpheme, even if the non-compounded item xe is occasionally used, 
referring to 'less typical, domestic birds' like chicken and ducks, i.e., 
vertebrates with wings that live on the ground and do not normally fly – 
thereby suggesting to speakers that xeví is (at least historically) composed of 
two distinct nouns.  
These examples show that there is a process from compounding to 
derivation in this language: Ewe speakers have exploited the vocabulary of 
nuclear kinship relations, i.e., 'father', 'mother', and 'child (of)', for developing 
derivational suffixes out of modifying noun-noun compounds, even if this 
process has not attained any productivity in the case of nɔ, which has given rise 
to largely lexicalized new words. This is a canonical process of 
grammaticalization, as can be shown most clearly for -ví: (a) The use of the 
head noun 'child' has been extended productively to new ranges of contexts 
(i.e., modifying nouns) with which it was previously incompatible (extension), 
(b) it has been desemanticized e.g. to a diminutive marker with inanimate count 
nouns (desemanticization), (c) it has lost its autonomy as an independent noun 
and is now a derivational affix (decategorialization), and (d) it has also 
undergone erosion, in that the low-high contour tone characterizing the noun viˊ  
has been reduced to a high tone (-ví) in the suffix. 
!Xun. That the situation found in Ewe is by no means unusual can be 
demonstrated by looking at another African language that is neither genetically 
nor areally related to Ewe. This language is !Xun,9 a Khoisan language spoken 
in Namibia, Angola, and Botswana. Like in Ewe, there is a highly productive 
                                                  
9
 The following data are taken from the W2 dialect of !Xun, spoken in and around Ekoka near 
the border of Namibia and Angola. 
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pattern of modifying noun-noun compounds with the same order modifier-
head.  
In this language, the noun kx'àò means 'parent or relative of a higher 
generation' or 'owner', but as the head in endocentric modifying compounds it 
productively serves as a derivational suffix to form agentive nouns, denoting 
more specifically 'someone who does the action described excessively and/or 
habitually', cf. (12). Note that it combines with verbs rather than nouns. 
 
(12) The !Xun noun kx'àò 'owner' as the head of compounds. 
Form Meaning First component 
còè-kxˈàò 'nurse'   còè 'to treat (a sick person)' 
cú-kxˈàò 'someone who likes to   cú 'to lie down (of one person)' 
 sleep constantly' 
ḿ-kxˈàò 'someone who eats a lot'   ḿ 'to eat', 'food' 
tcˈà-kxˈàò 'thief'   tcˈà 'to steal' 
ǁáúlè-kxˈàò 'hunter'   ǁáúlè 'to hunt' 
 
Furthermore, the !Xun noun g//ȍq, plural n//àē  'man' is also used productively 
as the head in compounds, denoting male referents (13a), but it also occurs 
with some plant names, cf. (13b). 
  
(13) The !Xun noun g//ȍq (plural n//àē 'man' as the head of compounds. 
 Form Meaning  First component 
a dàbà- gǁȍq  'male child'  dàbà 'child' 
 !xō- gǁȍq  'male elephant'            !xō 'elephant' 
 !xō-nǁàē   'male elephants'            !xō 'elephant' 
b gǁxˈā-gǁȍq  'manketti tree which          gǁxˈā 'manketti tree  
   does not bear fruit'            (Ricinodendron rautanenii) 
 
In a similar fashion, the item de ̄, an etymological reflex of the reconstructed 
Proto-!Xun noun *de 'mother', serving as the head in modifying compounds, 
has assumed the function of a derivational suffix denoting female referents. It 
is productive with nouns for humans and animals (14a), to some extent also for 
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 (14) The !Xun noun dē 'mother' as the head of compounds. 
 Form  Meaning First component 
a dàbà-dē 'female child' dàbà 'child' 
 !xō-dē 'female elephant' !xo ̄ 'elephant' 
 gùmí-dē 'cows' gùmí 'cattle'  




Like in Ewe, there are two nouns for 'child' in !Xun, where dàbà 'child 
(in general)' is non-relational and mà, plural m̏hè 'child of, offspring', is 
relational (e.g., mí mà 'my [own] child'); and like in Ewe, it is the latter that is 
commonly used as a head noun in endocentric compounds, cf. (15a), and when 
the first constituent denotes an inanimate concept, it is used productively as a 
diminutive suffix (15b) which can be added to virtually any noun. 
 
(15) The !Xun noun mà (plural m̏hè) 'child' as the head of compounds. 
 Form Meaning         First component 
a gǁȍq-mà  'boy'         gǁȍq 'man' 
 !xō-mà 'young or small elephant'        !xō 'elephant' 
b tcˈa ̄ō-mà 'small tooth'         tcˈāō 'tooth' 
 n!āō-mà 'small house'         n!āō 'house' 
 
Discussion  
The two languages examined, Ewe and !Xun, are genetically unrelated and are 
spoken in different parts of Africa, Ewe being a West African Niger-Congo 
language and !Xun a Khoisan language of southwestern Africa. Still, there are 
striking similarities in the way certain noun-noun compounds are formed. First, 
in both languages the head of the compound is placed last (both languages have 
the syntactic order modifier-head, or possessor-possessee). Second, both have a 
productive pattern of noun-noun compounding. Third, both languages use the 
lexicon of nuclear family relations productively as heads to express concepts of 
other domains of human experience. In this way, nouns for 'father', 'mother', 
'(own) child' and related concepts are combined with other nouns to express 
new concepts. Fourth, on account of their frequent occurrence, the use of these 
nouns is generalized to the extent that they are on the borderline between 
compounding and derivation.  
156 The genesis of grammar: on combining nouns 
 
Fifth, in some cases the head noun merges with the preceding noun to 
form a new, unanalyzable lexical item. For example, we observed above that 
the Ewe noun xeví 'bird' is composed of the earlier word for 'bird' xe plus the 
relational noun viˊ 'child', but synchronically it is unanalyzable, despite the fact 
that xe survives with the restricted meaning 'domestic bird'. Roughly the same 
process has occurred in !Xun, where the earlier word for 'bird' tcˈám has now 
the meaning 'domestic bird(s)' or 'poultry' while the new word for 'bird' is 
tcˈámmà, which is composed of tcˈám plus mà 'child of', but is conceived of as a 
mono-morphemic lexeme.   
Sixth, there is a similarity concerning the fate of some of the head nouns 
concerned. When regularly used as a head of compounds, the relevant noun 
may become increasingly restricted to uses as productive markers of 
compounds, gradually losing its status as an independent lexical item. Thus, 
Ewe tɔ ́ 'father' has given way to another noun, fofó, and the !Xun noun dē 
'mother' has survived only in compounds and a few fixed expressions (though 
in northern dialects it still exists as an independent lexical item; cf. m̄ dé 'my 
mother', a ̄ dé 'your mother' in the !Xun dialects of Angola.).   
Finally, there is another important similiarity. We observed above that 
with increasing frequency of use and extension to new contexts, the head nouns 
gradually lose in nominal properties and acquire properties of derivational 
suffixes. The effect is that for items such as Ewe -tɔ ́ or !Xun -kˈàò there is 
perhaps less justification to talk of nominal rather than of derivational 
elements. The problem associated with this situation, to be encountered also in 
many other languages, is one of linguistic taxonomy: Where to trace the 
boundary between compounding and derivation?  
But this problem does not exist with one of the nouns discussed: In both 
Ewe and !Xun, the noun for 'child', viˊ and mà, respectively, are unambiguously 
derivational suffixes with diminutive meaning when combining with inanimate 
nouns – actually, they are the only productive diminutive markers to be found 
in the two languages.  
 
Grammaticalization 
There are no historical records on earlier states of these languages, neither for 
Ewe nor for !Xun. Still, on the basis of the parameters of grammaticalization 
(see section 5.2) we can postulate the following development of the 
construction concerned:  
 
(a) At the earliest stage there was a noun-noun compounding pattern of the 
endocentric modifier-head type.  
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(b) Some head nouns, such as 'father', 'mother', 'man', 'woman', or 'child', 
acquired a higher frequency of use, combining with a larger number of 
other nouns (extension).  
(c) Being used as head nouns with many different other nouns, their 
meaning became more general and/or schematic, approaching that of 
functional categories (desemanticization). 
(d) In some cases, most clearly in the case of head nouns for 'child', the 
meaning was generalized to the extent that the erstwhile nouns turned 
into functional categories, being decategorialized in the process from 
noun to diminutive suffix (decategorialization). 
(e) But decategorialization was more dramatic in the case of the modifying 
nouns: They lost all salient properties of nouns such as taking 
modifiers or affixes. 
To conclude, what started out as a combination of two nouns ended up as 
a combination of noun plus derivational suffix. In spite of being suffixes when 
combined with inanimate nouns, Ewe -ví and !Xun -mà still exhibit some 
nominal relics, bearing witness to their nominal origin. For example, the !Xun 
noun mà '(own) child' has a suppletive plural, m̏hè, and this suppletism is 
retained when this item is used as a derivational suffix, cf. (16); we will return 
to this issue below.   
 
(16) !Xun, W2 dialect 
 n!āō 'house, houses' 
 n!āō-mà  'small house', n!āō-m ̏hè' small houses' 
 
In other words, we are dealing with a grammaticalization chain leading 
from nouns in compounds to functional categories. The question that one might 
wish to pose is the following: What kind of relationship is required between the 
two nouns to undergo this process? The data available suggest that the 
requirement is a modifier-head structure of attributive possession. Evidence for 
this claim can be seen in the fact that in languages with the reverse order head-
modifier (more precisely, possessee-possessor), the order in compounds also is 
head-modifier. The Chadic language Kwami is such a language (Leger 1994: 
95ff.); accordingly, the nouns láwó 'child', plural léwní 'children', fúbí 'father', 
and núní 'mother' precede the modifier in noun-noun compounds, even when 
these nouns assume the schematic functions 'young', 'male', and 'female', 
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(17) Kwami (Chadic, Afroasiatic; Leger 1994: 95ff.).  
Form  Literal meaning Meaning 
láwó shìlò 'child cow' 'calf' 
fúbí shìlò 'father cow' 'bull' 
núní shìlò 'mother cow' 'cow' 
 
Conceptual shift 
We saw above that it is specific concepts serving as heads in compounds that 
tend to undergo the grammaticalization process sketched above, and the same 
kind of processes of conceptual shift can be observed crosslinguistically. First, 
this involves desemanticization: There is a more general process leading from a 
kinship term with concrete lexical meaning to some more abstract/schematic 
concept standing for some perceptually salient property relating to size (small 
vs. normal), sex (male vs. female), etc.  
At the same time, each of these kinship terms leads to a different kind of 
conceptual shift. Nouns for 'father' and 'mother', or 'man' and 'woman' provide a 
convenient conceptual template for expressing a distinction of sex. Not 
uncommonly, conceptual shift leads from humans and animals to the plant 
world, where the distinction 'father' vs. 'mother' tends to be employed to 
distinguish between big vs. small, strong vs. weak, or barren vs. fruit-bearing 
exemplars of the same plant species, as for example in the Nilo-Saharan 
Songhay language  Koyraboro Senni (Heath 1999b: 107; see below). 
But there are other conceptual templates in addition. 'Father' tends to be 
associated with ownership and, when used in compounds with inanimate 
nouns, it may be used to denote 'owner of (property) X', and 'mother' appears to 
have evoked the concept of 'suffering' in Ewe, in that it combines with other 
nouns to denote 'a person suffering from a certain ailment'.   
The most dramatic patterns of conceptual shift can be found with nouns 
for 'child'. First, they tend to express 'a young X' when occurring in compounds 
with animate nouns, and 'a small X' with inanimate nouns. In the latter 
capacity, 'child' may also denote the subpart of some item. Thus, Ewe afɔ-ví 
'toe' means literally 'foot-child' and alɔ-ví 'finger' is literally 'arm-child', and in 
the Songhay language Koyraboro Senni, the word for 'finger' is kabe-ize, which 
is composed of kabe 'hand' and ize 'child' (Heath 1999b: 107). The subpart may 
also be the smaller of two parts forming one entity. For example, in Koyra 
Chiini, a 'rifle' is malfa while 'bullet' is the 'child (ije) of a rifle', and a 'bow' is 
toŋgotoŋgo and an 'arrow' the 'child of a bow' (Heath 1999a: 78). 
Another concept commonly derived from 'child' is 'a delineated part of a 
mass or quantity'. We had examples from Ewe, e.g. súkli-ví 'a piece of sugar, 
sugar cube' (literally, 'sugar child'), in Koyraboro Senni, this concept has given 
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rise to a singulative marker; for example, the singulative of the noun himbiri 
'hair' is himbiri-ize '(single) hair', literally 'hair-child' (Heath 1999b: 107). In a 
similar fashion, in the Chadic language Kwami, the noun láwó (plural léwní) 
'child' serves as an individualizing marker in the following example, singling 
out one (or more) items of a collective entity when used as the head of 
compounds: 
 
(18) Kwami (Chadic, Afroasiatic; Leger 1994: 95ff.)  
 míyá 'people' 
 láwó míyá 'one of the people' (literally, 'child people') 
 léwní míyá 'some of the people' (literally, 'children people') 
 
Another kind of conceptual shift leads from 'child' to 'member of a social 
unit', denoting, e.g., inhabitants of a village, town, or country.  For example, in 
Koyraboro Senni, the noun koyra means 'town' while koyra-yze, literally 'town-
child', means 'citizen, native (of town)' (Heath 1999b: 107); we presented 
similar examples from Ewe in (11d). On the other hand, this shift is manifested 
in expressions for professional groupings, as in the Swahili examples of (19), 
where the noun mwana '(own) child, offspring' serves as the head of a 
compound construction (note that attributive possession in Swahili has the 
order head-modifier, hence the same order is found in compounding).  
 
(19) Swahili (Bantu, Niger-Congo) 
Form Literal meaning Meaning 
mwana-chama 'child-party' '(party) member' 
mwana-hewa 'child-air' 'pilot' 
mwana-maji 'child-water' 'sailor' 
mwana-sheria 'child-law' 'lawyer' 
 
The significance that the kinship concepts discussed have for structuring 
certain domains of experience can be illustrated with the following example 
from the West African Songhay language Koyra Chiini, involving the nouns 
ñaa 'mother' and ije 'child' as heads of compounds: There appears to be a fairly 
productive pattern in the domain of plant terminology according to which the 
bare noun stem denotes the fruit of a plant, while a compound with the noun 
'mother' as its head denotes the whole plant and with the noun 'child' the seeds 
of the plant, cf. (20).  
 
 (20) Compounds with ñaa 'mother' and ije 'child' as heads of plant names in 
Koyra Chiini (Nilo-Saharan; Heath 1999a: 78). 
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Stem Meaning Stem + - ñaa 'mother' Stem + -ije 'child' 
baani 'pods of an acacia sp.' 'acacia sp. (tree)' 'acacia seed' 
koo 'baobab fruits' 'baobab tree' 'baobab seeds' 
duŋguri 'beans' 'bean plant’ 'seed (of bean)'  
   (also: 'pregnant woman') 
 
To conclude, there is yet another answer to the question of what may 
happen when two nouns are combined: There appears to be a 
crosslinguistically common process from noun-noun compounds to 
derivational structures. That this is a gradual process is suggested e.g. by the 
fact that there are usually combinations that can be described as transitional, in 
that they exhibit properties of both compounding and derivation. Note however 
that presence of a productive pattern of noun-noun compounding does not 
automatically lead to derivation; both English and German have such a pattern 
but have evolved hardly any derivational structures. 
 
Inflection  
The development from compounding to derivation is crosslinguistically 
widespread; but this is not normally the way in which inflectional morphology 
arises. Nevertheless, there are cases suggesting that in specific situations, 
compounding can also give rise to inflection. We saw above how modifying 
compounds of the form [noun + 'child'] gave rise to productive patterns of 
diminutive derivation in a number of languages. But the same combination can 
also lead to the emergence of inflectional categories. The !Xun examples 
looked at above illustrate one way in which this may happen. 
In this Khoisan language, nouns are essentially transnumeral, that is, 
they are unspecified for number. Thus, the noun !xō can mean 'elephant' or 
'elephants'. But there is a small number of exceptions: Some frequently used 
nouns, typically denoting human beings, follow a suppletive pattern, in that 
singular referents use a different lexeme than plural referents. We had one of 
these nouns above: mà 'child of, offspring' has the suppletive plural form m̏hè 
'children'. Accordingly, in noun combinations having this noun as their head 
there is an obligatory singular plural distinction. Thus, whereas !xo ̄ 'elephant(s)' 
is not number-sensitive, in combinations with mà as its head it is – hence !xo ̄-
mà 'young or small elephant' has an obligatory plural form !xō-mhȅ, that is, 
whenever mà is a derivational suffix there is an obligatory number distinction. 
Now, with a number of nouns, mà has been lexicalized as part of a new noun, 
and with such nouns the erstwhile plural form of the noun has become an 
inflectional plural suffix, e.g., xa ̄mà, plural xa ̄m̏hè 'old man', tcˈámmà, plural 
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tcˈámm̏hè 'bird'. In short, with the grammaticalization of the noun mà in 
modifying compounds, a lexical distinction has turned into an inflectional one. 
Nominal plural is generally described as a phenomenon belonging to the 
inflectional domain of grammar. The development from noun to plural marker 
via noun-noun combining is in fact well documented, and in most cases it 
involves nouns for 'people' that serve as the input of grammaticalization. For 
example, the noun tûu 'people' of the South Khoisan language !Xóõ appears to 
have given rise to the suffix -tû, forming the plural of human nouns of noun 
class 4 (Tom Güldemann, p.c.), and in the French-based creole Seselwa of the 
Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean, the noun ban 'group (of people)', 
historically derived from the French noun bande, has been grammaticalized to 
a plural marker of definite nouns, e.g., ban pirog (PL canoe) 'the canoes' (Heine 
and Kuteva 2002a).  
To conclude, compared to derivation, inflection is fairly rare as a 
grammaticalized output of noun combining; still, it may arise, as the preceding 
examples have shown. 
 
5.5 Adpositions 
Another way in which noun-noun combining may give rise to new functional 
categories can be seen in the development of adpositions, involving the 
reinterpretation of (21a) as (21b). Note that this is not the only way in which 
adpositions – both prepositions and postpositions - may evolve (see Heine and 
Kuteva 2007, chapter 2), but it is crosslinguistically presumably the most 
common one. 
 
 (21) The rise of adpositions 
a NP1  - NP2 
b NP - Adposition 
 
The way this happens involves most frequently attributive possession, that is, 
modifying combining, i.e. "genitive constructions", where one noun (phrase) is 
the syntactic modifier (N1) and the other its head (N2). That the diachronic 
development is from attributing possession to adpositional construction, rather 
than the other way round, is suggested e.g. by the fact that the latter tends to 
retain morphosyntactic properties that still bear witness to their origin as 
constructions of attributive possession. For example, the English adpositions in 
front of, because of exhibit properties of attributive possession, such as the 
possessive marker of and the word order head – modifier, even though they are 
now unambiguously prepositions. Accordingly, the placement of adpositions 
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(at least of the type looked at here) is determined by syntactic principles, in that 
a head – modifier order will give rise to prepositions and modifier – head order 
to postpositions. 
But the process leading from (21a) to (21b) is not restricted to attributive 
possession. It may as well be based on appositive combining, where N2 is 
added to N1 as an apposition serving to specify or further elaborate the meaning 
of N1, and having the same argument status as N1. This strategy is 
pragmatically rather syntactically determined, that is, the apposition almost 
invariably follows the other noun – irrespective of whether the language 
concerned has head – modifier or modifier – head word order. In some 
languages, the appositional noun takes a possessive modifier cross-referencing 
the preceding noun (e.g., 'the house, its top'). Appositive combining of this type 
gives rise most of all – though not necessarily – to locative constructions, 
where the apposition provides a locative specification of the other noun. It is in 
particular – but again, not always – body-part nouns that serve as appositions. 
Example (22) from the East Cushitic language Dhaasanac of southern Ethiopia 
illustrates this kind of combining, where the second noun delimits or specifies 
the location of the first noun. Of the ten nouns that have been grammaticalized 
to postpositions, eight denote body parts, as table 5.3 shows.  
 
(22) Dhaasanac (East Cushitic, Afroasiatic; Tosco 2001: 240-4) 
 kúo ɓíl ʔaf taalli? 
 2.SG.S house mouth stand.PERF 
 'Were you (standing) in front of the house?' 
 
Table 5.3: The grammaticalization of body part nouns to adpositions in 
Dhaasanac (East Cushitic, Afroasiatic; Tosco 2001: 240-4) 
 
Form Meaning Literal 
meaning 
ʔafu in front of mouth 
bál next to chest 
mé in front of head 
sugu Behind back 
ʔél behind, back back 
géere Inside belly 
ʔinnu around, amidst, between eyes 
tóomo between waist 
 




5.6 Classification  
But the combination of two nouns where one acquires a modifying function for 
the other may also lead to other forms of linguistic constructions. One way in 
which it can affect the typological profile of a language concerns what is 
commonly described as systems of classifiers (CL). In the present section we 
will look at such systems with a view to determining some of the effects noun 
combining can have on the development of some classifier categories. To this 
end we will be restricted to two types of classification, namely noun classifier 
and numeral classifier systems. Many languages have either of the two 
systems, but some languages have both, and both may occur within the same 
utterance (Aikhenvald 2000: 90).  
We are not able to do justice to the structure of nominal classifiers, for 
which see the rich literature on this subject (Aikhenvald 2000 and the 
references therein). Our interest is simply with what the conceptual process is 
when a noun assumes the role of a classifier of another noun. We will not be 
concerned with systems that are most commonly associated with noun 
classification, namely noun class systems of the type found e.g. in Niger-
Congo, some Australian and Amazonian languages, or gender systems as they 
occur e.g. in Indo-European or Afroasiatic languages,10 for the following 
reason: These systems are usually grammaticalized to the extent that it is in 
most cases not possible to reconstruct their genesis and the motivations 
underlying them. Since we are concerned in this paper with nouns, we will also 
ignore classifiers derived from verbs, and will have little to say on verbal 
classifier systems. 
Languages with noun classifiers are found in particular in Australia, 
Mesoamerica, Amazonia, and eastern and southeastern Asia. Classifier phrases 
consist of a classifier (CL) plus the classified noun, as in (23). 
 
 (23) Yidiny (Pama-Nyungan; Aikhenvald 2000: 83) 
 jarruy durrguu 
 CL.BIRD owl 
 'mopoke owl' 
 
The number of classifiers to be found in a given language varies from 
two (in the Australian language Emmi) to several hundred in some languages 
of East and Southeast Asia. In other languages again, almost any generic noun 
can be used as a classifier (Aikhenvald, 2000: 84-5). Classifiers are in the 
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 See Aikhenvald (2000: 95) on typological differences between these and nominal classifier 
systems. 
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majority of cases derived from nouns, and in many cases they are still 
homonymous with their lexical sources; for example, the Yidiny classifier 
jarruy in (23) is homonymous with the noun jarruy 'bird'. 
Noun classifiers are mostly free morphemes, but they may as well be 
affixes on nouns. They are either a subclass of nouns or form a morpheme class 
of their own. The extent to which the use of noun classifiers is obligatory 
differs from one language to another. They are not always restricted to nominal 
structures; at least some of them can be used as agreement or anaphoric 
markers, as in the following Yidiny example:  
 
(24) Yidiny (Pama-Nyungan; Aikhenvald 2000: 87) 
ngayu ganguul bugaany nyundu minya   baga  lnyunda. 
I.NOM wallaby.ABS eat.PAST you.NOM CL.EDIBLE.FLESH.ABS spear-SUB 
'I ate the wallaby, which animal you speared.' 
 
Numeral classifiers are found in many parts of the world; they are 
particularly common in East and Southeast Asia and Mesoamerica, but 
extremely rare in Africa, Europe, and Australia. They occur contiguous to a 
numeral (or other quantifier) in quantifying noun phrases, cf. (25).  
 
(25) Tashkent Uzbek (Aikhenvald 2000: 102) 
 bir bâs karâm 
 one CL.HEAD.SHAPED cabbage 
 one (head of) cabbage 
 
They tend to be free forms, but they may as well be clitics or affixes on 
numerals or, very rarely, on nouns, and in some languages they are treated as a 
subclass of adjectives. In numeral classifier constructions, the noun (N) is 
generally the head, and the classifier (CL) usually forms one constituent with 
the numeral (NUM). Constituent order depends on the general syntactic rules 
of the language concerned; crosslinguistically the most common constructions 
are [NUM-CL]-N, e.g. in Chinese, and N-[NUM-CL], e.g. in Thai; what is 
common to all constructions to be found is that the numeral and the classifier 
always occur adjacent (Aikhenvald 2000: 104-5). 
Numeral classifiers may form an open-class category, where virtually 
any noun can be used as a classifier, as in Thai and Lao, they may number 
several hundred, as in the Mayan language Tzeltal, but their number can as 
well be severely limited, as in the Tai language Nung, where there are only four 
classifiers. While noun classifiers are not always used obligatorily, numeral 
classifiers are normally obligatory whenever a numeral is used in a nominal 
construction. However, the higher the number value of the numeral is, the more 
likely it is that the classifier is omitted; note further that there are languages 
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where not every noun takes a numeral classifier. Finally, numeral classifiers 
(though not noun classifiers) can be "repeaters", that is, the classifier is the 
same as the classified noun, e.g., 
 
(26) Mal (Mon-Khmer; Aikhenvald 2000: 104) 
 ʔən ʔui ciaŋ ba  ciaŋ. 
 I have house one CL.house 
 ‘I have one house.’ 
 
Finally, mention should also be made of noun incorporation, that is, of 
noun-verb compounds where the noun is grammaticalized to a part of the verb, 
thereby giving rise to verb classification. This is the case in what Mithun 
(1984) calls classificatory noun incorporation, where the incorporated noun 
having a general meaning narrows the scope of the verb. Thus, in the Siberian 
language Koryak, the noun qoya- 'reindeer' in combination with the verb nm- 
'to kill' yields qoyanm- 'to reindeer-slaughter', and the noun dulg 'tree' of the 
Australian Gunwinggu language narrows the scope of the verb -naŋ 'to see'  to 
produce –dulg-naŋ ‘to tree-see’. 
  
Grammaticalization 
As far as the evidence available suggests, the rise and development of both 
types of classifiers is essentially the result of the grammaticalization of nouns 
as classifying categories. Concerning the choice of lexical sources of 
classifiers, Aikhenvald observes: 
 
The choice of which set of nouns becomes classifiers is typically 
language-, family-, or area-specific […]. Australian languages typically 
use generic nouns such as 'vegetable food', 'meat' (or 'edible animal'), and 
various human divisions (e.g. 'man', 'woman', 'person') as generic 
classifiers. Mayan languages typically have a number of classifiers 
which refer to the domain of social interaction, culture and beliefs (e.g. 
'male kin', 'respected male', 'deity'). Classifiers can come from words for 
'animal', 'dog', 'corn', 'rock', 'water' (Aikhenvald 2000: 353).  
 
While there is little information on the nature of the process leading to 
the rise of classifiers, the evidence that exists points to a process whereby 
noun-noun combinations gradually develop into noun-classifier constructions 
in that one of the nouns assumes a more general, classifying function. The 
process involves all four parameters of grammaticalization. Extension means 
that the noun acquiring properties of a classifier comes to be increasingly used 
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with a wider range of nouns classified, with the effect that the meaning of the 
classifier is increasingly generalized on the one hand, and modified by the 
meaning of the nouns with which it co-occurs on the other. 
Aikhenvald (2000: 82) observes that there is often a generic-specific 
relationship between the classifier and the noun classified. We argue that the 
generic nature of classifiers is due to desemanticization, that is, to the loss of 
specific semantic properties of their nominal sources. As we will see below, 
however, loss can – and frequently is – made up for by the emergence of new 
properties resulting from the extension of the item to new contexts. 
Desemanticization is minimal, if not absent, in the case of repeaters (see 
above), where the classifier tends to express largely the same meaning as the 
noun classified. But there are also quite a number of cases of 
grammaticalization from noun to classifier without desemanticization, where a 
generic noun gives rise to a generic classifier having essentially the same range 
of referents. For example, in the Western Austronesian languages 
Minangkabau and Acehnese, bungo and bungöng, respectively, are generic 
words for 'flower', and both have given rise to generic classifiers for flowers – 
that is, there has been decategorialization from noun to classifier but no 
semantic change. Further common examples involve nouns for 'man' and 
'woman' which have developed into noun classifiers, respectively, for male and 
female referents (Aikhenvald 2000: 402-3). There is also no desemanticization 
when a noun on the way to classifier acquires a more specific meaning. For 
example, the noun xiinaq 'man' of the Mayan language Mam appears to have 
provided the source for the noun classifier meaning 'old man, respectfully'. 
Otherwise however there is a generalization of meaning on the way from 
noun to classifier. There appears to be a difference between noun classifiers 
and numeral classifiers in the nature of this process. The former tend to involve 
a development from specific to generic meaning relating to material makeup 
and function, while the latter tends to highlight specific properties of the object 
classified, such as shape. For example, in the Western Austronesian language 
Minangkabau, the noun batang 'tree' appears to have given rise on the one hand 
to a noun classifier meaning 'tree as a generic' and on the other hand to a 
numeral classifier meaning 'vertical long object, often made of wood' 
(Aikhenvald 2000: 302).   
Once a noun assumes the function of a classifier, it undergoes 
decategorialization, losing many of the properties characterizing its use as a 
noun: It becomes restricted in its freedom of placement within the clause, and it 
loses the ability to take its own modifiers and determiners. In a number of 
cases, the process also involves erosion, in that the classifier may lose in 
phonetic substance. In the Mayan language Mam, the development from noun 
to noun classifier tends to lead to a shortening of vowels, e.g., q'aa 'young man' 
(noun) > q'a classifier, txiin 'young woman' (noun) > txin (classifier), while in 
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the Australian language Olgolo, the nouns úyu- 'fish' and ínha- 'animal' appear 
to have been shortened, respectively, to y- and nh- in their development to 
generic classifiers (Aikhenvald 2000: 91; 357). In the Mayan language Akatek, 
the noun winaj 'man' appears to have been reduced to the noun classifier naj 
used for human beings, saints and mythological animals, e.g.,  
 
(27) Akatek (Mayan; Zavala 2000: 134-6) 
 naj        me' 
 CL   sheep 
 'the sheep' 
 
The extent to which desemanticization takes place is a function of the 
extension parameter mentioned above, that is, of the number of nouns with 
which the classifier combines. An extreme example is provided by cases where 
a classifier combines only with one noun: In such cases, the meaning of the 
classifier is determined exclusively by the meaning of that noun. For example, 
in the Benue-Congo language Kana, the numeral classifier nε̄ε ̄, derived from 
the noun for 'person', combines only with the noun for 'guest'; the meaning of 
this classifier is thus highly specific, being determined by one noun only. But 
classifiers tend to combine with larger paradigms of nouns, and the larger the 
paradigm of nouns is, the more desemanticized the classifier will be. Common 
semantic properties that tend to survive or to surface are in particular the 
following (see Aikhenvald 2000: 404-5 for references): 
(a) Function. For example, in the Australian language Ngan'gityemerri, the 
noun syiri 'weapon' became extended to all things involving striking, 
including lightning, and in the North Arawak language Tariana of 
Amazonia, the classifier for 'canoe' is used for any vehicle. 
(b) Material. In the languages of the Kanjobalan branch of Mayan, the 
word for 'corn' is also used as a classifier for corn and products made of 
corn. 
(c) Shape. In the Austroasiatic language Dioi, the noun for 'leaf' is used as 
a classifier for paper, fabric, and board, and in Indonesian, the noun 
batang 'tree, trunk' is used to classify vertical things fabricated from 
wood and other long inflexible things. 
More generally, desemanticization tends to involve an extension to a 
larger class of referents, and thereby a loss in semantic specificity. For 
example, the noun bana 'fresh water' of the Pama-Nyungan language Yidiny is 
used to classify all drinkable liquids, and the noun ix or 'ix  'woman' of the 
Mayan language Akatek appears to have provided the source for the 
classificatory particle 'ix used for human beings, saints and mythological animals 
(Zavala 2000: 134), see also the discussion above about the development winaj 
'man' > noun classifier naj used for human beings, saints and mythological 
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animals in Akatek. The Thai item tua was used in earlier documents exclusively 
as classifier for four-legged animals; later on it underwent dramatic extension, 
with the effect that it now combines with a  wide range of referents, including 
mannequins, tables, ghosts, beds, numbers, or underwear – to the extent that it is 
hard to find any common semantic denominator11 (Aikhenvald 2000: 314). The 
final stage of desemanticization would be reached when the classifier can 
combine with all nouns and thereby loses all its semantic content.  
 
Conclusions  
The evidence presented by Aikhenvald (2000) and others suggests that noun-
noun combinations provide one of the main, if not the main source for the 
genesis of classifiers. However, in most of the cases discussed above there are 
no historical records on the directionality of change. That our reconstruction of 
a development from noun to classifier is nevertheless correct is suggested by 
the following pieces of evidence: First, there are some historically attested 
cases, and they are supportive of the unidirectionality hypothesis from noun to 
classifier and from less to more grammaticalized items. Classifiers were used 
sporadically in the classical period of Chinese (500-206 BC), and from about 
100 AD their use increased. For example, the Chinese classifier gè goes back to 
an item with the meaning 'trunk of bamboo tree' in the Shang Dynasty (c. 1400 
BC), it subsequently acquired the meaning 'trees' and then 'wooden objects', 
and in the Tang Dynasty (600-900 AD) it appears as a general classifier. In a 
similar fashion, tiáo meant 'small branch' in the Shang Dynasty and since the 
Song Dynasty (960-1117 AD) it serves as a general classifier for long things 
(see Aikhenvald, 2000: 410 for more details; see also Erbaugh 1986; Bisang 
1996). Second, we are not aware of any examples of a reverse development 
from classifier to noun. While it may turn out that such examples exist, they are 
likely to be extremely rare and exceptional. And third, as we saw above, 
classifiers exhibit exactly the same characteristics of grammaticalization vis-à-
vis their non-grammaticalized counterparts as other functional categories do. 
To conclude, we seem to be dealing with yet another instance of a 
development where the combination of two independent nouns is put to new 
uses, in that one of the nouns assumes a classifying function for the other noun. 
 
5.7 On creativity 
Noun-noun combining can be described as a process leading to the "creation" 
of new meanings, constructions, and words by combining independent nouns 
by means of specific strategies such as attributive possession (modifying 
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 But see Carpenter (1987: 45-6) and Downing (1996: 101-2) for a prototype-extension 
approach. 
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combining), coordination (additive combining), or juxtaposition (appositive 
combining). The term creativity has been used in a wide variety of different 
ways; the way we define the term in the present work is as follows: Creativity 
is an activity leading to the design of a novel object or idea by modifying 
existing norms, where this modification comes to be accepted by those who are 
responsible for maintaining these norms. With reference to the subject matter 
of this book, the expression "novel object or idea" stands for a meaning or 
linguistic structure that previously did not exist in this form in the language 
concerned, while "those who are responsible" are the speakers of that language. 
"Modification" means that the resulting structure cannot immediately be 
derived from existing norms (or rules) or conventions; rather, it consists of 
some break of constraints on the pragmatics, the morphosyntactic structure, 
and/or the (compositional) semantics of the items concerned. Note that not all 
modifications of norms lead to new creations. In fact, the vast majority do not, 
ending up as instances of "deviant" language use. It is only when modifications 
come to be accepted by the speakers of the language that we speak of 
creativity. Creativity thus may mean that existing norms are re-defined – that is 
changed; it contrasts sharply with productivity, which consists simply in the 
regular application of existing rules or norms. 
This definition, which is based on Csikszentmilhályi (1990), is not 
entirely satisfactory since it both includes and excludes a number of 
phenomena that some would consider essential for an understanding of 
creativity; still, it takes care of most salient instances of what tends to be 
subsumed under "creativity" and of the kind of conceptual processes that we 
are concerned with here. We may illustrate the use of this definition with the 
English compound egg head: Those who designed this concept modified 
existing norms in that they proposed a meaning that cannot compositionally be 
derived from that of its parts; the meaning is novel in that there does not appear 
to be any other English word expressing exactly this meaning, and this 
compound and its meaning have come to be accepted by speakers of English. 
Compounding is a productive mechanism which may but need not 
involve creativity. Obviously, alternative compounds are paradigm instances of 
creative activity but there are also other types of noun-noun compounds that 
can be called "creative" in accordance with our definition. In the following we 
will illustrate the creative use of modifying compounding by looking at the 
West African Niger-Congo language Ewe. In the contact situation between 
Ewe speakers and societies in Europe, speakers acquired a range of new 
concepts relating to western culture and technology. The primary strategy that 
Ewe speakers used in the 19th and early 20th century for creating terms for 
new concepts was modifying compounding, a highly productive mechanism of 
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the language. In the same way as in the inalienable possessive construction, the 
head follows the modifier in compounding. The following examples from Ewe, 
taken from Westermann (1905), are meant to illustrate the creativity that Ewe 
speakers used in forming new words for concepts that they were exposed to as 
a result of contact with the western world. Our examples are restricted to noun-
noun compounds with the noun ga 'metal' as a modifier. The meaning of this 
noun was extended to also denote specific items made from metal, namely 
'money' and 'watch, clock', although the latter concept was also expressed by 
the alternative compound ga-‧o- /ókuĭ (metal-strikes-itself). In combination 
with color adjectives, the use of ga was extended to express specific kinds of 
metal, e.g., ga dzẽ ́ (metal red) 'brass, copper', ga yibɔɔ  (metal black) 'iron, 
iron-like metal'. 
One domain of new concepts structured by modifying compounds was 
that of household goods, e.g., ga-tí (metal-stick) 'metal spoon', ga-zé (metal-
pot) 'kettle, metal pot', ga-nú (metal-thing) 'tin'. Furthermore, there were a 
number of other artefacts that came to be expressed by means of the noun ga 
'metal' as a modifying constituent, such as ga-ŋkúí (metal-eye.is.it) 'spectacles', 
ga-kă (metal-string) 'wire', ga-kpɔ ́ (metal-fencing) 'wire fence'. A new 
institution associated with metal that Ewe speakers were confronted with was 
that of prison, giving rise to compounds such as ga-xɔ (metal-house) 'prison', or 
ga-tɔ ́ (metal-owner) 'prisoner'. Another domain concerned means of modern 
transportation, e.g., ga-sɔ ́(metal-horse) 'bicycle', ga-mɔ ́ (metal-way) 'railway', 
ga-fɔkpa (metal-shoe) 'horseshoe'. In yet another domain, namely that of 
commercial interaction, it was not the meaning 'metal' but rather that of 'money' 
that was exploited for expressing new concepts, e.g., ga-sí.así (money-
hand.hand) 'cash (payment)', ga-ví (money-child) 'small change'.12  
These examples show that the Ewe noun ga in combination with some 
head noun has provided a rich source for forming new concepts by means of 
modifying compounding. The question now is whether this process can be 
called creative in accordance with the definition we gave above. One of the two 
requirements of this definition is clearly fulfilled: The compounds have been 
accepted by the speakers of the language. The answer is more complex in the 
case of the second requirement of modification of existing norms. With regard 
to the syntax of the construction, the answer is clearly in the negative since we 
                                                  
12
 There are a number of further compounds that are derived from the 'money' meaning of ga. For 
example, we observed above that in its 'metal' meaning, ga has given rise to the compound ga-tɔ ́ 
'prisoner'. But this compound has a second meaning, 'rich person', which appears to be derived 
from the 'money' meaning. 
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are dealing with the productive application of an existing rule, whereby two 
nouns are combined, with the first assuming the function of a modifier and the 
second that of the head of the construction.  
But what about the semantics of the compounds: Is it suggestive of a 
modification of existing norms? It would seem that in a number of these 
compounds the answer is also in the negative since the meaning of compounds 
can be derived compositionally from that of its constituent parts – e.g., when a 
kettle (ga-zé) is described as a 'metal pot'. Still, there are other cases where one 
might argue that there is a modification of norms – hence creativity, in that 
compounding led to a transfer from one domain of human experience to 
another, e.g., from metal to prison (ga-xɔ), or from animate to inanimate 
concepts, as in compounds such as ga-sɔ ́ (metal-horse) 'bicycle' or ga-mĭ  
(metal-excrement) 'rust (of iron)'.  
On the basis of this definition, noun-noun combining in general and 
compounding in particular do not necessarily entail creativity, and creativity is 
not an all-or-nothing matter; rather, there is a scale extending from non-creative 
productivity to full creativity. Our usage of creativity contrasts thus can be 
described in the following way: 
(a) Creativity is not a specifically linguistic phenomenon; rather, manifests 
itself in virtually all domains of human behavior – including domains 
of behavior where recursion is ostensibly absent. 
(b) It is unpredictable within limits. 
(c) Rather than being stable across space and time, it entails language 
change; with each new act of creativity, the language is no longer 
exactly what it used to be prior to this act. 
(d) It is one of the main driving forces of innovation, i.e., of language 
change, in that it constantly leads to the rise of new meanings and new 
constructions. 
Perhaps the most controversial component of this description can be seen 
in (b). Take the Ewe example ga-mĭ (metal-excrement) 'rust (of iron)' that we 
just presented: "Unpredictablity" consists in the fact that Ewe speakers 
recruited the concept 'excrement' to serve as a metaphorical vehicle to express 
the concept concept 'rust' – they could have chosen various other vehicles. At 
the same time there is also a limit as to what could serve as a vehicle in this 
case, in that it is only concepts that both the speaker and the hearer will accept 
to provide a possible cognitive link to 'rust' that could be recruited. 
 
5.8 Conclusions 
A question that we posed in the introduction to this paper was what one can do 
with two nouns, and what people in the past may have achieved by combining 
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two nouns. The answer we gave in this paper was bluntly: a lot. We saw in the 
preceding sections that combining free nouns can lead to noun modification, 
compounding, derivation, and even to inflection. It can also lead to the 
emergence of word categories such as adjectives and adpositions, and it may 
also give rise to classifying morphemes such as noun and numeral classifiers – 
in other words, noun-noun combining can be held responsible for a wide range 
of grammatical categories. And the process described in this paper is 
essentially unidirectional: We will not expect that any of these categories will 
develop diachronically into nouns and combinations of nouns.  
Combining two nouns is on the one hand a non-creative activity as long 
as it simply consists of applying existing "rules" productively. However, to the 
extent that this involves combinations that were hitherto considered 
inappropriate and/or leads to the propagation of novel meanings that cannot be 
predicted from the sum total of the meanings of the nouns combined, and that 
come to be accepted by the community of speakers, this is a creative activity. 
Such creativity is not restricted to but is most obvious in alternative 
compounds, such as English egg head, flatfoot, half-wit, highbrow, lowlife, 
redcoat, redhead, sabertooth, tenderfoot, whitecap, white-collar, etc., or the 
examples we had above, like Mandarin yún-yǔ  (cloud-rain) 'sexual intercourse' 
(= the sport of cloud and rain) and Vietnamese giăng-hoa (moon-flower) 
'flirtation, ephemeral love'. 
What accounts for the fact that certain kinds of nouns tend to be 
combined, giving rise to new structures such as compounding, nominal 
modification, derivation, noun classification, adpositions, etc.? Observations on  
grammaticalization suggest that there is a cluster of the following factors in 
particular: First, there is cognitive manipulation. By combining two words, A 
and B, in a novel way, a new concept may be expressed. In one type of 
combining – the one that we were centrally concerned with here, A assumes a 
modifying or specifying function for B. Second, there is the parameter of 
extension: Combining A and B is a necessary but not a sufficient requirement 
for grammaticalization to take place. What is required in addition is extension, 
whereby the use of A is extended to other members of the paradigm to which A 
belongs, i.e., A1, A2, etc. Third, there is desemanticization: The larger the 
paradigm of A-members becomes, the more will B lose in semantic specificity, 
that is, the more general its meaning will be. Fourth, in accordance with the 
parameter of decategorialization, the more productive the pattern becomes, the 
more are A and/or B likely to lose in properties characteristic of their erstwhile 
categories, and they may adopt other properties characteristic of new contexts. 
Extension entails an increase in frequency of use, or what Bybee (2002) 
also refers to as repetition: 
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[…] repetition is the glue that binds constituents together. Thus, I 
hypothesize that hierarchies of constituent structure are derivable from 
frequent sequential co-occurrence. In this view, the more often particular 
elements occur together, the tighter the constituent structure. Thus, low-
level constituents such as a determiner, the, and a noun, such as puppy, 
frequently co-occur, while higher-level constituents, such as an NP, the 
puppy, and verbs such as ran, licked, or slept occur together less often 
(Bybee 2002: 111). 
 
Frequency of use plays an important role in the rise of new functional 
categories out of noun-noun and other word combinations. At the same time we 
maintain, as is also acknowledged by Bybee, that the primary motivation for 
the process is semantic (or conceptual), and that frequency is derivative of this 
motivation. 
In a number of works on language genesis, e.g., in studies on complex 
adaptive (self-organizing) systems, it is assumed that the rise of grammar is 
contingent on the presence of a sufficiently large lexicon (e.g., Li 2002: 90). 
While this may be so, this does not appear to be a crucial factor: As we saw in 
this paper, the presence of one word category with only two instances is – in 
principle – enough to produce a wide range of different grammatical structures. 
This suggests that quantity is not necessarily a decisive issue for grammatical 
categories or relations to arise. 
Following Heine and Kuteva (2007) we hypothesize that the processes 
described in this paper can in some way be traced back to the earliest forms of 
human language. In their reconstruction of grammatical evolution, these 
authors do not deal with noun-noun combining, and the question arises at what 
stage it may have emerged in early language. Speaking about compounding – 
which, as we showed above, comes at a stage later than combining – 
Jackendoff (1999; 2002: 249-50) suggests that compounding is a possible 
"protolinguistic fossil" and "a plausible step between raw concatenation and 
full syntax" on account of the relations obtaining between the words of a 
compound. In support of this suggestion he presents in particular two kinds of 
evidence: First, he draws attention to observations according to which in the 
Basic Variety of late second language learners as proposed by Klein and 
Perdue (1997: 332) the formation of new words is limited to noun-noun 
compounds. And second, he argues that children improvise compounds very 
early.  
Neither of these arguments is entirely convincing. Compounding is not 
clearly productive in all instances of the Basic Variety (Sandra Benazzo, p.c.). 
In the acquisition process of English-speaking children, compounding has been 
found to be important. The first stage in the acquisition of compounds leads 
children to create a structure instantiated by combinations such as wash-man, 
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open-man for which there is no equivalent in the adult languages which they 
are exposed to. The strategy tends to be described in the relevant literature as 
"overextension", where children extend the use of their words to refer to things 
that would not be covered by the adult word. Overextensions appear most 
commonly in children's speech from about age 1;6 to 2;6 and may affect as 
many as 40% of children's early words (Clark 2003: 88). And compounding is 
not confined to English-speaking children; children acquiring German, 
Swedish, and Icelandic also construct new root compounds from as young as 
age two (Clark 2003: 297). But all these are languages having a highly 
productive mechanism of compounding, while many other languages, such as 
the Romance or Bantu languages, have not. It would seem in fact that in such 
languages, compounding does not nearly play the role it does in the acquisition 
of English: Children tend to wait until age three or four before they make much 
active use of novel word-formation, relying on mechanisms other than 
compounding, such as derivational means or possessive constructions, using 
prepositional phrases, as introduced, e.g., by à or de in French (see Clark 2003: 
298). 
Notice that, for the present purposes, it is important to recognize the 
distinction between combining and compounding. On the basis of the scenario 
proposed in table 5.1, nouns must have been the first category to emerge in 
early language (layer I), and it is reasonable to assume that, once there was 
such a category, it was possible to combine different instances of this category. 
But there are also reasons to argue that compounding was not among the 
earliest mechanisms of word combining. The first reason relates to the 
typological distribution of compounding just alluded to: While being 
widespread crosslinguistically, noun-noun compounding is not found 
everywhere in the world; it seems to be common in languages having a 
pronounced modifier-head word order and distinctly less so in head-modifier 
languages. More research is therefore required on whether it is in fact a 
situation like the one found in English, as Jackendoff (2002) argues, or else a 
situation as found in French that reflects an earlier structural pattern. If early 
language was characterized by modifier-head ordering then it would in fact be 
plausible to hypothesize that compounding arose early (Fritz Newmeyer, p.c.). 
Other reasons concern grammaticalization theory. According to table 
5.1, adjectives must have arisen fairly early in the evolution of language, 
namely at layer III. Now, a common – though not the only – diachronic source 
for adjectives is provided by nouns assuming the role of modifiers in noun-
noun combinations (see section 5.2). This means that the presence of such 
combinations must have preceded that of adjectives in time; in other words, 
noun-noun combining must have been present at least at layer III, if not earlier. 
Another common process that we discussed above (section 5.4) concerns the 
development from compounding to derivation (and occasionally to inflection). 
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In our scenario of grammaticalization of table 5.1, categories that may be 
suggestive of a derivational behavior did not arise in the early layers of 
evolution – certainly not within the first four layers. While this observation 
does not provide any clues as to when compounding emerged, it suggests at 
least that there is no evidence for an early emergence of it.  
But there is another reason why we are hesitant to accept the claim that 
compounding is a possible "fossil" of language evolution. A common source, if 
not the main source, of (modifying) compounds is provided by attributive 
possessive ("genitive") constructions. This observation is in accordance with 
the parameter of decategorialization, in that modifying nouns in possessive 
constructions generally show a lower degree of decategorialization than 
modifying nouns in compounds; for example, whereas the former usually 
dispose of the whole range of nominal properties (such as the ability to take 
modifiers or to be inflected) this is not normally the case with the latter. This 
suggests that there must have been attributive possessive constructions before 
noun-noun compounds arose – in other words, it is unlikely that compounding 
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6. Functional categories: an evolutionary perspective 
Pieter Muysken 
Radboud University, Nijmegen 
Abstract 
In this chapter I will focus on the status  and origin of functional categories in 
the languages of the world, and explore various ideas, with reference to 
proposals by researchers such Bickerton and Jackendoff, concerning three 
possibilities: (a) that in the course of language evolution, language developed 
from a functional category-free to a functional category-rich state; (b) that 
language started out as a system consisting mostly of syntactic patterns and 
functional categories (albeit of a different nature), and only then acquired a 
content lexicon. Ultimately, I tentatively propose that neither scenario is the 
most likely one, but that we need to consider the possibility of co-evolution of 
the syntactic and the lexical subsystems or modules in language, with 
functional categories at the interface between the two. 
 
6.1 Functional categories 
Functional categories can take various shapes. Consider for instance, the 
Andean language Cuzco Quechua. In this Quechua variety, the original 
language of the Inka Empire, sentences generally have the form given in (1): 
 
(1) Tusu-yu-spa taki-ya-spa-n asa-ru-n-ku kargo-yoq-kuna-qa. 
     dance-AUG-SS sing-AUG-SS-AF pass-EXH-3-PL charge-POS-PL-TO 
 'The charge holders [patrons of the feast] pass dancing and singing.' 
(Cusihuamán, 1976: 223) 
 
In this example we find two kinds of elements: lexical roots (two of which, 
kargo and pasa-, are loans from Spanish) and affixes (in bold in (1)). 
These two classes of elements differ on a number of dimensions: 
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Phonology and morphology 
(a) Roots often consist of two syllables, while affixes are generally mono-
syllabic; 
(b) In roots we sometimes find aspirated and glottalized consonants; these 
are absent in affixes. 
Semantics and pragmatics 
(c) The meaning of the affixes is very often much more abstract than that of 
the roots; 
(d) Some of the affixes play a role in organizing the information structure of 
the clause, such as affirmative marker –n and the topic –qa. 
Syntax 
(e) Many of the affixes play a role in the syntactic organization of the 
clause; thus –spa marks temporal subordination (here simultaneity) with 
identical subjects; -n-ku marks the subject-verb agreement relation. 
 
Then there are a few affixes in (1), often occurring closer to the root, which 
have properties intermediate between those of affixes and roots. The elements –
yu- (full form –yku-) and –ru-(full form –rqu-), glossed here as 'augmentative' 
and 'exhortative', but with much more complex meanings, as well as the 
possession marker –yoq, have somewhat more concrete meanings, are often 
lexicalized, and play a less central role in the organization of the clause. Their 
shape is also slightly more complex than that of other suffixes. 
Thus we find a rather sharp division in Quechua between roots and 
affixes, with some of the affixes having root-like characteristics. These types of 
distinctions do not exist only in languages with a complex morphology, such as 
Cuzco Quechua, but also in languages with more simple morphologies, often 
termed "isolating". 
Consider now an example from the Surinam creole Saramaccan, the 
language of one of the Maroon societies in the tropical inland forest:  
 
(2) a bi túe wan sitónu gó a mi báka 
 3s PST throw one stone go LOC 1s back 
 'He threw a stone at me (from behind)' (De Groot, 1981: 118). 
 
Here all elements are separate words (although there is some morphology in 
Saramaccan as well). Again, considering the different dimensions, the elements 







Phonology and morphology 
(a) Functional elements in Saramaccan generally consist of only one 
syllable, while lexical elements often are longer; 
(b) The functional elements in this Saramaccan example do not carry 
specified high tone (marked with a ´), but there are some elements that 
do (Norval Smith, p.c.). 
Semantics and pragmatics 
(c) Again, we find more concrete meanings such as sitónu 'stone' and túe 
'throw (away)', and more abstract meanings, such as a 'third singular 
pronoun',  bi 'past tense', and a 'locative'. 
Syntax 
(d) The functional elements, such as the person clitic a and the tense marker 
bi, play a role in organizing the clause syntactically. 
(e) In contrast with Cuzco Quechua, there is no overt marking of agreement. 
 
We also find a few elements with intermediate status, such as the serial 
directional verb gó and location specifier báka. These may carry a high tone, 
have a somewhat concrete meaning, and in phrase structure have a status 
similar, although not identical, to that of lexical heads. 
Not surprisingly, other languages, such as Dutch, may have a set of 
distinctions similar to the ones made in Cuzco Quechua and Saramaccan. 
Consider an example such as (3): 
 
(3) Vergeef-0   me toch         mijn ont-nuchter-end-e  
 forgive-IM  1s.AC though     1s.GE dis-illusion-ing-AG
 en       scept-isch-e toon. 
 and     scept-ical-AG tone. 
 'Please forgive me my disillusioning and sceptical tone.' 
 
In this sentence again we find some functional elements (in bold), as well as 
lexical elements. In addition, there are some elements intermediate between the 
two, and heavily lexicalized, which in this case are affixal (prefix ont- 'dis-' and 
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Phonology and morphology 
(a) Many functional elements in Dutch are pronounced with a schwa (even 
though sometimes written differently, as in the case of mijn 'my'); 
(b) Some morpho-syntactic categories in Dutch receive a null expression, 
such as imperative; 
(c) Some morpho-syntactic distinctions are suppletive, e.g. the me 'me'/mijn 
'my' distinction; 
(d) Some functional categories appear to be separate words, and others 
appear as affixes. 
Semantics and pragmatics 
(e) Some affixes have a purely formal function, such as adjective agreement 
–e, without a clear meaning; 
(f) There are elements with a purely discourse organizing functions, such as 
toch 'though'. 
Syntax 
(g) Various elements play a role in signalling the grammatical organization 
of the clause, such as the agreement marker and the case forms of the 
first person pronouns. 
 
Thus the lexical/functional distinction is valid for various languages, but with 
different morpho-lexical manifestations. 
 
While Cuzco Quechua, Saramaccan, and Dutch all have reasonably large 
inventories of functional elements, in some languages there may be many 
fewer. This has been claimed for Riau Indonesian by David Gil (e.g. 2001). 
Consider his often cited sentence (4): 
 
(4) ayam makan 
 chicken eat 
 
This may mean 'the chicken eats', but also 'the chicken is making somebody 
eat', or 'somebody is eating where the chicken is', and a host of other things. In 
Riau Indonesian many aspects of sentence meaning are not expressed through 
formal markers or rigid structural patterns, but through general interpretive 
conventions, heavily relying on the context. 
Still, Riau Indonesian has functional elements, such as the relator yang 
and tense markers such as past proximate tadi, but there are fewer of them than 
in, say, Cuzco Quechua, and they are relied on less frequently in actual 
language use. Parkvall (2005), using data from the World Atlas of Linguistics 




morpho-syntactic distinctions that different languages make, and concludes that 
there are large differences in these numbers. There have been claims that there 
are some languages (e.g. Old Chinese as it appears in poetic texts) without 
functional categories, but no such language appears in Parkvall's sample. 
From this brief survey we can perhaps draw the tentative conclusion in 
(5): 
 
(5) a. All languages are characterized by a lexical-functional distinction in 
their inventory of elements; 
b. In most languages there are some elements intermediate in status on 
the lexical functional/dimension; 
c. There are various ways that the functional categories of a language 
may be realized: as affixes, as separate words, as null forms, etc. 
d. Languages may differ in the richness of the inventories of functional 
elements. 
 
It should be noted that sign languages also have developed functional 
categories (cf. Muysken, in press), similar to those of spoken languages. This 
supports the idea that these categories are universal. 
The question addressed in this paper is what could be the evolutionary 
basis for the lexical/functional distinction? Botha (2003: 11) puts the justified 
demand of 'ontological transparency' on work in this area: if we are discussing 
the paths of evolution of a certain element or property of language, we should 
know what that element or property is. This is not simple in the case of 
functional categories. So how can we define functional categories, given their 
different manifestations? I propose the following definition (borrowing from 
Anderson's definition of inflection in his paper Where's morphology? (1982)): 
 
(6) A functional category is an element in the inventory of items in a 
language that plays a clear role in the grammatical rules of the language. 
 
This definition clearly locates functional categories at the interface of the 
lexicon and the grammar. What is the reason that human languages have 
developed this interface category? Before turning to this question, I will turn to 
further discussion of the question of whether the lexical / functional is sharp or 
gradual. 
 
6.2 A gradualist perspective: category models and semantic maps 
There is fairly widespread recognition, as mentioned in section 1, that among 
the functional categories not all elements are equal. Some adpositions are more 
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clearly 'functional' than others (compare French de 'of' to dessus 'on top', clitic 
pronouns show special behaviour when compared with strong pronouns 
(compare le '3SG.MS.OB' to lui 'him'), copulas (be) are more restricted than 
aspectual auxiliaries (finish), etc. Roughly, we get a number of chains 
converging, from more lexical categories, roughly as in figure 6.1, where four 
points of reference are taken. Departing from locational and directional 
adverbs, verbs marking boundaries, discourse markers, and descriptive nouns, 
several chains can be construed that converge on a class of definiteness and 
finiteness markers, the most grammaticalized categories perhaps in the nominal 
and clausal domains: 
 
Adverbs Verbs 
Locative adpositions  Restructuring verbs 
Simple adpositions Modal verbs 
Abstract adpositions  Aspectual auxiliaries 
Case markers  Tense markers 
[Definiteness and 
Finiteness markers] 
Clausal particles  Agreement markers 
Complementizers Clitic pronouns 
Conjunctions  Strong pronouns 
Modal particles  Classifiers 
Discourse markers Nouns 
 
Figure 6.1: Chains of related categories, arranged from lexical to functional 
from the outside inwards 
 
In order to properly deal with this array of notions expressed in 
categories, several models can be envisaged, which correspond to different 
approaches to grammatical categories. Currently there are at least four main 
models for categorisation (some of which, to be sure, have not been given very 
precise definitions yet, and may be better labelled 'views' or 'perspectives'): 
 
• Prototype models 
• Scale and Hierarchy models 
• Mono-dimensional models 





The Prototype model (e.g. Croft, 1991) assumes that each category has a 
typical meaning or use (e.g. nouns are typically used to refer), expressed by 
core members of the category, while other words may belong to a category 
without expressing this core meaning. A typical noun would be table, a less 
typical one size. Thus, one could envisage a proto-typical functional category 
such as 'the' at the centre of the definition (highly specific morpho-lexical 
properties, specialised syntax, reduced phonological shape, abstract meaning) 
and other elements more or less distant from this prototype. The prototype 
model does not seem to help us much in accounting for lexical/functional 
differentiation. 
The Scale model (Ross, 1972; Sasse, 1981) likewise assumes that the 
boundaries of a category may be fuzzy, but makes the additional assumption 
that categories can be arranged on a linear scale. There is a large literature on 
gradience in grammatical categories (cf. the summary in Sasse, 2001), e.g. the 
adverb … preposition cline or the noun … verb cline. The Hierarchy model 
(cf. e.g. Comrie, 2001: 34, who makes this relevant distinction) is a scale model 
which has a high/low dimension. This asymmetry could be due to historical 
change, as postulated in grammaticalisation theory, to cognitive development 
(from simple to complex), to language evolution, etc. Thus adpositions could 
be on a scale with adverbs on the lexical end and case markers on the 
functional end. Modals could be on a scale with auxiliaries on the functional 
end and full verbs on the lexical end, etc. Clearly, figure 6.1 is an instance of 
this type of scale model. 
The Mono-dimensional model (e.g. Baker, 2003) assumes that 
categories are not squishy and that they consist of one-to-one pairings of forms 
and meanings. Possible disparities between form and meaning are solved 
through special adjustment rules at either the syntax/phonology or the 
syntax/semantics interfaces. With respect to the issue at hand this model would 
assume that there is a true set of functional categories, and a number of other 
elements which might share features of functional categories but are really 
lexical in nature. The discussion then would be whether a certain class is 'truly' 
functional or not. This type of model would require an absolute boundary 
somewhere in the scales introduced in figure 6.1. 
The Multi-dimensional model (Plank, 1984; Sadock, 1991; Jackendoff, 
2002) assumes that categories lie at the interface of different representations – 
morpho-lexical, syntactic, phonological, and semantic. The Multi-level model 
as one instance (Cann, 2000: 58) would assume that functional categories can 
be distinguished, in absolute terms, at one level of analysis, in this case E-
language, but not at another level, I-language. The Chain model assumes that 
various categories may be part of a chain of some kind, as in the T-chain 
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proposal (Guéron and Hoekstra, 1988), where the Verb, Tense, the Inflection, 
and the Complementizer nodes may be part of a syntactically coherent 
subsystem. Conceptually, it can be seen as a type of multi-dimensional model, 
since the chain represents only one dimension. 
Independently of where one draws the line exactly in figure 6.1, it 
appears that there are at least a number of elements that fall under the loose 
definition of 'functional category', a class of elements which is relatively 
limited in size and does not readily admit new members. The elements 
typically have a fairly abstract meaning and serve to link different expressed 
notions, such as predicates and arguments. In (7) seven sets are distinguished, 
arranged in terms of their degree of integration into the clause. 
 
 (7) Rough classification of functional categories 
a. Interjections are not at all integrated into syntactic structure, and 
often have deviant morpho-phonological shapes;   
b. Discourse markers and adverbs, are only loosely integrated into the 
clause; 
c. Evidential markers, conjunctions and adpositions; 
d. Classifiers generally fit into more or less closed classes, but these 
are often not paradigmatically structured;  
e. Pronouns are generally tightly organised in paradigms, but often 
play a relatively independent role, and often do not have special 
morphology; 
f. Modals and auxiliaries are often closely linked to tense markers, but 
vary somewhat in their morpho-phonological features;   
g. Tense and agreement markers, case markers and determiners tend to 
have reduced phonological shapes and are tightly linked to the 
syntactic skeleton of the clause. 
 
The classification in (7) could be made more or less fine-grained, following the 
chains in figure 6.1, to be sure. However, it is clear that we are not dealing with 
a unified phenomenon here. Rather, it seems that lexical elements are 
'recruited', to a greater or lesser extent, into syntactic processing. 
This syntactic processing is linked to some kind of semantic map, 
involving major syntactic categories and the various functional notions linked 












 Size Gender Degree 
 Quantification Case Deixis Animacy  Intensive 
 Space Shape Number Person Anaphoricity 
Locations Tense Negation Predication      Predicates 
 Polarity 
 Topic  Focus Clause linking 
Transitivity  Voice Event structure 
Valency 




Figure 6.2: Rough semantic map of a number of notions likely to be expressed 
by functional categories 
 
The map sketched in figure 6.2 involves six 'anchor points': Entities, Properties, 
Locations, Predicates, Actions, and Events, and is indicative of the richness of 
the concepts expressed in the functional domain. 
The seemingly gradual nature of the classification of functional 
categories is the result of their being an interface category, and hence we must 
adopt a modular perspective to deal with this classification, taken up in the next 
section. 
 
6.3 A modular perspective 
Linguists can contribute to the study of language origins by considering the 
very nature of language itself. What is it about language that might inform us 
about its possible genesis? The most serious problem with most structural 
approaches to language, particularly those within the generative tradition (but 
already immanent in the Sausurean dictum that language is a system où tout se 
tient), is that they have tended to view the language capacity as a single 
monolithic whole. This monolithic view stands in the way of the gradualist 
perspective of language evolution that is required if we bring the origin of 
language in line with the genesis of other human capacities, both cognitive and 
more generally neurological, adopting a Darwinian perspective. 
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A more promising approach takes the modular organization of the 
language capacity as its starting point. In human language, (at least) four 
essentially different modules intersect: (a) the structure-building and -
processing capacity (syntax), (b) the sign forming and using capacity 
(semiotics), (c) the capacity to engage in sustained exchange of information 
(interaction), and (d) the capacity to form complex representations of 
information (cognition) in our mind. This claim of four different interacting 
modules remains empty unless we manage to isolate the formal properties of 
these modules.  I will briefly sketch those of the two of the modules involved 
that relate most directly the concerns of this paper: syntax and semiotics. 
Two crucial features of language are part of the module of syntax. These 
are not found outside of language: endocentricity plays a role in sentence 
grammar (through X-bar theory), in word formation (headedness), and in 
phonology (e.g. in syllable structure). The property sometimes confusingly 
labeled displacement by Chomsky (e.g. 2000), I will term 'movement' here 
(without any of the derivational claims often associated with this term): the fact 
that in language elements do not always appear in the place in the sequence 
where they are interpreted ([where] do you live < you live [what place]). 
Berwick (1998) assumes that the following five properties are 
characteristic of the syntactic capacity: digital infinity (including recursion), 
displacement (see above), structure dependence, core grammatical relations 
(subject, object), locality constraints (e.g. subjacency). Ultimately, he assumes 
the property of Merge (Chomsky, 1995) to account for these properties, 
interfacing with pronounceability and interpretability requirements. However, 
it is not clear to me how endocentricity follows directly from Merge. 
The module of semiotics contributes a number of properties to language; 
these principles or properties are however also found in non-linguistic semiotic 
systems (such as traffic signs). The first principle is that of distinctiveness: 
lexical elements must be sufficiently distinctive to contrast with other elements. 
A second principle is transparency: new lexical elements ideally are 
transparently derived from existing elements. A third principle, elementarity, 
refers to the requirement that a lexical element ideally functions as a coherent 
whole, as an atom which can be combined with other elements. This principle 
is often referred to as the lexical integrity principle in the case of language. 
Fourth, the principle of analogy, which causes new forms to be built parallel to 
already extant forms. 
The organization of the lexicon as a semiotic system has several effects. 
A well-known semiotic effect is that of blocking in morphology: the 
availability of one form (e.g. thief), no matter how it arose, will block the 




well-known effect is that of suppletion: within a tightly organized paradigm, a 
non-transparently derived or etymologically unrelated form may still be 
lexically related (e.g. bad / worse). Third, the principle of analogy produces 
lexical subsystems characterized by paradigmaticity. 
Bearing distinctions such as the above in mind, I argue for a multi-
dimensional, modular approach to the human language faculty, and 
subsequently, to grammatical categories, as the examples given in section 6.1 
show. This approach implies that syntactic computation, interactive 
communication, sign building (semiotics), cognition, and 
perception/production are assumed to cooperate conjointly in what appears to 
be a single phenomenon: the human language capacity. These capacities 
include, as stated, syntactic computation, interactive communication, sign 
building (semiotics), cognition, and perception/production. The modular 
perspective implies that functional elements can and should be viewed as 
multi-dimensional. Not only do they have a form and a meaning (the traditional 
Saussurean notion of sign), but they may or may not play a separate role in 
syntactic computation (through their feature content); in addition, they may 
have an interactive function. This multi-dimensional, interface, character is also 
responsible for the fact that categories are perceived as gradient. Thus, we can 
perceive the distinction between lexical and functional as gradient due to the 
interactive character of the different modules. In these modules, the functional 
categories have different definitions. 
 
1. Syntactically, functional categories are those elements that define the 
skeleton of the clause and its constituents. 
2. Semantically, functional categories are those elements that have an 
abstract, non-ontologically defined meaning. 
3. Phonologically, functional categories are those elements that do not form 
the nucleus of a phonological word. 
4. Morpho-lexically, functional categories are closed class, 
paradigmatically structured elements.  
 
Different dimensions of functional categories overlap but do not coincide: 
typically the semantic set of functional categories is a proper superset of the 
syntactic one, and typically the phonological set is a proper subset of the 
syntactic one. The morpho-lexical set and the syntactic set overlap only 
partially; etc. A modular view of functional categories opens the way for a 
gradualist view on language evolution, I will argue. 
 
 




6.4 Functional categories from an evolutionary perspective 
How can we explain the emergence of functional categories from an 
evolutionary perspective? We need to ask ourselves what the specific 
advantage of functional categories would be in human language. I will explore 
various ideas in this respect, with reference, of course, to proposals by 
researchers such Bickerton (1990) and Jackendoff (2002). These proposals 
depart from the assumption that in the course of language evolution, language 
went from a functional category-free to a category-rich system, feeding upon 
the expressive possibilities of a rich lexicon. This I will term the syntactic 
enrichment option. It is also the option explored, albeit with a twist, in work on 
grammaticalization by Heine and Kuteva (2007). 
An alternative would be that language started out as a system consisting 
mostly of structural patterns and functional categories (albeit of a different 
nature), and only then acquired a rich content lexicon. It is true that its 
extremely rich vocabulary is as much a feature setting human language apart 
from possibly antecedent animal communication systems as its rich syntax and 
inventory of functional categories. This could be termed the lexical enrichment 
option. However, if we take functional categories to be the original set of 
elements, it is unlikely that these are the continuation of the limited set of fairly 
concrete and generic alarm calls etc. of animal communication systems, given 
the highly abstract and category-bound nature of functional categories.  
A third possibility would be to assume that the lexical and the syntactic 
possibilities of human language co-evolved: a rich lexicon allowed further 
development of functional categories, and a rich syntactic system allowed 
further possibilities for lexical enrichment. I will term this the co-evolution 
option. 
Since the syntactic enrichment option has dominated the (admittedly 
syntactic-centric) theoretical literature this will occupy most of the following 
discussion. I will begin by sketching the preliminary assumptions in this 
direction of Bickerton (1990), and then those Jackendoff (2002: 236-7), 
building on Bickerton: in Jackendoff's view, language evolution involved a 
number of steps of syntactic enrichment towards a more adequate 









6.4.1 From a functional element-free to a functional element-rich system 
The primary original proponent of the syntactic enrichment or 'functional 
expansion' scenario is Bickerton (1990), who proposed an early protolanguage, 
with little syntax, followed by a qualitatively very different stage with Full 
Language. Bickerton assumes that with Homo erectus, about one million years 
ago, protolanguage emerged, a system with a lexicon, but without syntax. 
Clausal organization would be in term of pragmatic principles first, then 
semantic principles, and finally syntactic principles. There would be flat 
structure rather than layered structure, and no agreement markers in stead of the 
complex agreement characterising some natural languages. Finally, there would 
be no recursion. 
As to the lexicon, there would be only lexical categories, rather than 
lexical and functional categories as in full languages. There would not be the 
complex morphology of full languages. Also, protolanguage would show little 
diversity in categories, rather than the high diversity in categories of at least 
some full languages, and vocabulary would be poor. 
As far as the pragmatics of information processing is concerned, 
interpretation would be context dependent rather than context independent, and 
processing would not yet be fully automatic, as with full languages.  
As regards the phonology, protolanguage would have purely syllabic 
articulation, rather than the articulation based on more complex phoneme 
combinations. Phoneme inventories would be simple rather than the complex 
inventories of some contemporary languages, and likewise syllables would be 
simple. There would be no lento/allegro styles, presumably, rather than the 
complex lento/allegro and sanddhi rules of contemporary languages. 
Bickerton adduces evidence (p. 180) that whatever vocabularies primates 
manage to acquire in human captivity only involve content words.  However, 
Bickerton (1990: 181-5) assumes that certain functional pre-syntactic 
categories developed during the protolanguage period, since certain abstract 
notions are central to any basic communicative system. These would include: 
 
(8) Negation 
      Wh-words 
      Possibly pronouns 
      Modal operators such as can and must 
      Aspectual operators to indicate completed or earlier actions, or later actions 
      Direction and location markers 
      Quantifiers such as many and few 
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For Bickerton, following his work on pidgin and creole genesis in 
Bickerton (1981), it is crucial to adopt a non-gradualist position: the transition 
between protolanguage and full language was radical and did not involve any 
intermediary stages. However, the evidence from pidgin / creole genesis for 
this position is weak, and in other domains, such as child language and aphasia 
adduced by Bickerton (1990: 105-129), the evidence for a sharp break is not 
very strong either, if existent at all. 
Jackendoff (2002), building on Bickerton's work, assumes a much more 
complicated pattern of incremental development, involving a number of 
logically independent and yet in part logically subsequent separate steps. There 
is generally no independent evidence for these steps, but certainly they 
correspond to mostly separate phenomena. I will first present them and then 
turn to the question how these interact with the possible emergence of 
functional categories. The steps are (2002: 238-260): 
 
(9) a. Pre-existing primate conceptual structure 
b. Use of symbols in non-situation-specific fashion 
c. Use of an open, unlimited class of symbols 
d. Development of a phonological combinatorial system 
e. Concatenation of symbols 
f. Use of symbol position to convey basic semantic notions 
g. Hierarchical phrase structure 
h. Symbols that explicitly encode abstract semantic relations 
i. Grammatical categories 
j. System of inflections to convey semantic relations 
k. System of grammatical functions to convey semantic relations 
 
After phase (f) [Use of symbol position to convey basic semantic notions], 
something like Bickerton's protolanguage may have been arrived at, and after 
the final phase, (k), we can speak of modern language. The sequence of 





(a) conceptual structure 
↓ 
(b) symbols 
↓    ↓ 
(c) open class of symbols   (e) symbol concatenation 
↓      ↓ 
 (d) combinatorial phonology   (f) symbol position 
 
       xxxxxxx                                    <<< protolanguage 
 
↓ 
(g) phrase structure 
↓                           ↓ 
(h) abstract semantics relations  (i) grammatical categories 
↓  ↓ 
(j)  inflections (k) grammatical functions 
 
xxxxxxxx                           <<< modern language 
 
Figure 6.3: Jackendoff's (2002) scenario for the development of grammar 
 
One type of functional categories is introduced in step (h), [Symbols that 
explicitly encode abstract semantic relations]. Here Jackendoff mentions 
notions similar to those suggested by Bickerton in (8), enumerating the 
following types of elements (pp. 253-254): 
 
(10) a. Spatial relation terms: up, toward, behind 
b. Time terms: now, yesterday, before 
c. Markers of illocutionary force or modality: if, may, can 
d. Markers of discourse status: definite and indefinite determiners 
e. Quantification: some, all, always 
f. Purposes, reasons, intermediate causes: for ... to, with, because 
g  Discourse connectors: but, however, and so forth 
 
A second type of functional category is introduced in step (j), [System of 
inflections to convey semantic relations], referring to case markers, agreement 
markers, etc., elements whose interpretation is strictly grammatical rather than 
notional. 
Thus Jackendoff splits the functional categories into two sets: elements 
with more semantic content, often realized as separate words, and more purely 
formal elements, often realised as inflections. This distinction between two sets 
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would also correspond to different stages in the process of evolution: content-
full elements would evolve before more formal elements. 
Pursuing a similar line of argumentation as Jackendoff, Johansson 
(2006) argues that four different grammatical properties can be distinguished in 
the syntax of human languages, which to some extent are implicationally 
ordered: 
 
(11) a. Language is structured: the ordering and relations of the items in 
a clause has implications for the system; 
b. Language is hierarchical: within the structure there are several 
layers of ordering; 
c. Language is recursive: sometimes categories on one hierarchical 
layer in the structure re-appear on another one; 
d. Language is flexible: sometimes the order and arrangement of 
elements may alternate in different utterances. 
 
The basic sine qua non property is structure: all other properties imply 
structure, but not vice-versa. Furthermore, recursivity implies both structure 
and hierarchy, but not vice-versa. Similarly, flexibility implies structure (and 
possibly also hierarchy), but not vice-versa. Flexibility and recursivity are 
logically independent of one another. On the basis of the distinct properties in 
(11), Johansson arrives at a scenario with the following possible stages in 
grammatical development: 
 
(12) one word sentences 
 two word sentences (+ 11a) 
 sentences with hierarchical structure (+11b) 
 sentences with recursion (+11c) 
 sentences with full modern syntax (+11d) 
 
6.4.2 Evolutionary advantages of functional categories 
Assume that there was an earlier stage in the evolution of language, something 
like Bickerton's or Jackendoff's protolanguage, in which there were no 
functional categories. Rather, this language only would have the equivalent of 
content words. What would be the advantage that the emergence of functional 
categories would confer upon a type of language system, which had them? 
Surprisingly perhaps, this question was first posed, as far as I am aware, 
in an article by Labov written in 1971 and published in 1990: 'The adequacy of 
natural language I: The development of tense'. Here Labov contrasted the tense 




pidgin temporal reference was indicated with adverbs like 'yesterday' and 'later', 
in the creole with particles like 'been' and 'go'. Claiming that there is no 
inherent semantic reason for 'been' rather than 'yesterday', Labov argues that a 
system with tense particles allows greater stylistic possibilities. Citing the 
English example of the huge range of variability accompanying the 
pronunciation of 'I am going to go', which can be reduced to [angnego], but 
with many intermediary forms. Labov argues that there are at least 27 ways of 
pronouncing this sequence, and this variability makes a language with a future 
marker of the 'be going to'-type more attractive than one only with adverbs like 
'later'. The problem is of course that theoretically, adverbs might also show the 
same possibility of being shortened, yielding stylistic options. This is precisely 
what has happened with the Tok Pisin tense marker 'bye and bye', which is 
ultimately pronounced like [bə] (Sankoff and Laberge, 1973). However, the 
reduction of 'bye and bye' went in parallel with its shift to the preverbal 
position and its incorporation into the emerging Tense/Mood/Aspect particle 
system. 
While Labov's answer focuses on the stylistic dimension, Bickerton 
(1990: 55) assumes that functional categories provide a cognitive advantage: 
'They constitute, as it were, the coordinates of the linguistic map, a kind of 
topological grid whereby the positions of objects and events can be plotted 
relative to the observer and to one another.' Bickerton bases himself on work by 
Leonard Talmy in this respect, who contrasts (2001: 32-33) the open class 
system, which is engaged in conveying conceptual content, with the closed 
class system, which conveys conceptual structure. Thus we can think of the 
emergence of functional categories as the result of the emerging need to 
provide conceptual structure to messages as they became more complex. Even 
though the same meaning can be expressed with adverbs as with tense markers, 
there may be semantic advantages as well to more abstract meaning carrying 
elements. It may not always be relevant to indicate that something happened 
'yesterday' or 'last week', and in such a case a more generic marker like 'before' 
would be preferable. 
Other researchers have sought answers in the domain of formal syntactic 
patterning. One syntactic possibility, following the work by Hauser, Chomsky 
and Fitch (2002), was that functional elements emerged because of the 
development of recursion in the syntax: these elements would help making the 
links between the constituents visible in structures that were growing to be 
progressively more complex. The types of elements that could fulfil this task 
would primarily be complementizers, as in (13a), and adpositions or case 
markers, as in (13b): 
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(13) a. I told you already that I had seen that Mary had left. 
 b. my cousin's neighbour's cat 
 
A second possibility was that functional categories emerged to facilitate 
efficient marking of head/complement dependencies. As syntactic structures 
became more complex, there was an increasing need to clearly delineate the 
relation between the predicate and its arguments, as well as that between a head 
noun and its dependents. Consider a sentence such as (14) from Cuzco 
Quechua: 
 
(14) Mariya-man Pedru-q wasi-n-ta riku-chi-rqa-ni 
 Mary-DA Peter-GE house-3-AC see-CAU-PST-1 
 'I showed Peter's house to Mary.' 
 
In (14) there are agreement markers indicating subject (-ni '1st singular') 
and possessor (-n '3rd singular'), and case markers indicating indirect object (-
man 'dative), possessor (-q 'genitive'), and direct object (-ta 'accusative'). These 
elements generally allow unambiguous identification of the various 
interactants. 
A third possibility is that the functional categories actually define the 
categorical status of the content words. Consider the words from Quechua in 
(15a): 
 
(15) a. wasi        'house' b.     wasi-yki  'your house' 
 rumi 'stone'  rumi-yki 'your stone' 
 riku- 'see'  riku-nki 'you see' 
 puri- 'walk'  puri-nki 'you walk' 
 puka 'red' puka-yki '*you(r) red/your red one' 
 yana 'black' yana-yki '*you(r) black/your black one' 
 
While the lexical forms of Quechua nouns, verbs, and adjectives are non-
distinct or very similar, the endings make clear what kind of element is used, as 
in (15b). Verbs receive forms like –nki for the second person, and nouns forms 
like –yki. Adjectives can only be marked with –yki when they denote a noun. 
Thus it is the functional categories that give the lexical ones their clear 
categorical status. 
Thus various syntactic explanations may be given for why functional 
categories are useful in a slightly more complex grammatical system. However, 
these various explanations, and other imaginable ones, suffer from two 




(A) They each only cover certain sets of cases, not all functional 
categories. Roughly the following relations hold between these three functions 
and specific sets of categories: 
 
(16) a. recursion marking  complementisers, adpositions, case markers 
 b. head/complement marking  agreementmarkers,adpositions,case markers 
 c. categorical distinctions  determiners, inflections, case markers 
 
(B) Languages differ considerably in the extent to which these different 
syntactic functions are realised by functional categories. Everett (2005) claims 
that the Brazilian language Pirahã has only very limited sentential recursion, if 
any. Similarly, in some languages head/complement is indicated by strict word 
order, rather than with agreement and case marking. Finally, some languages 
show clear lexical distinctions between e.g. nouns and verbs, rather than 
marking these distinctions with functional categories. 
Thus, the syntactic processing advantages of functional categories can 
not easily be stated in terms of a single aspect of syntax. Rather, it is syntactic 
processing overall that is facilitated by functional categories. Levelt (1999: 86) 
writes: 'Syntax develops as "the poor man's semantics" for the child to 
systematize the expression of semantic roles, just as phonology is "the poor 
man's phonetics", a lean system for keeping track of the subtle infinitude of 
articulatory patterns.' In the same vein, we may suggest functional categories 
are the poor man's lexicon – that part of the lexicon involved in morpho-
syntactic patterning. Automaticity of processing is what is involved in the use 
of highly frequent markers, and automaticity of retrieval of functional elements 
from the mental lexicon. 
 
6.4.3 Claims of the linguistic fossil analysis 
Above, particularly in the work of Bickerton (1990), two or more parallel 
processing systems were postulated, available for language use: a more 
recently developed syntactic system A, and a fossil paratactic system B 
(reminiscent or a remnant of the protolanguage). The syntactic processing 
system A is assumed to use functional categories as part of the functional 
skeleton, is highly automatised, and has recursion. The primary syntactic 
structure building takes place through the selection of a specific complement 
by a specific head, like NP by D(eterminer), or VP by I(nflection). 
The paratactic processing system B uses various principles for ordering 
such as iconicity and information structure, is only partially automatised, and 
has no recursion. There are no functional categories, and there is no functional 
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skeleton. The primary syntactic structure building takes place through 
adjunction. 
Evidence for processing system A includes the lexical/functional 
asymmetries in insertional code-mixing, borrowing, Creole genesis, and mixed 
languages that I argued for in Muysken (2008). We may also refer to patterns 
of L1 development versus L2 development, and the results from speech error 
research. 
Possible evidence for system B, cited by Jackendoff and Bickerton, 
includes the possibility for paratactic speech in Foreigner Talk and other 
restricted registers, the emergence of early pidgins, the Basic Variety that 
emerges in early L2 learning (Klein and Perdue, 1997), and the possibility of 
agrammatic speech by patients with aphasia. In Muysken (2000) I discuss the 
capacities of bilinguals to create structures in alternational code mixing and the 
acquisition of complex structures in early L1 through adjunction, as examples 
of this paratactic processing capacity. 
While system B is assumed to be available as a fall-back system in the 
background, system A is dominant in actual language production for acquired 
languages, because it is more efficient, rapid, etc. It is tempting to assume that 
system B is anterior, in evolutionary terms, to system A, making pidgins etc. 
special windows on biologically earlier stages of human language. 
However, the route by which B developed into A is not clear. A first 
scenario would be that automatisation of frequently used forms would lead to 
internal restructuring and internally generated structural development, while a 
second scenario would be that another system (phonology, motor control) was 
co-opted to provide the functional skeleton. 
Also the evidence for a functional-category poor system is mainly 
indirect and of dubious value. Second language learners may fall back on non-
grammatical routines, but where they can transfer functional categories from 
their L1 they will do so. The data on the second language development of 
Dutch possessives presented by Van de Craats (2000), concerning both Turkish 
and Moroccan Arabic learners, are a case in point. To be sure, Klein and 
Perdue (1997) do not claim that the Basic Variety has no structure or functional 
categories, but rather that the settings for the values of the functional categories 
are unmarked. Similarly, pidgins may show many more features of the original 
native languages of their speakers than is sometimes assumed, and hence 
contain evidence for the functional categories of these languages. Likewise, the 
evidence from agrammatic aphasia shows that speakers have to rely on non-
syntactic strategies if their syntactic system has been impaired, rather than that 




Thus the actual evidence for the syntactic enrichment model is not as 
strong as sometimes made out to be. 
 
6.4.4 Lexical enrichment models 
The co-optation scenario, by which a non-linguistic system, e.g. the one 
involved in motor control, is co-opted to serve as the basis of a grammatical 
subsystem, could also be the basis for a lexical enrichment model. In this 
model there would be an essential discontinuity between the non-syntactic sign 
manipulation capacity of primates and human language, assumed to be a 
control system in its initial stages. However, it would be hard to imagine for 
such a system to work without a basic lexicon in place. It is also not clear that 
this lexicon would grow by itself, without the concomitant expansion of the 
syntactic system, which could become progressively more complex.  
 
6.5 Discussion: towards a co-evolution model 
The model proposed by Heine and Kuteva (2007) assumes gradual enfolding of 
the lexical system, with the emergence of more and more different categories. 
Thus the syntax and the lexicon would evolve together. A rich lexical system 
relies on a rich syntactic system as much as the other way around. 
Lexical systems, as they become richer, start showing evidence of more 
and internal structure. This structure is of a different nature, however, from that 
of syntax. Paradigmatic relationships between items (e.g. analogy and 
contrastive pairing) start playing an important role, but so do syntagmatic 
patterns, as words get longer and more complex. Carstairs-McCarthy (2005: 
183) reflects upon the evolutionary origin of morphology, following up on his 
earlier work in Carstairs-McCarthy (2000), and suggests that it involves 'a shift 
from a domain of grammar in which the syntagmatic dimension is dominant to 
one in which the paradigmatic dimension has at least equal importance.' In fact, 
some functional elements (e.g. the series anybody, anyone, anywhere, anyway) 
show complex internal structure, and some combinations of auxiliary elements 
may also be partly fixed (cf. the combination ain't or didn't (you)). 
Functional categories emerged at the interface of the syntax and the 
lexicon, as these systems became more complex, and helped structure the 
interaction between these modules. As lexical forms become part of the 
syntactic processing system, they tend to become reduced and eventually end 
up as null, but then new forms come in to take their place. Like pebbles in a 
mountain stream, the lexical elements get polished, and eventually reduce to 
sand. 
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The differences between languages with respect to the extent that the 
morpho-syntactic categories receive lexical expression reflect their histories 
and typological make up (see also Kusters, 2003), in that more isolated 




I am grateful to the editorial team for detailed comments on a previous draft. 
Some of the material in this chapter is drawn from the first and last chapters of 
Muysken (2008).   
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7. Do mouths sign? Do hands speak?: Echo phonology as a 
window on language genesis 
Bencie Woll 
University College London 
Abstract 
Although the sign languages in use today are full human languages, certain of 
the features they share with gestures have been suggested to provide 
information about possible origins of human language. These features include 
sharing common articulators with gestures, and exhibiting substantial iconicity 
in comparison to spoken languages. If human protolanguage was gestural, the 
question remains of how a highly iconic manual communication system might 
have led to the creation of a vocal communication system in which the links 
between symbol and referent are for the most part arbitrary. Posing the 
question in this way, and regarding sign languages as 'manual' ignores the rich 
and complex role played by other articulators: body, face, and, in particular, the 
mouth. 
As well as manual actions, sign languages include several types of 
mouth actions. The research reported here focuses on one subgroup: 'echo 
phonology', a repertoire of mouth actions which are characterised by 'echoing' 
on the mouth certain of the articulatory actions of the hands. 
Three different types of data (narratives in 3 European sign languages, 
code mixing in hearing British Sign Language/English bilinguals, and 
functional imaging studies) provide examples of a possible mechanism in the 
evolution of language by which the units of an iconic manual communication 
system could convert into a largely arbitrary vocal communication system.  
 
7.1 Introduction 
Since gesture systems (home sign) can appear in the absence of linguistic input 
(Goldin-Meadow, 2003), the sign languages of Deaf1 communities have 
sometimes been regarded as primitive communication systems and, the 
reasoning follows, as a precursor to spoken languages. Linguistic research over 
the past 40 years has shown that sign languages are not primitive and are in fact 
                                                  
1
 'Deaf' with an upper-case 'D' is used to refer to membership of a sign language-using 
community and includes both hearing and (audiologically) deaf individuals.  
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full natural languages with complex grammars (Stokoe, 1960; Klima and 
Bellugi, 1979; Sutton-Spence and Woll, 1999). Nevertheless it is possible that 
sign languages, being in a visual-gestural modality, have features in common 
with evolutionary precursors of spoken language. 
Although the sign languages in use today are full human languages, and 
are used by modern humans with 'language-ready' brains, certain of the features 
they share with gestures have been suggested to provide information about 
possible origins of human language. These features include sharing common 
articulators with gestures, and exhibiting substantial iconicity in comparison to 
spoken languages. This iconicity is present both in signs that represent concrete 
objects and actions, and those which represent abstract concepts. For example, 
signs in British Sign Language (BSL) referring to cognitive activities (THINK, 
UNDERSTAND, KNOW, LEARN, etc.) are generally located at the forehead, 
while signs relating to emotional activities (FEEL, INTERESTED, EXCITED, 
ANGRY) are located on the chest and abdomen. 
If human proto-language was gestural, the question remains of how a 
highly iconic manual communication system might have led to the creation of a 
vocal communication system in which the links between symbol and referent 
are for the most part arbitrary. Posing the question in this way, and regarding 
sign languages as 'manual' ignores the rich and complex role played by other 
articulators: body, face, and, in particular, the mouth. 
As well as manual actions, sign languages include several types of 
mouth actions. The research reported here focuses on one subgroup of these 
mouth actions: 'echo phonology', a repertoire of mouth actions which are not 
derived from spoken language, which form an obligatory accompaniment to 
some manual signs in a range of sign languages, and which are characterised by 
'echoing' on the mouth certain of the articulatory actions of the hands. 
Three very different types of data (narratives in 3 different European 
sign languages, anecdotal observations of hearing individuals bilingual in BSL 
and English, and functional imaging studies with deaf signers) will be 
presented. These provide examples of a possible mechanism in the evolution of 
language by which the units of an iconic manual communication system could 
convert into a largely arbitrary vocal communication system.  
 
7.2 Historical perspectives 
Many writers have suggested that human vocal language may have evolved 
from manual gestures. What is required to sustain such a claim is a plausible 
mechanism by which primarily manual actions could have transformed 




communicative gesturing as an intermediate stage) was suggested by Darwin in 
his study The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals (1872): 
 
'there are other actions [of the mouth] which are commonly performed 
under certain circumstances … and which seem to be due to imitation or 
some sort of sympathy. Thus, persons cutting anything may be seen to 
move their jaws simultaneously with the blades of the scissors. Children 
learning to write often twist about their tongues as their fingers move, in 
a ridiculous fashion' (p. 34). 
 
Henry Sweet (1888) extended this notion to encompass a transition from 
manual gesture to 'lingual gesture':  
 
'Gesture ... helped to develop the power of forming sounds while at the 
same time helping to lay the foundation of language proper. When men 
first expressed the idea of 'teeth', 'eat', 'bite', it was by pointing to their 
teeth. If the interlocutor's back was turned, a cry for attention was 
necessary which would naturally assume the form of the clearest and 
most open vowel. A sympathetic lingual gesture would then accompany 
the hand gesture which later would be dropped as superfluous so that 
ADA or more emphatically ATA would mean 'teeth' or 'tooth' and 'bite' 
or 'eat', these different meanings being only gradually differentiated' (pp. 
50-52). 
 
To Sweet, therefore, should go the credit for hypothesising as a key link 
between gesture and spoken language, the 'sympathetic lingual gesture 
accompanying a natural hand gesture'. Richard Paget (1930) attempted to find 
evidence for such a theory. Like Sweet, Paget claimed that the earliest human 
language was a language of gestures, in which actions originally made by hand 
were unconsciously copied by movements or positions of the mouth, tongue or 
lips. 
  
'Originally man expressed his ideas by gesture, but as he gesticulated 
with his hands, his tongue, lips and jaw unconsciously followed suit … 
The consequence was that when, owing to pressure of other business, the 
principal actors (the hands) retired from the stage … their understudies – 
the tongue, lips and jaw – were already proficient in the pantomimic art' 
(p. 133). 
 
He supplies a number of examples of this process: 
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'Another … example may be given, namely, in connection with the 
beckoning gesture – commonly made by extending the hand, palm up, 
drawing it inwards towards the face and at the same time bending the 
fingers inwards towards the palm. This gesture may be imitated with the 
tongue, by protruding, withdrawing, and bending up its tip as it re-enters 
the mouth.  
If this 'gesture' be blown or voiced, we get a resultant whispered or 
phonated word, like edə, eđə, or eđra … suggestive of … our English 
word 'hither' (p. 138). 
 
Paget's theory (known as the 'ta-ta' theory from the example above) was 
developed further by Swadesh (1971). He quotes another example of its 
application:  
 
'… a word like the Latin capio, I take, or English capture, whose root 
begins with a k sound and ends in the sound p, made by closing the lips. 
It has been suggested that the formation of the k sound at the back of the 
mouth, while the lips are open, is comparable to the open hand. The 
closing of the lips, then, is analogous to the fingers closing with the 
thumb as one takes hold of an object. Thus the pronunciation of the root 
capio is like the action of taking. Of course not all words are to be 
explained in this way; in fact, only a few. And yet the possibility that 
some words developed in this way is not denied by other qualities also 
evident in language' (p. 4). 
 
Paget's theory can only be validated if there is evidence for a historical 
process by which overt gestures were reflected, reproduced in miniature, in 
gestures, particularly of the tongue and lips, which were then associated with 
the production of speech-sounds. 
In the absence of any plausible mechanism for the shift from hand to 
mouth, or any historical evidence, the notion of a hand-mouth link remains as 
speculative as any other theory of language origins. One weakness of the 
approach of Paget and the others is that they all suggest that the mouth actions 
themselves share underlying imagery with the iconic manual gesture, leaving 
open the question of how a hypothesised highly iconic manual communication 
system could have led to the creation of a vocal communication system in 






7.3 Contemporary evidence 
7.3.1 Neurobiological perspectives 
Studies of neurons in the monkey brain by Rizzolatti and colleagues since 1996 
(Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese and Fogassi, 1996; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004) 
have identified 'mirror neurons', which fire when the animal observes another 
individual making specific movements (primarily for reaching and grasping). 
The mirror system, in temporal, parietal and frontal regions, is part of a system 
specialised for perceiving and understanding biological motion. Although 
research has not shown a mapping of vocalisation production onto perception 
of vocalisations, this mapping is implicit in Liberman and Mattingly's (1985) 
motor theory of speech perception, which proposes that speech is understood in 
terms of its articulation, rather than its perception. It should also be noted that 
the anatomical closeness of hand and mouth related neurons in the premotor 
cortex may relate evolutionarily to the involvement of both in common goals. 
The relationship between mouth actions related to eating, and those found in 
spoken language, have been discussed in detail by MacNeilage (1998). 
Gentilucci (2003) has shown in a series of studies that when humans 
were asked to open their mouths while grasping objects, the size of the mouth 
opening increased with the size of the grasped object. Grasping larger objects 
and bringing them to the mouth induces increases in the size of mouth opening 
and voice spectra of syllables pronounced simultaneously. Observing another 
individual grasping or bringing different sizes of objects to the mouth also 
affects the articulation of syllables.   
 
7.3.2 Gesture and speech 
A number of theorists have postulated that gesture (on its own) is the origin of 
language. McNeill (2008) provides a strong set of arguments against this 
position.  
His basic claim is that a primitive phase in which communication was by 
gesture or sign alone, could not have evolved into the kind of speech-gesture 
combinations that can be observed in modern human communication, 
suggesting that if such a phrase existed, it was not a proto-language, but a 
precursor of mimicry and pantomime. He argues that a 'gesture-first' theory: 
 
 'incorrectly predicts that speech would have supplanted gesture, and 
fails to predict that speech and gesture became a single system. It is thus 
a hypothesis about the origin of language that almost uniquely meets 
Popper's requirement of falsifiability – and is falsified, doubly so in fact' 
(McNeill, 2008:12). 
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As with the earlier writers on the subjects, Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) 
also see gesture as fading once speech has emerged: 
 
'Manual gestures progressively lost their importance, whereas, by 
contrast, vocalization acquired autonomy, until the relation between 
gestural and vocal communication inverted and gesture became purely 
an accessory factor to sound communication' (p. 193). 
 
In such models, gesture is seen as unintegrated with speech – both in 
modern human communication and in human evolution. 
Another thread in the 'supplantation of gesture by speech' argument 
relates to the advantages of speech over gesture (Corballis, 2003). McNeill, 
Duncan, Cole, Gallagher and Bertenthal (in press) have argued that speech is 
the default form of human communication because it has fewer dimensions, is 
more linear, is non-imagistic (and hence more arbitrary (with the potential for a 
larger lexicon), etc. Given this asymmetry, McNeill argues that even though 
speech and gesture were selected jointly, it would still work out that speech is 
the medium of linguistic segmentation: 
 
'Sign languages – their existence as full linguistic systems – impresses 
many as a reason for gesture-first, but in fact, historically and over the 
world, manual languages are found only when speech is unavailable; the 
discrete semiotic then transferring to the hands. As we shall see later, this 
transfer takes place automatically. So it is not that gesture is incapable of 
carrying a linguistic semiotic, it is that speech (to visually disposed 
creatures) does not carry the imagery semiotic' (p. 13). 
 
7.4 Hands and mouth in sign language 
7.4.1 Mouth actions and other non-manual articulators 
As mentioned above, sign languages of the deaf offer a unique perspective on 
language, since they embody the structural and communicative properties of 
spoken language, while existing entirely within a wholly visual-gestural 
medium. Among other insights, they enable investigators to clarify the core 
components of language in distinction to those that reflect input or action 
characteristics of the language system. This difference is reflected in the 
articulators on which languages in the two modes rely. Sign languages make 
use of non-manual articulators, including actions of the head, face and trunk 
(e.g., Liddell, 1978; Sutton-Spence and Woll, 1999). Within the face, eye 




actions (raise/lower) play important roles in sign language communication 
(Crasborn, 2006). In addition, although sign languages are unrelated to the 
spoken languages used in the surrounding hearing community, sign languages 
do borrow elements from spoken language (Sutton-Spence and Woll, 1999). 
Other mouth actions (mouth gestures) are unrelated to spoken languages (see 
figure 7.1 below). 
 
 
Non-manual actions in sign languages
(after Woll, 2001)
Mouth actions Eyes, brows, head, body...
Mouthings
derived from spoken language
Mouth gestures






Figure 7.1: Mouth actions in sign language 
 
7.4.1.1 Mouthings. Sign languages can borrow mouth actions from spoken 
words – speech-like actions accompanying manual signs than can disambiguate 
manually homonymous forms. These are considered to be borrowings, rather 
than contact forms reflecting bilingualism in a spoken and signed language, 
since there is evidence that signers can learn these without knowing the source 
spoken language. These can disambiguate signs with similar or identical 
manual forms. For example, the BSL signs, ASIAN and BLUE, are manually 
identical (see figure 5.7c). To distinguish which meaning is meant, mouthings 
are incorporated, derived from the mouth actions used when speaking the 
words 'Asian' or 'blue'. 
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7.4.1.2 Adverbials are arrangements of the mouth which are used to signal 
manner and degree (e.g. to indicate that an action is performed with difficulty 
or with ease; to indicate if an object is very small or very large, etc.). 
7.4.1.3 In Enaction (sometimes called mouth-for-mouth), the action performed 
by the mouth represents that action directly (e.g. in CHEW, the mouth 
performs a 'chewing' action, while the sign is articulated on the hands). 
 
7.4.2 Echo Phonology 
The term Echo Phonology (Woll and Sieratzki, 1998) is used for a class of 
mouth actions that are obligatory in the citation forms of lexical signs. In the 
BSL sign TRUE (see figure 7.5d below), the upper hand moves downwards to 
contact the lower hand, and this action is accompanied by mouth closure, 
synchronised with the hand contact. This type of non-speech-like mouth 
gesture has been termed 'echo phonology' (EP), since the mouth action is 
considered secondary to that of the hands (Woll and Sieratzki, 1996; Woll, 
2001). That is, the mouth gesture 'follows' the hand actions in terms of onset 
and offset, dynamic characteristics (speed and acceleration) and direction and 
type of movement (opening, closing, or internal movement). Thus, these 
gestures illustrate a condition where 'the hands are the head of the mouth' 
(Boyes-Braem and Sutton-Spence, 2001). EP mouth gestures are not derived 
from or influenced by the forms of spoken words borrowed into sign; rather, 
they are an obligatory, intrinsic component of this subgroup of signs, their 
patterning presumably constrained by common motor control mechanisms for 
hands and mouth (Woll, 2001). The signs in which they are found require the 
presence of the mouth gesture to be well-formed, and mouth action includes 
some movement: either the exhalation or inhalation of breath, or a change in 
mouth configuration during the articulation of the sign: for example, EXIST 
(wiggling of fingers, no path movement, accompanied by [∫∫]); TRUE (active 
hand makes abrupt contact with palm of passive hand, accompanied by [am] – 
see figure 7.5d below); DISAPPEAR (spread hands close to 'flat O' shape, 
accompanied by [θp]). 
The essential dependence of the mouthing on the articulatory features of 
the manual movement can be seen in three BSL signs all meaning 'succeed' or 
'win'. Three different oral patterns of mouthing co-occur with these signs, and 
one cannot be substituted for the other. 
In SUCCEED, the thumbs are initially in contact, but move apart 
abruptly as the mouth articulates [pa]. In WIN, the hand rotates at the wrist 
repeatedly as the mouth articulates [hy]; and in WON, the hand closes to a flat 
O, while the mouth articulates [∧p]. Most importantly, the action of the mouth 




iconic. Sweet, Paget and the other early writers cited above postulated that 
iconicity in the mouth gesture itself was the source of spoken words. However, 
it is difficult to see how a mouth gesture on its own could iconically express the 
semantic notion of 'succeed' or 'true'. Echo phonology illustrates a mechanism 
by which abstract concepts, which can be represented by iconic manual 
gestures, can be attached to abstract mouth gestures.  
 
7.5 Echo Phonology in different sign languages 
In a study comparing narratives in three sign languages 
(http://www.let.ru.nl/sign-lang/echo/index.html), the occurrence of echo 
phonology was compared with other types of mouth action. The chart below 
shows the percentage of signs accompanied by mouth actions other than 
mouthings, in narratives of Aesop's fables. Although there is variability across 
the data for two signers of each of the three sign languages (Swedish, British, 
Netherlands) echo phonology is found in all three (figure 7.2) (van der Kooij, 



















Figure 7.2: Echo phonology in 3 sign languages 
 
7.6 Evidence from bilinguals 
Sign and speech are frequently mixed in bilingual signers (both deaf and 
hearing. Because these languages occur in different modalities (bimodal 
bilingualism), a unique type of mixing can take place: code blending, where 
elements from a spoken language appear simultaneously with elements of a 
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sign language. Either language can serve as the base language, and the 
elements can either be overlapping or identical. Van den Bogaerde provides 
many examples in the language of deaf mothers to their children. In the first 
example below, Dutch is the base language, and one of the spoken words is 
accompanied by a sign with the same meaning. In the second example, Dutch 
Sign Language is the base language, and one of the signs is accompanied by a 
word with the same meaning: 
 
1. Signed VALLEN 
Spoken die gaat vallen 
English gloss that goes  fall 
Translation That [doll] is going to fall 
 
2. Signed INDEXhij JAS BLAUW 
Spoken blauw 
English gloss INDEXhe COAT BLUE 
Translation He has a blue coat 
 
However, in mixed code blending, each language contributes 
complementary information in simultaneous constructions. In Example 3, the 
signed and spoken elements (POP + geel) combine to form a single phrase: 
 
3. Signed POP SPELEN 
Spoken geel 
English gloss DOLL PLAY 
 yellow 
Translation (I want) to play with the yellow doll 
 
Strikingly, there are no examples in van den Bogaerde's corpus study of 
any sequential code switching or mixing, although this is the norm for 
unimodal bilinguals. However, anecdotal observations from conversations 
between hearing people with deaf parents (bilinguals native in both BSL and 
English) indicate that some of the mouth gestures found in signs with echo 
phonology can appear (with voicing) as code mixing with English in the 
absence of production of any manual signs.  
Examples include: 
 
1. A: 'Have you done that poster?' 
B: '[ʃʃʃ] (NOT-YET), I'll do it tomorrow' 




3.  'I couldn't get a straight answer from anyone. It was completely 
[pıpıpıp]' (VARIED/inconsistent) 
 
These examples are suggestive of a possible leap from mouth gestures 
accompanying signs to a situation where mouth gestures appear to have 
independent existence as lexical items. Further research is necessary to explore 
whether these forms are more similar to vocal gestures or to words. In either 
case they demonstrate that echo phonological elements can occur within 
speech.  
 
7.7 Functional imaging study 
Despite the differences in the modality of the perceived signal, the neural 
organisation of language processing is remarkably similar for sign and for 
speech. Studies of patients with brain lesions reliably show that sign language 
processing is supported by perisylvian regions of the left hemisphere (e.g., 
Atkinson, Marshall, Woll and Thacker, 2005). Neuroimaging studies show 
similar patterns of activation for processing sign language and spoken language 
when acquired as native languages by deaf people and hearing people, 
respectively. In particular, sign language processing elicits activation in the 
superior temporal plane and posterior portions of the superior temporal gyrus 
and left inferior frontal cortex including Broca's area (BA 44/45) (MacSweeney 
et al., 2002; Neville et al., 1998; Petitto et al., 2000), just as for spoken 
language (Capek, Bavelier, Corina, Newman, Jezzard et al., 2004; 
MacSweeney et al., 2002) 
Speech and sign, however, do not appear to rely on identical brain 
networks. In a study directly contrasting BSL (deaf native signers) and audio-
visual English (hearing monolingual speakers), MacSweeney and colleagues 
(2002) did not find any laterality differences between the languages. However, 
MacSweeney and colleagues (2002) did find differences between sign language 
and audio-visual speech, which they attributed to the modality of the input 
rather than to linguistic processes. Regions which showed more activation for 
sign than audiovisual speech included the middle occipital gyri, bilaterally, and 
the left inferior parietal lobule (BA 40). In contrast, audio-visual English 
sentences elicited greater activation in superior temporal regions than signed 
sentences.  
With these considerations in mind, a study (Capek et al., 2008) explored 
the following conditions in which lists of single items were presented to deaf 
native signers in the fMRI scanner: (1) silent speechreading of English (SS); 
(2) BSL signs with no mouth action (hands only – HO); (3) BSL signs with 
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mouthings (disambiguating mouth – DM) and (4) BSL signs with mouth 
gestures (echo phonology – EP). 
The stimuli were designed to vary on the dimensions of presence or 
absence of mouth opening/closing; presence or absence of hand and arm 
movements; and presence or absence of English-based mouth actions (figure 
7.3). 
 









No mouth (HO) 
- + - 
Phonology (EP) + + - 
Disambiguating mouth (DM) + + + 
Silent speech (SS) + - + 
Figure 7.3: Characteristics of stimuli 
 
Stimuli consisted of single words/signs, examples of which are given in 
figure 7.4. The list of silently spoken words was based on English translations 
of the signs below (figure 7.4).  
 
EP DM HO 
EXIST [] FINLAND/METAL TABLE 
WIN [hy] BATTERY/AUNT CHERRY 
NONE [pu] WOOD/PROBLEM BUTTER 
SUCCESS [pa] RUSSIA/BOY KNOW 
END [pəm] ITALY/WIN FAX 










Figure 7.5 shows examples of each of the stimuli types: 
 
 
Figure 7.5: Illustrations of stimuli 
7.5a. SS. Silent articulation of the English word “football”. The fricative (/f/)( 
‘foot..’), and the semi-open vowel /:/ (‘..ball’)  are clearly visible 
7.5b. HO. The BSL sign ILL  
7.5c. DM. The BSL sign ASIAN shows the mouthing of /e/  and //. The face 
insets show the corresponding parts of the mouthings for the manual 
homonym BLUE, where /b/ and /u:/ can be seen 
7.5d. EP. The manual sequence for [TRUE] requires abrupt movement from 
an open to a closed contact gesture. As this occurs, the mouth closes 
abruptly. 
 
This experiment was designed to address a number of specific questions: 
to what extent does the pattern of activation between speech perception and 
sign language perception differ?; does the processing of mouthings (DM) differ 
compared to signs without mouth action (HO)?; does echo phonology (EP) 
generate distinctive activation compared with mouthings (DM)?; How do non-
signers differ from signers? 
216 Echo phonology as window on language genesis 
 
Thirteen (6 female; mean age 27.4; age range: 18-49) right handed 
participants were tested. Volunteers were congenitally, severely or profoundly 
deaf native signers, having acquired BSL from their deaf parents. Stimuli were 
presented in alternating blocks of each of the experimental and a baseline 
condition. Participants were instructed to understand the signs and words and 
they performed a target-detection task in all conditions, to encourage lexical 
processing. During the experimental conditions, participants were directed to 
make a push-button response whenever the stimulus item contained the 
meaning 'yes'. This 'yes' target was presented in an appropriate form across all 
4 conditions, specifically: as an English word with no manual component in the 
SS condition, as a BSL sign with no mouth action (but BSL-appropriate facial 
affect) in the HO condition, as a BSL sign with an English mouth pattern in the 
DM condition and as a BSL sign with a motoric mouth echo in the EP 
condition. Full details of the experimental protocol and analysis may be found 
in Capek et al. (2008). 
 
7.7.1 To what extent does the pattern of activation for speech perception and 
sign language perception differ? 
7.7.1.1 Speechreading (SS) 
The major area of activation was perisylvian (superior temporal and inferior 
frontal), with somewhat more extensive activation on the left than the right. 
These findings conform with other recent studies. They confirm that silent 
speech can activate regions in deaf people's brains that have been identified as 







Figure 7.6: Brain activation 
7.6a (top left) activation during silent speechreading (SS) 
7.6b (top right) activation during processing of signs without any mouth actions 
(HO) 
7.6c (bottom left) activation during processing of signs with disambiguating 
mouth actions (DM) 
7.6d (bottom right) activation during processing of signs with echo phonology 
(EP) 
 
7.7.1.2 Sign language (HO, DM, EP) 
In all three sign language conditions, there is also activation in 
perisylvian regions. It affirms that sign language in Deaf native signers 
activates core language regions that are typically found when hearing people 
listen to speech. Although both sign language and speech involve perisylvian 
regions, sign language perception activated more posterior and inferior regions. 
For this analysis, silent speechreading is compared with the 3 sign conditions 
(figure 7.7) 
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Figure 7.7: Silent speech (light grey) vs. Signs (EP, DM & HO) (dark grey) 
 
7.7.2 Does the perception of signs with mouthings (DM) differ from signs 
with no mouth (HO)? 
If language (speech vs. sign) is the crucial reason for the more posterior 
activation found in BSL perception, then signs with disambiguating mouth and 
signs without mouth should be processed identically. On the other hand, if the 
articulators used determine the areas of activation, then DM and HO signs 
should differ, with more posterior activation for the NM signs. The data 
support the first alternative: anterior activation characterised DM and posterior 
activation HO (figure 7.8). There was greater activation for signs with mouth 
actions in superior temporal sulci of both hemispheres; additional activation in 
the left inferior frontal gyrus; and HO signs activated more right posterior 
temporo-occipital regions. These may be particularly important for the 
perception of hand actions. These findings are very similar to those exploring 
distinctive patterns of activation consequent on observation of hand and mouth 






Figure 7.8: Signs with mouth actions (DM & EP) (light grey) vs. HO signs 
(dark grey) 
 
7.7.3 Does echo phonology (EP) generate distinctive activation compared 
with other mouthings (DM)? 
The contrast between the condition that used DM and the one that used EP 
provides further insight into the cortical correlates associated with observing 
specific articulators within sign language. Here the pattern differed. DM 
generated relatively greater activation in a circumscribed region of the left 
middle and posterior portions of the superior temporal gyrus, while EP 
produced relatively greater posterior activation. This can be considered to 
reflect the fact that DM is more 'speech-like' than EP. Thus EP appears to 
occupy an intermediate position between signs without mouth and signs with 
mouth actions derived from spoken language (figure 7.9). 
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Figure 7.9: DM (light grey) vs. EP signs (dark grey) 
 
These findings suggest a strong conclusion concerning brain 
organisation for the perception of sign language. The task required participants 
to process material linguistically. In order to achieve lexical processing, BSL 
users must integrate perceptual processing hands and of face/head, and this 
needs to be achieved fluently and automatically. If the cortical circuitry for sign 
language processing were driven by a mechanism that is 'articulation-blind', we 
would expect there to be no systematic differential activation between, for 
example, signs with mouthings (where the mouth information is non-
redundant), signs without mouthing (where there is no mouth information or 
signs with echo phonology, where the information on the mouth is redundant. 
Yet the contrasts analysed here suggest this is not the case. It appears that 
mouth actions, when they are a required component of the sign, differentially 
activate a circumscribed region within the middle and posterior portions of the 
superior temporal gyrus. More generally, there is a strong similarity between 
the patterns of distinctive activation for mouth actions and for hand actions. 
This suggests that when the language processor is engaged, it requires ongoing 
access to visual information about the articulators that deliver information to it, 
and that this information can be distinguished in terms of relative cortical 
location. The core language processes themselves, appear to be similarly 









One issue for those concerned with suggesting a link between gesture and word 
has always been how the largely visually-motivated gestures could have been 
transformed into the largely arbitrary words of spoken language. Echo 
phonology provides evidence for a possible mechanism. Firstly, the 
phenomenon appears to be fairly common across different sign languages 
(although the occurrence of echo phonology needs to be researched in non-
European sign languages). Secondly, the oral activities in echo phonology are 
themselves non-visually motivated. It is impossible to reconstruct from a 
syllable such as [ʃ] the meaning 'exist', although the manual activities can be 
interpreted as visually representing the marking of an area in space. Thirdly, 
the actual inventory of elements in echo phonology looks very much like a 
system of maximal contrasts in a spoken language phonology (although there 
are some limitations because of the absence of sound contrasts). Fourthly, 
functional imaging research on the representation of signs and words in the 
brain suggests that echo phonology occupies an interesting intermediate 
position.  
This paper represents only a very preliminary exploration of echo 
phonology. However, the data lead us to a number of conclusions. They 
support the arguments of those who argue against the notion that a unimodal 
manual protolanguage preceded the evolution of spoken language, since they 
demonstrate the extent to which signs are combined with mouth actions. The 
data also provide a window onto a mechanism by which the arbitrary pairing of 
a referent with a symbol (Saussure's defining feature of spoken language) could 
have occurred. Further research is needed to explore the presence of echo 
phonology in other sign languages (including those with a more recent point of 
creation than BSL) and whether echo phonology is subject to change (for 
example, added or transformed in a process of sign conventionalization). These 
studies may provide more insights into the origins of phonological/lexical 
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